

HISTORY JOURNAL

EDITION IV

Table of Contents

Page

<u>Pre-1900</u>	1
Shah Aurangzeb's policies & the decline of the Mughal Empire.....	2
Napoleon's overconfidence in Russia.....	5
The Iron Chancellor.....	7
America's Expedition in Japan.....	10
<u>1900-1940</u>	13
Premier's Anzac Spirit School Prize.....	14
Leninist policy in reaching the Bolshevik aims of female emancipation.....	19
Was the Tokyo cabinet responsible for the outbreak of the Mukden Incident?.....	22
<u>1940-1950</u>	25
Were Truman's motive to save lives justified in the Atomic Bombing of Japan?.....	26
Was the mobilisation of civilians critical to victory in the Second World War?.....	27
The Nazi's use of force to obtain power.....	29
<u>1950-1970</u>	31
British colonial economic contribution to the Sri Lankan 'golden years'.....	32
The Sciences and the Humanities; enemies, just friends, or lovers?.....	35
<u>1950-2000</u>	38
The Israeli government's strikes on Egyptian airfields.....	39
Dr John Jenkin, a personal reflection.....	42
FACT VS FICTION, Hamilton vs Bohemian Rhapsody.....	43
Serbian Nationalism and the outbreak of the Yugoslav Wars.....	45
<u>Book Reviews</u>	48
Hannibal: A Hellenistic Life.....	49
Hitler Vol I: Ascent & Hitler Vol II: Downfall.....	50
On the Trail of Genghis Khan by Tim Cope.....	52
<u>References</u>	53

Foreword

2020 will be remembered as the year of the COVID-19 pandemic, which has had a massive impact throughout the world. As well as the health and mortality implications, we have seen economic, social and political consequences on an unprecedented scale.

This has emphasised the complex integration of effects and influences which make up our history, from the individual perspective through to the global stage. We are currently living a major world event, which will influence all of us for a long time to come. Moreover, we can expect that the year of the COVID-19 pandemic will figure prominently in future history.

This year's History Journal theme - Documenting the Decades - highlights key events from previous decades at a time when we are very conscious of the impact of current events on our futures. I congratulate each of the contributors on providing your historical perspective on some of these events.

I am delighted that the History Journal has become an annual fixture in the academic life of Prince Alfred College. I commend our History Coordinator Mr Ron Pippett, Editor Liam Hindshaw, and all those involved on another outstanding publication.

Bradley Fenner,

Headmaster

Chairman's Foreword

This year, perhaps more than any other in recent memory, has truly been historic – holding so many moments that will shape our future for years to come. From the COVID-19 pandemic to the tragic killing of George Floyd, we are part of a forever changing world.

As Martin Luther King Jr once said, “we are not makers of history – we are made by history”. It is in this light that we should seek to understand what has gone before and appreciate its significance to our world today. A group of enthusiastic historians have set out to do just this through the production of the colleges' History Journal. This year, our Committee have set out to understand history through the theme of “Documenting the Decades”, with the Committee writing articles highlighting key events from various decades. This year's edition has benefitted greatly from the contribution of the College Community with students, staff and old scholars providing articles that have enriched this year's Journal.

In these unique and unprecedented times, it is even more important to become involved in documenting history. This year's edition is the largest to date, and perhaps the most important, presenting the opportunity to understand and appreciate our history.

Liam Hindshaw,

Chairman of the History Journal 2020



PRE-1900

To what extent were Shah Aurangzeb's policies from 1658 to 1707, the main factor in the decline of the Mughal Empire?

Liam Hindshaw, Student

Introduction

During the reign of Shah Aurangzeb from 1658 to 1708 the Mughal empire reached its territorial peak with the Mughal Empire being seen as the jewel of Asia with the empire's economy in 1700 being the largest in the world comprising 24% of the world's GDP. However, throughout his reign Aurangzeb reversed the tolerant policies of Shah Akbar the Great (1556-1605) and instead pursued policies that sought to disenfranchise the majority Hindu population to fully establish sharia and to finance his conquests in the Deccan region. Aurangzeb reinstated the Jizyah tax on non-Muslims and started a campaign of Hindu temple destruction that created the discontent needed for rebellions of the Rajputs, Sikhs and Marathas that greatly destabilised the Empire. Furthermore, Aurangzeb's desire for conquest in the Deccan saw the conquest of Bajpur and Golconda that overextended the empire. The prolonged wars in the Deccan brought the depletion of the royal treasury and the loss of Mughal military prestige, which combined with Aurangzeb's absence from the capital for the majority of his reign saw the loss of the Empire's centralised structure causing regions such as Bengal to assert their independence. However, some historians such as Irfan Habib contend that the decline of the Empire was brought about by the failings of the Agrarian tax system caused by a shortage in land grants and rival landowners leading to crippling tax rates upon the peasants. While the endemic nature of the Agrarian system is valid, Aurangzeb furthered the crisis by implementing a land grant policy whereby all new land taken in the Deccan wars would be incorporated into the royal treasury to finance the war rather than being allocated to the landowning class. This policy brought the furtherment of the shortage causing increased taxation and peasant revolts across the empire leading to the disintegration of the Agrarian structure that upheld the Empire. Therefore, Aurangzeb's policies were to a sig-

nificant extent responsible for causing the decline of the Mughal Empire through his discriminatory religious policies and misguided conquests that caused mass discontent, loss of imperial authority and revolts that saw the structure of the empire collapse leading to the decline of the Empire.

Aurangzeb's Policies

Shah Aurangzeb's discriminatory religious policies were an essential factor in the decline of the Mughal Empire as they created discontent in the majority Hindu population that weakened the structure of the Mughal Empire. Historian Sir Jadunath Sarkar states that the effect of Aurangzeb's reign was to "goad the Hindus into constant revolt and disturbances, but also to make them deteriorate in intellect, organisation and economic resources" (Sarkar, 1924, p.282). There is clear evidence to support Sarkar's view of Aurangzeb's religious intolerance with his reinstatement of the Jizyah poll tax on non-Muslims in 1679. The tax for poor Hindus was levied at 6% and only levied at 2.5% for wealthy Hindus (Musta'idd, 2008, p.94). This shows Aurangzeb's targeted policy to create a class divide to weaken Hindus and coerce them to convert to Islam to avoid the tax. Consequently, this created discontent in the Hindu populace, especially the urban masses and growing merchant class. This is evident with demonstrations across the Empire and protestors outside the Red Fort being crushed by Aurangzeb's elephants (Chandra, 1969, p.12). In levying the jizyah, Aurangzeb was "deaf to the pleadings of pity and political expediency alike" (Sarkar, 1924, p.95). This sentiment is seen when Aurangzeb vetoed his General's proposal to suspend the jizyah, leading to Hindu merchants fleeing the Deccan causing a scarcity of grain in the imperial army's camp. Clearly, Aurangzeb was responsible for this policy that sought to disenfranchise and convert the Hindu population leading to significant discontent and climate of revolt that was to spark the Empire's decline.

Further, in 1669 Aurangzeb issued an edict for the destruction of all "infidel" Hindu schools and temples (Wolpert, 2009 p.194). In one year from 1679-80, 66

temples were destroyed in Amber alone with his hand falling "...upon the temples that commanded the veneration of the Hindus all over India" (Sarkar, 1924, p.395). This policy marked the complete reversal of Shah Akbar's liberalism that afforded the Empire the loyalty of the Hindus, who now instead "prayed for his death" (Durant, 1935, p.204). Aurangzeb's policies of the jizyah and temple destruction created the discontent that laid the foundation for rebellions of the Jats in 1669 which was a "Hindu reaction" to Aurangzeb's policies (Sarkar, 1924, p.246). While the rebellion was a failure with 20,000 Jat rebels killed, this revolt, so close to the capital, proved the disunity of the Empire which led to the inspiration for further rebellions of the Sikhs in 1699 that undoubtedly caused declines in the Empire's economic and military strength (Chandra, 1969, p.13). Sarkar's notion that Aurangzeb's religious policies would lead to "constant revolt" and disenfranchisement is supported. Clearly, Aurangzeb's religious policies ultimately caused a rise in Hindu nationalism and regionalism, leading to the destabilisation of the Mughal Empire.

Another critical aspect of Aurangzeb's policies were the wars in the Deccan against Bajpur, Golconda and the Marathas from 1680 to 1707 which caused the depletion of the Empire's treasury and military destruction, leading to the loss of Mughal prestige and sustainable power. As Sarkar states "The Spanish ulcer ruined Napoleon and the Deccan ulcer ruined Aurangzeb" (Sarkar, 1924, p.231). This effect is seen with the siege of Jinji in 1690, lasting eight years, causing the exhaustion of Mughal resources in the region with the loss of 13,000 troops (Richards, 1976, p.18). The reputation of the Mughal forces was destroyed with many generals now advising Aurangzeb to discontinue the war. However, he refused, as Mannucci a Mughal courtier stated, "Aurangzeb feels forced to continue the war against Shivaji" (Mannucci, 1981, p.144). When Mughal forces had marched eastward into Hyderabad, it became clear that after 24 years of constant war, Aurangzeb had not succeeded in annexing the Maratha State. The wars had disastrous consequences for the Empire being classified as a "Pyrrhic Victory" with the loss of over 2.5 million Mughal troops (Wolpert, 2009, p.384). This loss completely disintegrated the Mughal military force making the Empire powerless to repel revolts

and rival kingdoms. The lands of Golconda and Bajpur were also destroyed due to troop movements causing famine, leading to 2 million civilian deaths (Richards, 1976, p.20). This destruction created mass discontent for Mughal rule leading to the formation of regional opposition groups and complete loss of power in the south.

Furthermore, the Royal Treasury became drained, and due to Aurangzeb's absence from the capital for 26 years, the central structure of the Mughal Empire collapsed. Evident with Bengal not providing its Jagir for the first time (Ali, 1997, p.45). This lack of authority led to further rebellions of the Jats and Rajput's with a war of succession ensuing between Aurangzeb's sons dividing resources and creating a state of anarchy in which Hyderabad, Oudh and Bengal asserted their independence in 1717 thus disintegrating the Empire (Chandra, 2001, p.174). Therefore, the wars in the Deccan proved to be Aurangzeb's "ulcer" leading to the depletion of the treasury and destruction of its military, rendering the Empire powerless to a state of anarchy that saw the empire fragment and decline.

Agrarian crisis

Nevertheless, while Aurangzeb's religious and military policies brought the dissolution of the Empire, some consideration should be given to the Marxist view that socio-economic factors via excessive agrarian taxation leading to revolts and degradation of the Empire played an important role in the Mughal decline. Irfan Habib (2014, p.282) classifies this as an "agrarian crisis" caused by a shortage in Jagirs (land grants) given to Jagirdars (ruling class) who raised taxation upon Zamindars (landlords) and khud khasts (peasants) causing the collapse of the Jagirdari system that was the foundation of Mughal power. This shortage of wealthy land grants was evident as 61% of the Empire's agrarian revenue was controlled by only 5% of the Jagirdars (Gupta, 1993, p.14). Due to rising military expenses and increased price level caused by Eu-

ropean luxury goods, the Jagirdars raised exploitative taxation with no interest in the longevity of the land due to the 4-year ownership limit (Habib, 2014, p.106). This taxation appropriated the surplus of the khud khast, creating significant discontent. As Habib states, the Jagirdar's need for money encouraged him to "sanction any act of oppression... even if it ruined the peasantry" (Habib, 2014, p.129). This is seen as khud khasts left the land due to the taxation causing Zamindars to lead revolts and withhold revenue payments (Gupta, 1993, p.21). These agrarian uprisings, especially in Moradabad and Awadh in 1722 weakened the Empire's foundations with the formation of regional groupings causing Mughal authority to be stripped away.

However, Habib's view of an "agrarian crisis" does not account for the complexities of social transformation that paved the way for regionalism. Agricultural production was increasing allowing zamindars to be "strong enough to rise against the Mughals, asking for a greater share in political power and produce in the area under their control" (Alam, 1986, p.205) causing a shift in the configurations of social power with the accumulation of surplus resources. Therefore, the decline of the Empire was not solely due to the decline in the economy; instead, it was a redistribution of resources and growing regionalism that allowed the zamindars to become more powerful, thus weakening the centralised Empire.

Furthermore, the agrarian crisis was an "artificially created problem" (Richards, 1990, p.637) with Habib failing to recognise the critical role of Aurangzeb's land allocation policies in initiating the crisis. The role of Aurangzeb's policies is evident with his attempts to assimilate nobles from Bajpur and Golconda during the Deccan wars increasing the demand for jagirs, furthering the shortage (Subramanian, 2010, 35). The crisis could have been solved if Aurangzeb assigned the lands, which provided a 23% revenue increase to the Jagirdars. However, under a deliberate policy to finance the war, Aurangzeb retained the revenues incorporating them into the khalisa (imperial treasury), which remained without reassignment for extended periods (Richards, 1990, p.638). Therefore the "agrarian crisis" was mostly artificial as the shortage in Jagirs was directly influenced by Shah Aurangzeb's misguided poli-

cies further leading to the collapse of central authority and the Empire's decline.

Conclusion

Aurangzeb, through his religious intolerance and misguided conquests, was directly responsible for the decline of the Empire. Through his religious policies and wars in the Deccan, he created mass discontent in the Empire, promoting Hindu nationalism causing increased regionalism and the destruction of both the Empires central political and military structure leading to the Empires decline. Also, while the Agrarian crisis was endemic, Aurangzeb brought the furtherment of the crisis through his land grant policies furthering the Empires disintegration. Therefore, Aurangzeb's policies were, to a large extent, responsible for the decline of the Mughal Empire.

To what extent was Napoleon's overconfidence the catalyst for his defeat in Russia in 1812?

James Newman, Student

Napoleon's overconfidence was to a large extent responsible for his defeat in his infamous Russian campaign in 1812. This overconfidence led to poor strategic decisions such as the decision to attack Moscow instead of chasing the tsar and a misplaced belief that his weak supply lines would last throughout the war effort. However, the negative effects of his overconfidence were exacerbated by the superior Russian tactics that were employed successfully by the General Mikhail Kutuzov. These tactical decisions included the scorched earth policy and the choice of defensive position. Overall, although it was a combination of these factors, Napoleon's overconfidence was the instigator in his defeat.

The Battle of Borodino, which was fought on the 7th of September 1812, was a tactical mistake made by Napoleon as a result of his overconfidence. Prior to the battle, Napoleon made the fatal mistake of choosing to drive his army towards Moscow instead of chasing the Tsar which would've resulted in a victory (Barton, 1925). Napoleon decided to pursue pride over reason, caused by his overconfident belief in his armies' ability to defeat the Russians. (Sommerville, 1999). The battle exhausted the French troops who had battled throughout Europe in the prior years in an attempt to complete their European conquest. Exhaustion came quickly in the Russian campaign because it was an addition to the already gruelling European campaign (Lefebvre, 1939). Napoleon's successful conquest meant that his army had moved throughout Europe in the preceding years prior to the invasion of Russia, which was a massive factor in their exhaustion levels. (Lefebvre, 1939) The French were the most dominant force in Europe, as they had been for the past ten years during which they had won three of the Napoleonic Wars. The first of these wars was fought between 1803 and 1806 throughout central Europe and Italy (Bodart, 1916). This war was very successful as in three months, the French had occupied

Vienna, decimated two armies, and humbled the Austrian Empire (Bodart, 1916). The second war was a shorter war that was fought against Russia and Britain however this war ended with France making peace with Russia (Clodfelter, 2002). However, despite the Russians making peace with the French, Britain remained at war with France. (Clodfelter, 2002) The third war was a mainly western European war as Russia had, as previously mentioned, made its peace with France by this point. This war was the shortest yet, being only 6 months in length, compared to the three years of the first war (Clodfelter, 2002). Hence showing that the army was exhausted by the time they reached Russia and the decision to battle the Russians at Borodino was a strategic one made by Napoleon's overconfidence.

Napoleon's overconfidence was the main reason why the Battle of Borodino became a disaster. Historian Theodore Dodge recognises this when he reveals that Napoleon wrote to General Francis that 'I assume the losses of the enemy to be forty or fifty thousand men ... I lost eight or ten thousand killed or wounded ... and made a great number of prisoners.' (1904) This figure was inaccurate as there was in fact, over 30,000 French casualties and over 40,000 Russian casualties (Sommerville, 1999), thus showing Napoleon's overconfidence due to the fact that he held his army in such a high regard that he believed they had the ability to decimate the opposition forces whilst maintaining a large portion of their army. Historian Dominic Lieven concurs with this view as he believes that in the first weeks of Napoleon's campaign, Napoleon underestimated the size of Tormasov's army. (2017) Napoleon's overconfidence was again seen to plague the campaign due to the inability to listen to his advisors as he believed that he would lead the French to victory. He was advised to follow the Tsar as it would have resulted in victory however, his overconfidence meant that he ignored the advice and instead decided to push the army towards Moscow and capture the capital. (Barton, 1925) This defeat shows Napoleon's overconfidence in his army and *his* plans which began the decline of the Russian campaign. Overall, despite the fact that the Battle of Borodino resulted in a draw with the Russians engaging in a tactical retreat it marked the begin-

ning of Napoleon's defeat within Russia and it was due to his overconfidence.

The tactics employed by the Russians emphasized Napoleon's tactical blunders which were a result of Napoleon's overconfidence. The tactics resulted in the defeat of Napoleon throughout his Russian campaign. (Lefebvre, 1939) These tactics were led by the new commander in chief of the Russian army, General Mikhail Kutuzov, who was known to be a tough and cunning leader and he took control of the Russian army before the battle of Borodino. (Sommerville, 1999) Kutuzov masterminded many strategies including the scorched earth policy and he was instrumental in the Russians defence of Borodino. The Russians position at Borodino was described as being a very well defended position which was protected by a river, a number of ravines and woods on one flank. (Sommerville, 1999) A position which would allow the Russians the upper hand when conflict was fought between the two armies. After the battle, the Russians policy of scorched earth countered Napoleon's strategy of living off of the land. (David, 2012) This mistake made by Napoleon allowing General Kutuzov was born out of his sense of overconfidence and this halted Napoleon's march across Europe. (Lefebvre, 1939) This poor use of strategy by Napoleon was exacerbated by the relative tactical genius employed by General Kutuzov who is recognised to have brilliantly repelled Napoleon's invasion of Russia. (Kushchayev, 2020) This exacerbation by General Kutuzov led to Napoleon's defeat within his Russian campaign as a result of Napoleon's overconfidence.

Napoleon's overconfidence in his army's ability to succeed within their Russian campaign meant that there was a lack of planning and this hindered the French supply lines. This forced the French commanders began to send out Army units to find supplies within the fields of Russia however this was countered by the Russian policy of scorched earth. (Rose, 2005) The fact that the French were prevented from living off of the land meant that their food supply was limited so that the soldiers were only getting half a pound of bread a day, and there was no more meat. (Lefebvre, 1939) This limited food supply severely restricted the French army on their march through Russia due to the fact that there was no food to be found within Russia at

the time, due to the scorched earth policy.

The scorched earth policy, implemented by the Russian army, in combination with the Russian winter prevented Napoleon's army from succeeding during this campaign as these two factors plagued their ability to fuel the army. The policy of scorched earth led by General Mikhail Kutuzov was a key reason as to why the French attack failed. (Sommerville, 1999) As Historian George Lefebvre states that 'The French army was dwindling at a frightening rate ... due to hunger'. (1939) This came about due to the policy of scorched earth which was a policy that meant burning all the food, crop fields, and shelter and leaving the French to survive in the winter. (Lefebvre, 1939) The result of this meant that the French were having a hard task of going through Russian without Shelter or food in the winter. (Sommerville, 1999) Historian Anthony Kuhn recognises how brutal this was for Napoleon's army as he believes that Napoleon's grand army was prevented from using its usual doctrine of living off the lands that it conquered during this invasion. (2008) Whilst Napoleon's usual method had served him so well in the past it failed him in Russia. This restriction led to the failure of Napoleon's Russian campaign. Which in conjunction with the scorched earth policy and the Russian winter, were crucial component of Napoleon's failure within his Russian campaign.

Overall, it can be seen that whilst Napoleon's overconfidence was to a large part responsible for his defeat in Russia in 1812 there was other factors involved. These include the poor strategic decisions made by Napoleon's which were made in combination with the effective Russian tactics, the most prominent of these being the scorched earth policy which was enacted to exploit the poor French supply lines. The Battle of Borodino was the beginning of Napoleon's defeat in Russia as it was where the Russians first utilised their tactical superiority to defeat the French which was due to Napoleon's overconfidence. This is combination with the scorched earth policy employed by the Russians which decimated the French supplies.

The Iron Chancellor

Regan Nelson, Student

On May 26th 1941, the German Battleship Bismarck was sunk in the Bay of Biscay by Allied forces. This defeat marked the beginning of the end of the German Reich. But who was this mighty battleship named after? The wild man Bismarck. Six feet of dashing, with a mane of tousled blond hair, seen walking, not with a walking stick, but with a cane of wrought iron. Such was the man, who, in his later years, would use Europe for a chessboard.

When Bismarck returned from an excursion to his wife's father, he found on his desk a letter. An assignment by the government to attend to the dikes. He attacked his new post with vigour. Then, in 1847, something monumental happened. The king of Prussia had called for a parliament for the first time in history, and Bismarck received an invite. Although reluctant at first, he later decided to attend after being asked by a dear friend. When he arrived, he found the people pushing for an elected parliament and being a staunch conservative, this grated against all that he believed. One of the men stood up and said that "the Prussian people had only thrown back Napoleon because they were promised a proper constitution." For Bismarck, this was too much. He stated that the Prussian people had thrown back Napoleon for Prussia, and asked the man if he genuinely believed that the Prussian people would not have thrown back a foreign invader if they were not promised a piece of paper? The hall erupted in boos and shouts, but Bismarck simply sat back down and read a newspaper until they were quiet. Once they were finished, he continued his speech and at that moment, Bismarck, the country squire became, Bismarck, the statesmen.

In 1848, the French monarchy fell, and months later, there was a revolution in Vienna. With the king of Prussia being pushed more and more towards a parliament, Bismarck

got himself elected as the representative of Brandenburg and went off to deal with this matter, and after the birth of his first child, he left to help the king. When he arrived, there was a new question on everyone's minds, the unification of the 39 German states and whether it would be under Austria or Prussia. The Austrian emperor rejected the offer, but when it was offered to king Frederik Wilhelm, he refused also. This sparked fury in Bismarck who spoke out so vigorously against the king's actions that the press made him out as a fool and was barely re-elected. But before his new position could go anywhere, he got caught up in a new subject, the inevitable geopolitical war between Austria and Prussia. And this is where we truly see his change, from the wild man Bismarck, to Bismarck the statesmen.

As Bismarck moved from radical to pragmatic, he was at last offered a position in which he would shine. The position of envoy, diplomat, and dealmaker. Bismarck's tutelage in the diplomatic craft was swift, as he wrote to his wife, "I am making rapid progress in the art of using many words to say nothing at all." He wrote this from Frankfurt. He had been assigned as the Prussian envoy to the rest of the German confederation, this being the body that was supposed to figure out how the 39 German states could unite. But working with the Austrians' was the furthest thing from Bismarck's mind. He was there to assert that Prussia was Austria's equal. And he did this with confidence by lighting a cigar. Smoking in the assembly was a privilege granted only to Austrian diplomats but when the Austrian representative sitting next to him struck his cigar, Bismarck pulled out one of his own and, saying nothing, lit it up. The press loved it, as did his enemies. When he returned to Berlin, one of them claimed publicly that the only thing that Bismarck had managed to achieve in Frankfurt, was lighting a cigar. But if his time in Frankfurt had taught him anything, it was that if Prussia was to ever carry the same weight amongst the German states as their much larger rival Austria, then they were going to need allies. Specifically, the Russians and the French.

Bismarck had a list, and he was checking it twice. Item number 1 on that list? Steamroll some Danes. The Danish king had just kicked the bucket, and as was customary for Europe at this time, other European nations started scrambling for the Danish succession. Most notably one staunchly Danish side of the family and one sympathetic to the Prussians. Eventually, the Danish side won out and they wanted to conquer the mostly German duchies of Schleswig and Holstein. Now, this violated a treaty that the Danish had signed with the Prussians 16 years prior, and gave Bismarck his chance. But it also made things tricky. After all, if Bismarck invaded Schleswig and Holstein under the banner of liberation and protecting smaller nations, he'd have to have a pretty good reason to stick around afterwards other than just because. He had been setting up the dominos for a while now, though. There would be no repeat of 16 years ago when they had tried to invade Denmark, but the threat of foreign intervention had forced them to retreat. He had already secured the Russians as allies and had made vague promises to the French that they may see some benefit from this if they remain neutral. And without the support of the French or the Russians, Britain would protest, but they would never actually go to war. He had also talked to Austria convincing them that they were all on the same side, Germans defending Germans and all that. They had even convinced them to commit a reasonable number of troops to the war effort. And this was key. Not only did he need Austrian troops to secure a quick victory, but this also made the Austrians accountable. If after they one, Prussia announced that it was going to take some land, then the Austrians wouldn't walk away without their fair share. The European public opinion wouldn't turn against the Prussians, and it also meant that Prussia could maintain the moral high ground in the German confederacy. His plan worked perfectly. Prussia would get Schleswig, Austria would get Holstein, and he would get a small pile of concessions and war reparations for his troubles. But Bismarck had a plan. He played up every error and mistake that the Austrians made in Holstein, even publicly calling it a breeding ground for revolution. His sound and fury brought the two nations to the brink of war, but both monarchs did not want such a conflict between brothers. But Bismarck had a backup plan. He went to any and every ethnic minority in the Austrian empire, to make it look like he was sewing a revolution. He also secured an

alliance with Victor Emmanuel, the man trying to unify Italy, and promised that if he helped to defeat the Austrians, he could have Venice. Next the French. While not openly successful, Bismarck was dealing with Napoleon the 3rd, and here, a man too clever for his own good by half. Napoleon took the only course of action that would get him nothing. He wouldn't support the Austrians, but he wouldn't support the Prussians either. So, with his allies ready, and France's neutrality assured, he could finally have his war with Austria and unite the north of Germany under Prussia. The war could have been long and grueling, but Prussia had new general, general Von Moltke, a general just as capable on the battlefield as Bismarck was in the senate. After 7 weeks of war, Bismarck made sure not to impose a peace treaty that would leave the Austrians hating Prussia, as he may need them later to balance out one of the other major European powers. Meanwhile, he needed something to make the other southern states willingly join the new north German confederation. And what better threat than France.

With an increase in power comes an increase in enemies. But to Bismarck, enemies were as useful as friends. Napoleon the 3rd had been content to stand by and do nothing while Prussia picked off its smaller neighbours when it was a minor power, but now, overnight, a power to rival France had risen on his border, and he could not allow any further increase in power. Already upset about how he never received any territory as a bribe for staying neutral during the 7 weeks of war, Napoleon was primed and readied for a fight with Prussia. But there was a problem. Both Prussia and France needed the other one to be the aggressor. Neither wanted to risk international rebuke or intervention on the opposing side. But Bismarck had a plan. His plan was, to wait until circumstances presented themselves that allowed him to formulate an advantageous plan. So, he did. Then when the queen of Spain was suddenly kicked out of Spain by revolutionaries, Bismarck knew that it was go time, because the Spanish had asked a Prussian prince, Prince Leopold, to be the new king. Bismarck knew the French would have to war over this ar-

rangement because if Spain ever allied with Prussia, which would be increasingly likely with a Prussian king on the throne, France would be surrounded. All of these dealings were kept a very close secret, however. If France found out too early, it could have disastrous consequences. But history turned, as it so often does. Due to an error in the translations, Leopold was discovered before he could be crowned king. The Kaiser had him withdraw his nomination, but as always, Napoleon pushed it too far and tried to get the Kaiser to swear that no Prussian prince would ever sit on the Spanish throne. He said no. The people of both Prussia and France found this very insulting, and France declared war on Prussia. Bismarck had his defensive war, and he had the moral high ground. The southern German states flocked to the Prussian banner. But he had played a dangerous game. By letting the French declare war, he had given them time to mobilise, and now he had to move his troops to the front-line before the country was conquered. But he had a secret weapon, that was, Moltke. He not only mobilised troops to the border before the French, but he also got more soldiers there than the French did. After the complete and utter destruction of the French army, the Germans got Alsace and Lorraine, and the German empire was formed.

The birth of the German Empire under Otto Von Bismarck was the golden age for Germany, and the destruction of the battleship Bismarck marked its decline. These two distinct moments in history are simultaneously separate but also undoubtedly linked through this one man.

To What Extent was the American Expedition in Japan in 1853 the Main Cause for the 1868 Collapse of the Tokugawa Shogunate?

Ethan Hayes, Student

The reign of the Japanese Tokugawa shogunate throughout the Edo period from 1603 to 1868 was characterised as a period of economic growth, strict isolationist policy, prolonged peace and developments in art and science. Since isolationist policy exacerbated a nationalist populace throughout Japan, the Tokugawa shogunate was staunchly opposed to the prospect of foreigners on Japanese soil, primarily resulting in acts such as the frequent murder of shipwrecked American whalers. In 1853, American Commodore Matthew C. Perry landed in Japan and catalysed a series of xenophobic domestic events and increasing discontent towards the shogunate, paving the way for its collapse. It ultimately involved the abdication of Tokugawa Yoshinobu and his replacement by Emperor Meiji in 1867, followed by the loss of pro-shogunate forces against *ishin shishi* nationalists in the 1868-1869 Boshin War. The collapse was initiated to some significant extent by American expedition, uncovering fundamental weaknesses in the shogunate's government, the bakufu, and centralising national dissatisfaction of its anti-xenophobic policies.

American Expedition

The 1853 arrival of Matthew C. Perry in Japan directly impacted economic and ideological pillars of the Tokugawa rule over the Japanese populace. Demanding free trade and settlement with Japan, Western powers had a significant military advantage, namely the 'black ships' which were used as an intimidating force (Takano. Y, n.d, p.6). Japan's deficient attention for military prowess throughout the Tokugawa shogunate had led to a lack of preparation for war with America. Nationalist attempts to fire upon these American ships in 1863 in Shimonoseki were only met with devastating bombardments in return a year later. American forcefulness instigated the opening of Japan's borders and their signing of the heavily American-favoured 1854 Treaty of Kanagawa and 1858 Harris Treaty signed between Japan and America. Free trade brought about significant economic turmoil,

such as heightened inflation and unemployment, angering the Japanese populace. American presence in Japan was infectious to the Tokugawa economy, which had spent over 200 years attempting to establish economic development (Tokugawa. T, 2007, p.60).

In stark contrast to the strict Tokugawa isolationist policy *sakoku*, the forceful expedition of America would be at odds with the growing nationalist 'loyalty' of Japanese citizens (Gordon. A, 1952, p.44). Though Japanese discomfort would therefore be expected, historian Kenneth Pyle (1996) instead argues that the image of Japan as a 'closed country' has been somewhat exaggerated and that the uniqueness of Japanese culture has been over-emphasised. Indeed, Tokugawa Japan did make trade with China, Korea, and the Dutch (McCargo. D, 2013 p.3), but the prospect of American residence and essential intrusion in Japan, in conjunction with the great juxtaposition between the two cultures, would certainly cause for domestic upheaval. Key cultural differences culminated in the September 1862 Namaguchi incident, where a foreign unawareness of traditional Japanese customs resulted in the murder of American men by samurai. Clearly, the Japanese ideologically discerned that Americans did not belong in Japan, meaning that even government signings of open trade and borders would not ease the tension between American and Japanese citizens. The 1862 Namamugi incident, where the nationalist Satsuma clan was defeated by the British signalled to the people that tension with America was not sustainable. Instead, they underwent an ideological change and formed *kaikoku* sentiment, an openness to trade on equal terms. Though this was the case, the results of the 1854 Treaty of Kanagawa and 1858 Harris Treaty remained a source of Japanese dissatisfaction, which would eventually turn the populace towards the governing body which allowed it.

Bakufu Reaction

In American expedition causing significant turmoil toward the domestic conditions of Tokugawa Japan, prevaricating behaviour by the bakufu, the central cabinet of the Tokugawa shogunate, would lead to a collapse of the shogunate. While American expedition itself only affected domestic economic and ideological conditions, it catalysed a dissatisfaction of the bakufu in its failure to defend Japan. Historian Andrew Gordon argues that the bakufu “was trapped between a rock and a hard place” (Gordon. A, 1952, p30). In fact, the bakufu had recognised that “foreign trade is... without merit” (Tokugawa. T, 2007, p.133). Due to the military superiority displayed by America, however, the bakufu would have no choice but to open Japan to trade. In order to grow its military might, the Tokugawa government intended to make trade with America temporarily, however, this was interpreted by the populace as a signal of weakness (Gordon. A, 1952, p32). It would leave the growing popularity of *kaikoku* in stark contrast to the unequal treaties for which the bakufu had settled. The bakufu, when faced with forceful American expedition and the discontent for it by the Japanese people, would have to act prevaricatingly, appeasing both sides, but pleasing none. Essentially, the bakufu’s passive protection of Japanese sovereignty signalled to the people “that the shogunate could no longer effectively guard national interest” (Takano. Y, n.d, p.7).

Alternatively, historian Thayer Watkins contends a source of the population’s discontent as the bakufu’s lack of explicit permission from the Emperor to sign the American treaties. Huffman (2004) brings attention to the argument of nationalist Tokugawa scholars which compares the Japanese Emperor to that of the role of Christ in Europe. The role of the Emperor bore an increasing importance to Japanese citizens (Gordon. A, 1952, p42). In fact, he had formally requested that the Americans be driven out by May 1863 (Gordon. A, 1952, p56). Disconnection between the Emperor and the shogun would cost the shogun his reputation (Watkins. T, n.d, p50). This was demonstrated in the 1860 Sakuradamongai incident, where Ii Naosuke, signatory of the 1858 Harris Treaty, was assassinated. Though these acts should have signalled a need for change to the bakufu, the bakufu suppressed most revolutionary action through-

out the early 1860s (Watkins. T, n.d, p62), such as the 1864 Choshu expedition. However, the shogunate crushing of rebellions only caused for major discontent of the bakufu amongst elites (Huffman. J, 2004, p.32), meaning that a constant authoritarianism would only stew a revolutionary climate. In essence, though the bakufu had little in terms of room to act, there was a slight undercurrent of bakufu ignorance of its people which exacerbated an already precarious situation.

Tokugawa Structure

While American expedition brought about undesirable domestic conditions and revealed the ineffectiveness of the bakufu, it was the structure upon which the entire shogunate was built that allowed a central source of discontent to dissipate it. Essentially, as argued by Pyle, “the role of the foreign crisis was to bring into sharp focus the impotence of the old system and to prompt revolutionary action...” (McCargo. D, 2013, p.6). The economic policy of the shogunate, specifically the *baku-han* system involved the shogunate asserting its control by keeping regional domains financially weak. Such “financial impoverishment” (Takano. Y, n.d, p.7) restricted political and military developmental potential, forcing the bakufu’s passivity in defending Japanese sovereignty in the face of American might. This, being realised by Japanese intellectual elites culminated in Aizawa Seishisai’s *New Theses*, which was distributed around Japan in the 1850s and condemned the *baku-han* system for leaving Japan so weak (Gordon. A, 1952, p45). Though this seems the main contention against the *baku-han* system, it was only the tip of the iceberg for weak Tokugawa policy. Some peasants were left to only 10% of their annual income (Huffman. J, 2004, p.39). Resentment from the peasantry was evident in the 1830 mass-pilgrimage, where approximately five million villagers moved to Ise shrine for around four months (Gordon. A, 1952, p45).

Economic conditions had caused for resentment both

amongst intellectual elites as well as the general populace, but the Tokugawa political structure allowed for rebellion to stew easily. Tension from Tozama Daimyos, regional lords who once fought against the Tokugawa in 1600, would contribute to the revolutionary *ishin shishi* rebellion forces. The exclusion of these daimyo from the bakufu and their ostracization contributed to a growing anti-bakufu sentiment amongst the furthest regions from the capital, namely Satsuma and Choshu. Their nationalist stance would support the Emperor's wish to expel the Americans, justifying their growing anti-shogunate rhetoric. However, this force relied upon American expedition in order to make a significant impact, as the 1864 Kinmon incident and uprising was simply quelled by the shogunate. Beyond the influence of the Tozama, the shogunate's political structure was ossified by the dissolving status of samurai. Approximately 7% of the population were samurai, from whom power was being shifted away due to high inflation (Maxey. T, 2016) and a lack of outlet for their militarism (Watkins. T, n.d.). Essentially, as Duncan McCargo (2013) argues, such a power shift "undermined the hierarchical ideology" upon which Tokugawa Japan was founded, angering the samurai population. Detrimental to the suppressive capabilities of the bakufu, like in Kinmon in 1864, the high ratio of samurai to commoners in Satsuma and Choshu (Gordon. A, 1952, p58) as well as the discontent by the Tozama daimyo were the primary reasons for the Satsuma-Choshu alliance in 1866, allowing for the march upon Kyoto in 1867, ultimately prompting the abdication of Yoshinobu and the rise of Emperor Meiji. The foundational issues of the Tokugawa shogunate led to an extended wish for revolution and loss of military support for the shogunate which would blossom at a significant revolutionary opportunity. For this purpose, American expedition served as a most ripe opportunity.

Not only did American expedition in Japan present an opportunity for the slowly malfunctioning political and economic system of the Tokugawa to be deposed, but it catalysed the showing of intrinsic bakufu weaknesses in terms of reaction to the two-fronted revolution. Therefore, it served as the crucial impetus for such an overthrow to take place. However, that is not to say that the bakufu was wholly weak, in fact, it was situ-

ated in a position of unfortunate political climate where most action would likely lead to a similar result. Therefore, to a moderately large extent, did American expedition in 1853 in Japan cause for the 1868 collapse of the Tokugawa shogunate.



1900-1940

Premier's Anzac Spirit School Prize

Archie McEwen, Student

Not often do you see a man who gives everything in the field, and yet more in the air. Not often does a man grace the beaches of Gallipoli and the clouds over France.

“Fight on and fly on to the last drop of blood and the last drop of fuel, to the last beat of the heart.”

-Manfred von Richthofen

On a damp, grey night, not too dissimilar to the weather of colonial Australia's motherland; England, a child was born. An Australian hero was born. It was the 12th of August 1891, when John Godlee was born to Mr Theo. Godlee and Mrs Godlee, in a small house in St Peters, Adelaide. He was to be an only child. At just 11, John began his schooling at the relatively young Prince Alfred College, where he would study under Mr Frederic Chapple.



Figure 1. John Godlee in his RFC uniform. He was a striking young man. (Virtual War Memorial.)



Figure 2. Prince Alfred College in 1910- 2 years after Godlee graduated. (State Library.)

John adored sport. He played for the third and second eleven cricket teams and was written up in the College's 1908 chronicles as having an average batting score of 21 and top scoring with 44. (PAC Chronicles 1908.) So he wasn't unbelievable at it... But it didn't detract from his passion. In his final years, with the threat of war still entirely fictional, John passed in history, Latin, algebra, and geometry, as well as English history, English literature, and French. An eager, handsome John was quick to gain entry into the School of Mines. He had distinctive short, cleanly shaven hair and a kind face, serious and smart but ultimately compassionate.

For two, long, arduous years, John essentially disappeared from all accounts; he moved to a station in the North to receive his wool classing qualifications. Although there are almost no written records of John's life during these years, the NT Government writes about this early pastoralism; “In the early stages it was often a story of physical and financial hardship, tremendous isolation, poor country, and scarce white labour.” John was then successfully accepted to work as a stockman at a station in the North Western districts of Western Australia. It is around this time that Australia began to wake to the looming threat of global tyranny; a world war.

On August 4th, 1914, the newly federated Australia promised the British Empire over 20 000 men, and John wasn't missing out. His enemy; the newly formed alliance of Germany and Austria-Hungary. Travelling to Guilford, WA, he enlisted just two months later, leaving Fremantle as a trooper in the 10th Light Horse Regiment, aged 23.

In early February 1915, after local training in Australia, John departed for Egypt onboard HMAT A47 Mashobra, a medium sized passenger ship capable of carrying 66 first class passengers. (Birtwistle Wiki) John was trained in preparation for a land-based campaign targeting Turkey, “Intended to allow Allied ships to pass through the Dardanelles,” and ultimately “Capture Constantinople (Now Istanbul.)” (Imperial War Museum). In May of the

same year, an Australian stockman found himself in a country he'd never been to, fighting for an Empire he'd never been to, for a reason only comprehended by the world's most superior politicians.




Figure 3. HMAT A47 Mashobra, capable of housing 66 passengers, one being John Godlee. (Birtwistle Wiki, 2020)

The conditions at Gallipoli were not pleasant for the men. Although not as commonly known, the constant sound of shell fire kept many soldiers awake and caused psychological trauma, as well as severe fatigue. The men were provided with very poor nutrition, such as the famously hated 'bully beef' and rock hard 'ANZAC biscuits.' (The Conversation, 2015) This lack of nutrition in turn caused a large increase in disease. These included dysentery, tetanus, and septic wounds. Water was limited and caused dehydration as well as a lack of hygiene.

Unfortunately, like many other men who fought at Gallipoli, John's intentions were to do the best for his country, and not to record everything for historical benefit. The following information is based on the service of his regiment and other men based at Gallipoli. Despite being a light horse regiment, the men of the 10th regiment found themselves working as infantrymen at Quinn's Post and Pope's Hill, as a defensive unit. The Australian War Memorial describes Quinn's Post as "The most advanced post of the ANZAC line." It provided a crucial location from which to attack and defend from.



Figure 4. A view of Pope's Hill, July 1915 (Australian War Memorial, n.d.)

The most notable actions of the 10th Light Horse Regiment at Gallipoli include the notorious charging of the Nek, made famous through its portrayal in the 1981 film, 'Gallipoli.' The Nek was a steep ridge, strategically useful as a distraction from a main attack planned later in August. Despite last ditch attempts to call off the attack, the 8th Light Horse Regiment went first, being quickly decimated by machine guns, many "killed just metres out of the trench." (Australian War Memorial.) Charles Bean, an official Australian historian wrote of the 10th's involvement, "The 10th went forward to meet death instantly... the men running swiftly and as straight as they could at the Turkish rifles." The final death toll of the attack was 234 for not one metre of ground gained. It was a major failure.



Figure 5. Godlee's enemy; Turkish troops marching to their post at Gallipoli, 1914-15 (The Age, 2015)

Godlee's time at Gallipoli ended when he fell ill with enteric fever. He had been promoted to corporal, and survived roughly 4 months in battle. As his sickness worsened, he was evacuated back to Malta on the 19th of August. After just 9 days, he was transported back to England aboard HS Franconia, an 18 000-tonne converted troop

ship. He spent his time recovering at No 4 London General Hospital at Denmark Hill. Godlee was awarded the 1914-15 Star to recognise his efforts against the Ottoman Empire. As he began to recover, he was formally discharged from the AIF on the 27th of December, and just one day later was granted commission as a 2nd Lieutenant in the Royal Flying Corps (RFC.)



Figure 6. HS Franconia in 1910, before its conversion into a troop ship. Godlee was transported from Malta to England on this ship. (Wikipedia, n.d.)

Aircraft technology was still in its early stages, and as a result training was extremely dangerous. Pilot Frederic Barr Shaw recorded that there were “an average of three crashes a day,” many fatal. “You will report to Air Ministry in service dress, drill order. Shoes, coloured scarves, fur collars and other irregular dress will not be worn in public at any time, whether on duty or on leave...” These were typical orders given to newly entered RFC members. Beginning with ground school, Godlee had to attend the School of Military Aeronautics for 4 weeks to learn about aerial observation, wireless telegraphy, engine mechanics, and more. However many men considered this training to be useless for practical application. A typical day began with a six o’clock wake up call, breakfast, and then a parade from barracks. (The Aerodrome, 1998) Moving to Gosport, he then had to achieve 15 hours of solo flight, flying in Maurice Farman MF.11’s, Avro 504’s, and Airco DH2’s. Dual flights took place under 1000 feet within sight of the aerodrome for safety precautions. Each solo flight was 15-20 minutes long.



Figure 7. No.32 Squadron standing in front of a DH2 on the Wester Front, 1916. Godlee could very well be in this photograph. (Wikimedia, n.d.)

On the 20th of February 1916, John Godlee graduated as a 2nd Lieutenant Flying Officer and was moved to France to begin his service with No.32nd Squadron. Equipped with Airco DH.2s, the squadron began to fly patrols over the Western front. These aircraft were fitted with Gnôme Monosoupape 100 HP rotary engines, forward firing .303 Lewis machine guns, and were “very manoeuvrable and easy to fly.” (Bae Systems, n.d.) They could reach a maximum speed of 150 km/h, fly to an altitude of 14 000 ft, and last in the air for up to 2 hours and 45 minutes. Godlee would fly over the Somme, Arras, Bethune... On the 15th of July, while flying in a DH2, Godlee took part in a patrol with his own squadron and members of No.25 Squadron flying FE 2bs.



Figure 8. “A DH2 Similar to that in which Godlee was killed in.” -Published in the South Australian Aviation Museum’s monthly newsletter.

At 6:30 am, the group of allied aircraft engaged with multiple German ‘Fokkers,’ and one was seen ‘going down after losing a wing.’(The Aerodrome, 2018) Officially, an FE 2b crew were credited with the attack, however most pilots present believed it was Godlee, who could not make a report due to injuries. Achieving a ‘kill’ in these simple aircraft was near impossible, yet Godlee had managed to do so. The Fokker crashed near an airfield at Provin, killing its pilot, Vzfw Otto Dapper, a 25-year-old from Meissen.

Sadly, the heroic story of John Godlee ends with death. Just four days after this unofficial aerial, Godlee was flying an escort patrol when he was attacked by two Fokker Eindeckers. His aircraft was badly damaged, and he crashed West of the lines. Three days later, aged just 24 years, 2nd Lieutenant John Godlee was pronounced dead from his injuries. His commanding officer wrote of the incident, “Lieutenant Godlee fell in our lines and was alive, although unconscious, when picked up, but died immediately on arrival at hospital. He died bravely for his country, and even on the morning that he met his death had done good work. His death leaves a gap in our squadron; in fact, in the Flying Corps, which will be hard to replace, for he was a most gallant and capable officer.”



Figure 9. A Fokker Eindecker; the type of plane that shot Godlee down. Note the early monoplane design. (Ares Games, 2018)

“Courage is doing what you are afraid to do. There can be no courage unless you are scared.”

-Edward Vernon Rickenbacker



Figure 10. Godlee’s medals, including the 1914-15 star as seen on the left. (Virtual War Memorial, n.d.)

Part B

Perseverance and courage- one might argue that these qualities can be found in most humans. But through the dangers and circumstances that our ANZAC soldiers faced, it is clear that these values take a whole new meaning, and for John Godlee, this is no exception. In fact, it is hard enough to choose just two qualities for a man so keen on holding up a roof of safety for his family and for his country, a roof seemingly made of the heaviest steel.

John’s display of perseverance began many years before World War 1. With his goal set on wool classing, he quickly entered ‘The School of the Mines’ and then moved not straight into a job, but to a station to finalise this education. In the early 1900’s, education was not like it is now and most men would go straight into work after school. John Godlee however pushed on through these two experimental years to finally achieve his full qualifications. His perseverance was rewarded by his successful employment at a station, showing the value of his hard work and strong-willed mind.

I'm sure after researching Godlee that he would say that he was just doing what everyone else did, but there is no doubt at the outbreak of WWI Godlee's commitment to do the best job possible was special, heroic, and brave. After representing Australia at Gallipoli, day after day surviving shell after shell, bullet after bullet, Godlee was ready to give enough to go over the top at the Nek.

After falling ill, his recovery was not quick. It is likely being sent home with his illness may have been shameful to Godlee, but his duties were not over. He persevered to get over his illness, quickly enlisting in a whole new field of battle. Determined to honour his country and family to the highest possible limit, he was soon flying in the sky, only thirteen years after the first aeroplane was invented. Godlee's death symbolises the limit of his perseverance, his sacrifice; he would not stop until his heart was not beating. And he reached this limit, at age 24. At just 24, he gave his life for his country.

Clearly, by persevering through some of the harshest conditions known to man, John Godlee had a courageous heart. As written above, Edward Vernon Rickenbacker says that there 'can be no courage unless you are scared.' Godlee was an only child. He did not have brothers to look out for him through school. He was not with best mates when he joined the Light horse. He was alone when he fell ill, and he was alone when he joined the RFC. There is no doubt he would have been scared-petrified even. Using only his heart and his mind, Godlee was able to make some of the most courageous decisions, and for this he truly embodies the brave spirit of the ANZAC.

RIP John Godlee, 1891-1916

To what extent was Leninist policy successful in reaching the Bolshevik aims of female emancipation by 1928?

Daniel Mills, Student

Introduction:

Following the 1918 Bolshevik Revolution, leader Vladimir Lenin would introduce policy to remove the ‘petty housework’ that ‘strangles, stultifies and degrades’ women – in an attempt to legislatively emancipate women (Lenin, 1919). Placed importantly in the global context of the early 20th century, in which the concept of female emancipation was both extremely progressive, and unprecedented. The period of 1917-28 is the period of Leninist Russia, as even after his death in 1924, no active opposition intervened with Lenin’s policies. Lenin achieved his goals of female emancipation legislatively – by introducing laws that would theoretically free the woman from her domestic lifestyle. However, when examining the reach and effect of Leninist policy it is clear it struggled greatly in influencing pre-established Russian social conservatism. Social policy attempting to shift women’s societal status was largely limited by the large agrarian population, being not welcoming to Bolshevik progressivism. Economic policy, limited by largely unrealistic socialist policy, thrust women into a double burden of work and domesticity. Lastly, political participation, restricted by a culture of distrust shown toward the Bolshevik Government. Showing overall how Leninist policy was extremely limited by cultural norms of Russia. Ultimately, it is clear Leninist policy aimed to emancipate women in three clear spheres: social, economic and political – but due to both conservatism present within Russia, especially in the agrarian bulk of the population, and large amounts of wariness shown toward the Bolshevik party, Leninist policy would be largely ineffective, and in many cases, worsen the situation for women in Russia.

Social Change:

Family Code of 1918 and Divorce

Bolsheviks attempted to elevate women’s societal status through stark progressive social reform for women - but were limited in overturning pre-established Russian conservatism.

Following the Bolshevik Revolution, the newly formed Central Executive Committee of the Soviet (VTsIK) would ratify the Family Code on Marriage, the Family, and Guardianship. Led by Alexander Goikhbarg – would introduce progressivism to Russia’s social culture – allowing for easy divorce with the ‘desire of one [being] considered as a ground for divorce.’, and establishing ‘support’ for children by the Department of Social Security of the local Soviet (RSFSR, 1921). This legislation was met with large amounts of backlash, not for its content but for the means – as under socialism many viewed these codes as unnecessary. Goikhbarg understood this would be a ‘hypocritical phase’ – Goikhbarg quoting opponents as screaming ‘What kind of socialism is this’ (Goikhbarg, 1918). As many viewed codes on marriage to limiting the freedom of the individual, a step away from the true emancipation of women in the eyes of many socialists. However, it eventually would pass with Goikhbarg stating ‘We must accept this [code] knowing that it is not a socialist measure, because socialist legislation will hardly exist. Only limited norms will remain.’ (Goldman, 1933). Showing how, that within the Bolshevik party itself the means of emancipation differed greatly. The Family Code of 1918 mainly passed, against the wishes of many socialists to fight religious institutions grip over marriage. Through this, it can be understood that no one clear vision of female emancipation was apparent – instead, the Family Code of 1918 was based on disagreement and argument. The effect of the Family Code of 1918 can be seen largely in the increase of divorces. During years 1911-13, during Tsarist Russia, the divorce rate per marriage was 2.2 per 1,000 marriages, with .0002 divorces per 1,000 people – in stark contrast, by 1924 the divorce rate per marriage was increased to 113.0 per 1,000 marriages with 1.3 divorces per 1,000 people (Lubnyi-Gertsyuk, 1928). These figures clearly highlight an increase in divorces with Bolshevik Russia, evidently becoming more commonplace. These figures though, being generalised for all of Russia, do not highlight the disparity between rural and urban. Marriage rates among cities and in rural areas all remain relatively similar with no outliers – however it is clear the disparity of divorce rates. In 1926, divorce rates in cities (defined with places with populations over 50,000) had a divorce

rate of 3.6 per 1,000 people, a large difference to the 1.3 per 1,000 in rural areas (Lubnyi-Gertsyk, 1928). As cities got larger, divorce rates increased – for example, in Moscow during 1926 divorce rates showed 1 divorce for every 2 marriages (Wheatcroft, 1985). Showing, the clear disparity between the effectiveness of Leninist policy among cities (in which Bolshevism was clearly more popular) and rural areas (where the ideology of Bolshevism struggled to gain traction).

Abortion:

A similar case can be seen for abortion – in 1920 Nikolai Semashko, Bolshevik Statesman pushed for legal abortion, purely to fight dangerous ‘back-alley’ abortions and provide abortions ‘under conditions where it will do the least damage’ to pregnant women (Goldman, 1933). By November 1920, abortions were legalized, largely to prevent *babki* (peasant midwives) from performing abortions – these were now made illegal. The official decree on abortion defined clearly who could receive legal abortions: ‘working women only in exceptional cases due to extreme poverty, illness, or genetic defects’ (Gromov, 1924). After legalisation, again, a clear disparity in urban and rural rates were seen in abortion. Moscow and Leningrad performed 39% of Bolshevik Russia’s abortions, only accounting for 3.5% of the female population – whereas, even though accounting for 84% of Russian Women, rural areas only performed 15% of abortions. Again, showing how Leninist policy failed in overturning rural traditionalism. Illustrating how even with clear legislative aims, the Bolsheviks failed in reaching the bulk of population – rural Russia.

Economic Change:

Domesticity, Work and the Family Unit

Through pushing women into the workplace in attempts to achieve economic independence, women now held the ‘double-burden’ of domesticity and work – contributing to the deteriorating perception of women in Leninist Russia. The female economic question was viewed by Bolsheviks, in the words of Lenin: ‘necessary to be socialized and for women to participate in common productive labour.’, Bolsheviks believed by achieving economic equality through labour, only ‘then woman will be the equal of man.’ (Lenin, 1919). By 1922, 63% of women were unemployed, comparatively though, so were 59% of men

– these high numbers of unemployment were largely due to the impacts of the civil war on employment. (Ilić, 1999) Lenin believed as women became economic equals and became less reliant on patriarchal breadwinners the concept of the family unit would ‘wither away’ (Lenin, 1992). The Bolsheviks envisioned socialist utopia in which family would not exist, with the family unit to be replaced by a ‘communal family’ (including things like communal homes, dining, etc.) However, this generally resulted in a ‘double-burden’ for women – being both required to work and also remain as mothers to children; As Russian women were unwilling to give up their children to the Government. Evidently captured in 1921, where a meeting of peasant women voted against a resolution against state rearing of children, stating ‘[we] refuse to open and organize kindergartens and nurseries, since among us there are no mothers who would give up the rearing of their children’ (Sokolova, 1921). Showing how women were unwilling to concede to Bolshevik wishes of the socialised family unit. The communal family initiatives by the Bolshevik Government were not fully functional and did not provide proper aid for mothers and children. As by 1922 there were 7.5 million *Besprizornosf* (homeless waifs) – displaced, starving and dying children in search of food (O Bor'be, 1927) – highlighting both the ineffectiveness of Bolshevik Government to better the family in an attempt to emancipate women, but also the unwillingness of Russian women to concede to Leninist policy.

Poverty and Prostitution

Even with attempts from the Bolshevik Government to allow women to become economic equals – to be emancipated from economic burdens, they were not. Bolsheviks continually pushed women into the workplace – with numbers of women in factory production increasing from 416,900 in 1923 to 725,926 by 1928 (Randall, 2004). However, even with the increase of women in the workplace, women did not receive economic emancipation – as the pay disparity between men and women were significantly large. During the 1920’s women made only 65% of wages to what men made, with the average salary of female workers being 32 rubles per month (Markus, 1928).

These low wages, coupled with an increase in divorce, due to the new Family Code would negatively impact women in Russia – turning to widespread prostitution. The implication of prostitution in Bolshevik Russia was not a result of sexual implication – instead in the words of Nadezhda Krupskaya, Lenin’s wife ‘Poverty compels women to sell themselves. They are not prostitutes who make an enterprise out of this, but mothers of families.’ Poverty forced women into ‘sex for a crust of bread’; it was ‘the grave of human relations.’ (Krupskaya, 1920) Professor N. Duboshinskii’s study of prostitution, he found that over 50% of prostitutes became prostitutes out of need, with 84% attempting to escape prostitution; he concluded: ‘Hunger is the most powerful factor in prostitution’ (Duboshinskii, 1925) Showing how overall, due to Bolshevik’s inability to genuinely protect women economically, women were plunged into larger amounts of poverty.

Political Participation:

Zhenotdel:

Programmes attempting to push women into the political realm were largely redundant through large amounts of distrust shown toward the Bolsheviks. During 1918 the Zhenotdel (Women’s department of the Bolshevik party) being involved strictly in the liberation of women – with Inessa Armand as head. However, the Zhenotdel would struggle greatly in participation from females. Peasants expressed their fears of the Bolshevik programme for female emancipation by accusing the Bolsheviks of trying to undermine ‘village morality’. The Bolsheviks were viewed as ‘city people... loose-living atheists whose women bobbed their hair and smoked cigarettes.’ (Clements, 1982). Zhenotdel advertised their meetings to women, with purpose to inform them about Bolshevik programmes to largely improve the lives of women – however, even with tens of millions of women in Russia, only 14,709 peasant women would be present at Zhenotdel meetings in fifteen large provinces in Russia. (Kanatchikova, 1921) Showing how even with meetings driven to improve conditions for women, women from peasant areas would refuse to come. Showing the limits of Bolshevik attempts to emancipate women. Even with a plethora of higher-ranking female figures within the Bolshevik Party, such as Inessa Armand, Alexandra Kollontai and Nadezhda Krupskaya the Bolshevik Party still

largely lacked any significant female participation; with women accounting for less than 8% of party membership (Lapidus, 1978). Ultimately, the Bolsheviks largely struggled with female political participation among Leninist initiatives such as Zhenotdel and party membership.

Conclusion:

In conclusion, it is clear that when examining the impact of Leninist policy on female liberation within Russia the situation for women deteriorated largely. Even with egalitarianism of Leninist policy with women achieving legislative equality the Bolsheviks were largely ineffective among rural Russia with large amounts of mistrust shown toward the Government. Bolshevik attempts to shift the culture within Russia were largely ineffective – the allowance of easier divorces was not receptive in rural areas. However, in urban areas coupled with the push from the Government to put women into the workplace, still being forced to work, and take care of her children in many cases pushing women into widespread prostitution. With a similar effect seen with abortion: being more common in urban than rural areas. With political participation of women being drastically low, being unable to win over the trust of traditionalists. Showing overall, progressive Leninist policy was ineffective due strong anti-Bolshevik and conservatism within rural areas – a bloc of people making up the majority of the Russian population.

To what extent was the Tokyo cabinet responsible for the outbreak of the Mukden Incident in 1931?

Rojan Joshi, Student

Introduction

On the 18th of September 1931, the Kwantung army staged an explosion on a section of the Japanese-owned South Manchuria Railway. Immediately afterwards, the army commenced their invasion of Manchuria, marking the beginning of the Pacific theatre of the Second World War. Though the Mukden Incident was in essence an uprising of the Kwantung army behaving separately of government orders, their actions were only possible due to the weakness of the Tokyo cabinet. The cabinet's failure to sufficiently reprimand instigators of previous incidents created difficulty in restraining the army, allowing military leaders to defy orders and act independently. Thus, the Tokyo cabinet can be held responsible for the Mukden Incident to a moderate extent – though not explicitly their responsibility, the rising power of the military and the creation of an environment conducive to such an event can be directly linked to cabinet actions.

The Cabinet

The Tokyo cabinet played an important role in the outbreak of the Mukden Incident through its prior actions that enabled military insubordination. The assassination of Manchurian warlord Zhang Zuolin was a precursor to the Mukden Incident, setting a precedent for the army's increasing influence. Yoshihashi (1963, p. 60) argues that the "indecisive" actions of Prime Minister Tanaka following the assassination "[began] the army's domination of Japan". Japan supported Zhang for the stability he provided in Manchuria, but his conflict with Chinese leader Jiang Jieshi sparked fears of a breakdown in Sino-Japanese relations. Subsequently, a split formed between the army and the cabinet – though both agreed that Zhang was problematic, Tanaka engaged in private diplomacy in order to resolve the issue, whilst the army assassinated Zhang on 4 June 1928. Tanaka sought to court-martial the instigating officers since

they acted without approval, but such was army influence that he failed to prosecute those responsible. The officers only faced lenient internal disciplining – Komoto, the leader, was merely suspended from active duty (Ienaga, 1978). In July 1929, Emperor Hirohito forced Tanaka's resignation, which gave officers "the feeling they could take matters into their own hands" (Bix, 2000, p. 217) as it indicated that army aims could be achieved by force. Yoshihashi's claim is thus justified, since the army's recognition of their ability to undermine governmental authority created the framework for the Mukden Incident.

Furthermore, it could be argued that the cabinet actually approved of expansion into Manchuria. Despite engaging in international cooperation through the Four-Power and Nine-Power Pacts, Japan was not prepared to cede influence in Manchuria. According to Baron Sakatani, financial advisor to China, Japanese interests in the region were "quite unique" (Penlington, 1932, p. 8) and consequently, both the army and the government were determined to maintain Japanese influence. However, although perhaps receptive of militarily achieved outcomes, the cabinet were not supportive of army actions. On 24 September, the cabinet stated that it "[harboured] no territorial design in Manchuria" (Office of the Historian). Although it must be noted that the statement was intended to allay international concerns about Japanese expansion and could therefore misrepresent its true ambitions, the cabinet's words indicate that it was not supportive of military action as a means of maintaining influence. Furthermore, the cabinet's preventative precautions were actively sabotaged by the army. On 12 September, Foreign Minister Shidehara received a message from Mukden warning of a possible incident, and subsequently sent General Tatekawa to reprimand the army. However, Tatekawa supported the plot, and the message remained undelivered. Instead, the army advanced their planned date for the incident from 30 September to 18 September. Thus, attempts to restrain the army were deliberately undermined. Bix (2000, p. 232) argues that "the cabinet never imagined the army ... would completely overturn [its] policies", and thus cannot be held accountable. However, since the cabinet had themselves set a

precedent for the army's independence through the disastrous Zhang Zuolin Incident, its inability to foresee insubordination is a failure of responsibility. Thus, although the cabinet opposed the army's actions, it still holds a level of culpability through its mismanagement of affairs that paved the way for the Mukden Incident.

The Army

Although the cabinet created conditions that enabled independent military action, the Mukden Incident was driven by the army through its conspiratorial actions which directly contradicted cabinet orders. Indeed, Prime Minister Wakatsuki complained that "[he] [was] not being informed by either the Foreign Ministry or the Army Ministry" (Bix, 2000, p. 236). A clear tension existed between the army and the cabinet, stemming from the divisions in their respective aims of militarism and international cooperation. At the 1930 London Naval Conference, the Navy argued that Japan's fleet was insufficient, seeking an agreement in which they would be permitted a fleet in a ratio of 7:10 with that of the US. However, the US only offered a 6:10 ratio. Despite Admiral Heihachiro's insistence that Japan should "withdraw ... if America [would] not accommodate [Japanese] demands" (Morley, 1984, p. 34), the government signed the treaty, highlighting a significant distinction between the Navy and the cabinet regarding militarism. Yoshihashi (1963, p. 96) asserts that the treaty "forced the hand of political extremists", evidenced by the March 1931 Incident in which ultranationalist Sakurakai officers attempted a coup d'état. The coup ultimately failed due to logistical issues, but was nonetheless indicative of the growing nationalism in Japan, as officers sought to incite riots to enable the Imperial Army's takeover of government. However, though the treaty was significant, Yoshihashi's suggestion that army officers simply reacted to cabinet policies undervalues their pre-existing motivations. The Mukden Incident had been planned by General Ishiwara, who, believing that "Japan must expand overseas for political stability" (Ienaga, 1978, p. 11), had devised plans for an invasion as early as 1929. Thus, the Mukden Incident had its roots within the nationalist desires of the military. Although the cabinet still maintains a degree of responsibility for failing to restrain the army, expansionist sentiment was such that an

aggressive act by Japanese forces was almost inevitable.

Socio-political Conditions

The cabinet's agency was also severely limited by the rise of Japanese nationalism, which increased the army's influence. In the 1930s, the Great Depression pushed the Japanese people towards expansionism. Exports collapsed as America imposed duties of 300% on Japanese goods (Megarry, 1995), leading to unemployment reaching 3million. The deteriorating economic conditions combined with the dramatic increase in population (which doubled from 32million to 65million between 1870-1930) to ignite a desire for expansion. The Japanese people fervently supported the military, raising *¥2,180,000 and donating 1,530,000 comfort bags between September 1931 and January 1932, more than in the entirety of the Russo-Japanese War (Penlington, 1932, p. 122). Given this zeal, Yoshihashi (1963, p. 1) is justified in describing Japan as "ripe for momentous change". In this climate, the cabinet were unable to enforce disciplinary actions against the army, who were seen by the population at large as a "shining example of the true national spirit" (Wilson, 2002) due to their fulfilment of these expansionist aims. However, the rise of the military can still be traced to the weaknesses of government, as it was the cabinet's indecisiveness that enabled the military to offer certainty through their resolute actions and win popular support.*

Emperor Hirohito's tacit approval of the army further undermined the cabinet, since he held ultimate power in Japan. In the Japanese Meiji Constitution, Article XI declared that the Emperor had "the supreme command of Army and Navy" (Columbia University, 1962), which the military interpreted to mean that it had the right to bypass the decision-making processes of the cabinet. Article XI thereby enabled the military to act independently of the cabinet, but the Emperor still held the right to intervene. Consequently, Hirohito holds a degree of responsibility for the outbreak of the Mukden Incident due to his refusal to do so. Indeed, Bix (2000) argues that the Emperor actually approved of the army's actions by allowing disciplin-

ing to be handled internally. Conversely, Large (2013) contends that Hirohito was simply heeding his advisor Prince Saionji, who, fearing the collapse of the monarchy, did not sanction the use of imperial authority in political affairs. However, Hirohito's dismissal of Tanaka in the Zhang Zuolin Incident indicates that the Emperor was willing to wield some influence, supporting Bix's contention that his non-intervention in Mukden may indeed have stemmed from militarist tendencies. The immediate aftermath of the incident also supports this argument, as Hirohito enabled the army's actions. On 19 September, General Hayashi requested permission to move troops from Korea into Manchuria. Wakatsuki rejected this request, but Hayashi advanced nonetheless. Hirohito had the opportunity to support the cabinet by exercising his power, but instead permitted the movement, stating simply that "the army was to be more careful in the future" (Bix, 2000, p. 239). Thus, Emperor Hirohito's unwillingness to intervene suggests at least some support for expansion, forming a considerable barrier to the cabinet given his prerogative of supreme command. Nevertheless, Hirohito's actions served to enable the army's expansion rather than instigate the incident, so he holds a similar level of responsibility as the cabinet.

Conclusion

Thus, the Tokyo cabinet was moderately responsible for the Mukden Incident due to its inability to restrain and discipline the army. However, the rise of the military through deteriorating socio-economic conditions and the tacit approval of Hirohito effectively tied the cabinet's hands, allowing the army to undermine its attempts to prevent conflict. Ultimately, although the cabinet did fail to control the military, the army were the key instigators of the incident, taking aggressive expansionist actions that firmly set Japan onto the path to war.



1940-1950

To what extent was Truman's motive to save lives justified in the Atomic Bombing of Japan? (1945)

Jaxin Browne, Student

Following the Nazi defeat in May 1945, there was but one conflict remaining active within the Pacific Theatre. With a steady, yet hard-fought progression from the United States and Soviet Russia towards Japan, the Manhattan Project arose from completion to put an end to the struggle. In this dire time, President Harry S. Truman found himself in an ultimatum, as the cost of lives was to be weighed with the outcome of a potential victory. However, the use of these weapons must be weighed against opposing factors for it to be justified. In this way, Truman's motives to save lives through the Atomic Bombing of Japan is justified to a small extent.

Critically, Truman's motives of saving Japanese and American lives are presented through the planned land invasions of Japan, and the subsequent use of Atomic Bombs. Firstly, Truman wished to "spare the Japanese people from utter destruction" (Truman, 1945) with the use of Atomic Weaponry acting as a more just way to end the war over a full-scale invasion of mainland Japan. Alongside this, Truman also states that the bombs would "shorten the agony of war in order to save thousands" (Truman, 1945) In this way, Truman's evaluation of lives saved with the deployment of atomic weapons was a principal motive for an end to the war. Lives at risk in the scenario of a land invasion are foreshadowed by the casualty tolls in the Battle of Iwo Jima, revealing that 20,000 Americans and 25,000 Japanese were affected, with a further 46,700 Americans and 119,000 Japanese taken as casualties at the Battle of Okinawa (MacEachin, 1998). Truman, when talking of a land invasion notably stated that his goal was preventing a "second Okinawa" (Truman, 1945), which the bombs would suffice at doing. Moreover, the planned land invasion of Japan

through Operation Downfall estimated the American Death Toll to exceed 1,100,000 (Allen T, 1995). When comparing this figure to the highest estimates of 100,000 and 40,000 deaths for Hiroshima and Nagasaki respectively (Kaufman, 2005), the overarching devastation of the bombs on Japan's population are far lessened. These figures justify Truman's motives to spare additional Japanese lives through the use of atomic bombs rather than conducting a land invasion.

There are, however, reasons to argue that the saving of lives was not Truman's principal motive for an end to war. It can be presented that air raids, more than any other military tactic, had "devastated" Japan. Historian Mark Weber has pointed out that on March 9-10, 1945, 300 B-29s bombed 16 square miles in the city of Tokyo, killing 100,000 people (Kaufman, 2005). Additionally, a further 200,000 Japanese had been killed in air raids before the events of Hiroshima (Kaufman, 2005). This is seen to have put the Japanese on their last legs, putting Truman's idea of 'saving lives' at the time under question. Truman even captured this perspective in a 1963 Interview with Newsweek, to where he claimed the Japanese were "ready to surrender" and it "was not necessary" to drop the bombs (Kaufman, 2005). This ushers in a perspective of Truman's motives being more destructive towards Japan, rather than aiming to save their lives. These destructive traits are revealed through Truman's reply to a Protestant clergyman, pleading the president to cease the bombing before "any further devastation" is brought down on Japanese people (nps, 2019). Truman replied to this two days later stating the only language they understand is to "bombard them" (nps, 2019). This adds to the idea of Truman's lack of regard towards Japanese lives lost, which overall contradicts his more public statements during the same period. Truman was also showcased demonstrating his bitterness towards the Soviets, using them as a motive to end the war. Truman stated publicly he wanted to prevent the Soviets from seizing "the fruits of a long and bitter and courageous fight... in which [the Soviets] had not participated" (Hasegawa, 2003). This is stemmed from the upcoming expiration of a five-year neutrality act between Japan and Russia which America, due to their ideological tension with the Soviets, were unwilling to let happen due to fear of a Soviet invasion of Japan. This

suggests that Truman used the bombs to result in Japan's swift surrender, thus causing the deaths of innocent Japanese citizens for America's political gain. The Soviet willingness for war is captured through Soviet foreign affairs commissar Vyacheslav M. Molotov, who stated that "[due to] America's attitude, we [must] continue fighting" (aph, 1995). This puts Truman's ethics under question. Additionally, weapon developer Leo Szilard has discussed the hypothetical idea if Germany attained and used the bomb on the U.S., claiming that it would be considered a "war crime, and we would have sentenced the Germans who were guilty... to death." (Kauffman 2005). This solidifies the idea that Truman possessed double standards in the case of the atomic bombing, to where the conservation of Japanese lives was far from his key focus in ending the war.

Overall, it can be concluded through the air raids of Japan, the rivalry against the Soviets, and the unethical nature of the atomic bombs, Truman's public quest to save lives can be rendered as untruthful. In this way, Truman's motives to save lives through the Atomic Bombing of Japan is justified to a small extent.

How and why was the mobilisation of civilians critical to victory in the Second World War?

George Bartley, Student

The Second World War from 1939 to 1945 was primarily fought by the military and aided by intense government effort, however the use of civilians is often underestimated. The general public was integral through industrialisation, bringing them into war and the misuse of opposing civilians. The organisation and subsequent movement of the members of the public was vital to the winning of battles within World War Two.

Industry was a catalyst for triumphs throughout world war 2. According to Henry Stimson, 'If you want to win a war, you let businesses make money.', with German strength in weaponry as a result of industry with thousands more Panzer tanks leading to their obliteration of Poland in 1939 (History.com editors, 2019). Volkswagen alone built 210 Sedans for the officers and Standard Oil "furnishing millions" to aid Germany according to the Commercial Attache from the US embassy (Warfare History Network, 2019). Germany would proceed to use their thousands more aircraft to annihilate first Belgium and the Netherlands, before France in 1940 (Hart, n.d). The use of civil industry would enable German victories in battle early in the war. However, America would proceed to completely overpower Germany in production. Whilst in 1941, America had begun to bring in business leaders to jobs in the army, Germany did not turn to a full war economy until 1942 when America had already created a war production board to convert industry to war. The Americans had used business to revitalise the economy, from 1941-45 outproducing Germany by a total of 210,000 Airplanes (Klein 2013, pp. 515-16). The conversion of business to war was integral to the American defeat of the Germans, the Germans simply not keeping up with the industrial level of the Americans until they ramped up production in 1942. When either side used industry to supply their troops in the war, they would win convincingly.

In addition, the successful coordination of civilians in battle was also very important to being victorious in battle. In 1935, the Germans introduced conscription, five years ahead of England who were the first of the Allies to do so (UK Parliament, 2020). Not only did this enable a greater army, but it also allowed Hitler to test the waters of 'appeasement'. If Hitler had not reintroduced conscription he may not have known whether he could defeat Poland. Nevertheless, through in 1940, the evacuation of 338, 000 soldiers (BBC - History - World Wars: Dunkirk, 2020) from Dunkirk was undertaken by British civilians would enable the 'win' of the battle of Dunkirk by not being crushed, slowing the momentum of Blitzkrieg. As Britain could more than handle a naval invasion, the Battle of Britain required the prevention of an airborne attack by the home guard. The efforts of the 1.5 million British civilians in the Civil Defence service were critical to the Battle of Britain by halting the Germans before the reinforcements arrived. However, historians such as Andrew Gordon believe that 'the Germans stayed away because of the Royal Navy' (Gillan, 2006). In other words, it was not the civilians that resulted in the British succeeding in the Battle of Britain. Also, the British did not truly win either battle, rather just not lose them. Key to success within world war two was the direct call to arms of the civilians.

The Germans' organisation, or lack thereof, of opposing civilians was the final of their series of non-military failures in World War 2. The Germans initially used people to their advantage by utilising forced labour in early 1941(United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, n.d.). The 20 million people employed in 60% of the workforce in Germany would greatly improve the German war machine (Stefanski, 2019). The extra resources would be vital to early successes in the fight with Russia in 'Operation Barbarossa'. However, despite the obvious advantages of increased workers, the Germans would begin 'The final solution' from November 1941(Bytwerk, 1998), destroying the labour force using their resources evidently required for the war. The Jewish people who were classed as 'Mischlinge'(Hybrids) would be unable to join the nazi party and Mischlinge of the first degree (With two Jewish grandparents) would be sent to death camps (Museum of Tolerance.

2018). Out of the 100, 000 Jewish people in the German army in World War 1, 12, 000 would be killed in the holocaust (Montalbano, 1996). The Germans would lose the Battle of Stalingrad by lack of resources before being defeated in D-Day in 1944. If the Germans had used the Jewish people for the war effort, rather than merciless slaughter they would have had a far greater chance at winning the battle of Stalingrad. The German lack of continuing to use the civilians for military lead to not being victorious in the war.

Ultimately, despite Germany's military power, they made a severe oversight in terms of civilians. Not only were they outclassed in industry and bringing all people into the war, but made severe tactical misjudgements in regards to other countries' civilians. If Germany had not waited until 1942 to carry on the way they began, then they could have continued to be successful in World War Two.

The use of force was the most important method used by the Nazi Party to gain power.

Henry Nind, Student

The Nazi Party's long and arduous rise to power was, to a great extent, the result of a successful multi-faceted application of force. Hitler and the Nazis utilised coercive measures, both physical and political, to consolidate power, ultimately culminating in the amalgamation in the role of Fuhrer on August 2nd, 1934. Although other methods were important factors, such as a general exploitation of society, their significance paled in comparison to the instrumental impact of force, however multifarious. Accordingly, it is likely that without the use of force, the Nazi Party would have remained an extremist party on the fringe, with no impact on German politics or disruption of Weimar democracy.

The Nazi Party was hugely dependent on the use of physical compulsion, as a means of obtaining political superiority. Remaining an insignificant feature within German democracy throughout much of the 1920s, the Nazis utilised their original paramilitary group, the *Sturmabteilung* (SA), to clear the political path during Hitler's rise to power. By 1934, the SA numbered almost 4 million active members, constituting a force 40 times larger than the national army. Their sheer number made them a useful ally for the Nazi Party, who overtly encouraged violent measures to oppress opposing political parties, with Ernst Rohm stating, "brutality is respected, the people need wholesome fear". Between the years of 1929 and 1934, an estimated 8124 political-related deaths were accredited to the SA, including both the *Feme Murders* and, although indirectly through Freikorps members, the deaths of the leaders of the Spartacist Revolt, encouraging a wide-spread fear and obedience that presented the Nazi's with the perfect medium in which to rise to power. Furthermore, under Hitler's guidance, the Nazi party also enforced solidarity within their own ranks, eliminating any

high-ranking party members with the potential to overthrow the current political hierarchy. Although Hitler's violent paranoia of his own party was constant, this was demonstrated most prominently during the Night of the Long Knives. Due to his belief that the German population required a "second revolution", Ernst Rohm and an estimated 400 other SA members were massacred.

Whilst this action resulted in the consolidation of power within the party, it also "despaired of the success of any further resistance", setting a precedent from which Hitler's consolidation of power would follow. In that, through physical force, which undoubtedly intimidated the general population, the Nazi Party diminished the risk for objection, allowing their rise to power to be relatively untroubled.

The Nazi Party also utilised force within the realm of legality to secure political power. An important factor in the Nazis attaining power within Germany was the legal pressure they placed upon their opposition, making it difficult for them to challenge their leadership. As a result of panic surrounding the Reichstag fire of 1933, the Nazi Party compounded acts of emergency powers, climaxing in the Enabling Act of 1933. By April of the same year, all opposing political parties were banned and their members interned within concentration camps, and under the jurisdiction of the *Schutzhaft*, the Nazi police force became independent from judicial controls. As a result, the Nazi Party were able to structure a one-party state, "cloaking the seizure of absolute power in legality", and allowing them to rule almost unopposed until their dissolution in 1945. In addition, the Nazi Party used this legality to indoctrinate the public through the forceful use of propaganda. As the only political party in the nation, they were able to fuse Nazi-sourced information with entertainment, allowing them to manipulate public opinion. Throughout the 1930s, the Nazi Party increased their control of the press, in part due to their purchase of press baron Hugenberg's publishing houses, and through dictatorial decrees such as the 1933 Reich Press Law. As a result, their political agenda slowly percolated through to the general public, with their "words being moulded until they clothed ideas" that encouraged loyalist party support throughout society. Consequently, the Nazi Par-

ty's indoctrination of society resulted in them attaining absolute power through the transmission of ideas to the extent that even "the last member of the public understood what [they] wanted him to understand".

However, throughout this period of political and economic instability, the Nazi Party successfully exploited the flaws within society at that time. Upon the onset of the Great Depression, Hitler took advantage of the crippling unemployment crisis to promote his party as one that could fix all of the nation's problems. In the original 25-point program of the Nazi Party, it is stated that "every citizen shall have the possibility of living decently and earning a livelihood", an idea which appealed to the almost 6 million unemployed Germans of the middle and lower classes. In that regard, with no tangible evidence to suggest he could accomplish this feat, it confirmed Hitler's belief that "the broad masses of a population are more amendable to rhetoric than any other force". Similarly, this rhetoric extended to an intense nationalism, an idea which attracted many disgruntled veterans of World War 1. After the shame and humiliation of their defeat, which culminated in the signing of the Treaty of Versailles, many Germans "began to flock to Hitler's speeches, motivated by the kindling of the fires of their anger". With that, Hitler gained their support, with many becoming members of the Freikorps, and later members of the SA. Therefore, as he embodied "a man of the 'common people' with the makings of a 'popular hero' appealing to all classes", Hitler and his party were able to gain significant public support that was integral in ensuring a political foothold within the German society.

Although the Nazi Party's rise to power relied heavily upon many factors, none was more significant than their use of force. This coercion extended throughout much of German society, and although the landscape of society was inherently exploitable, it was this force that allowed for such exploitation to occur, completing Hitler's consolidation of power and the creation of a dictatorship under his rule. Therefore, "without their coercive capacity to size up people and situations", the Nazi Party would have simply been a contending extremist party, symbolising an ideology that would have no impact on the landscape of German politics.



1950-1970

To what extent did the British colonial economic policies contribute to the Sri Lankan ‘golden years’ of the 1950s?

Alexander Titus, Student

Investigation

An evaluation of Sri Lanka’s colonial history reveals a complex relationship between developmental economics, colonial policy and global macro-economic trends that undoubtedly shaped its modern character. Unsurprisingly, the interplay of these factors produced a remarkable sequence of unprecedented economic growth, only punctuated by equally significant decay. One such period of economic growth was the post war “golden years” of the 1950s that was characterised as “an oasis of stability” where social indicators and disposable income dramatically rose. While European historians tend to emphasise the importance of colonial policy in constructing the foundations of economic prosperity, Asian historians focus on the importance of global macro-economic trends in propelling the Sri Lankan economy to new heights. While both perspectives have merit in evaluating aspects of the “golden years”, in isolation they are incomplete and frequently underplay the interaction between these causal factors which makes them all equally important in creating the “golden years”.

British colonial policy

The widely successful British development of tea and rubber plantations became the crucible in which the fundamentals of the 1950s-national economy were forged. De Silvia argues that the plantation economy was the “catalyst for modernisation” from which “almost every salient feature [of Sri Lanka] ... can be traced”, including the post-independence golden years. This was supported by the colonial government’s agricultural diversification policy inaugurated in 1867 by the Ceylon Chamber of Commerce’s decision to introduce tea and rubber. The policy rectified Sri Lanka’s undeveloped national infrastructure by establishing 996 tea plantations which required the construction of efficient transportation, communication and energy networks. This alleviated a fundamental constriction to economic growth, which was

crucial to the Kandyan province that previously lacked any infrastructure. The accompanying construction of roads, railways, telegraph lines and irrigation canals increased overall economic output by changing Kandy’s agricultural composition from predominantly subsistence farmers to high yield plantations. Accordingly, by 1899 tea’s total acreage had grown to 400,000 which De Silvia attributes to a “period of remarkable prosperity” between 1855 and 1860 created by Governor Sir Henry Ward. While Ward’s five-year tenure limited his short-term impact, his 1-million-pound project constructed a national transport system that, through its unprecedented success, changed Sri Lanka’s previously ‘laissez-faire’ colonial administration to actively developing institutions and infrastructure. Ultimately, Ward’s road network ensured competitive prices by reducing transport costs. This, in the 1950s, secured the viability of tea where exports weighing 255 million pounds became the “bedrock of the island’s economy”. However, rubber generated more income from exports making it the second largest component of the plantation economy, employing 500,000 people. As Sri Lanka lacked minerals essential for technically advanced fabrication, the demand for rubber in contemporary manufacturing enabled it to command a large market share in an industry with geographic limitations. The success of rubber and tea plantations demonstrated Sri Lanka’s economic stability, thereby increasing British investment. However, this argument ignores the dependency on imports caused by lopsided economic development, that focused almost exclusively on cash crops, leading to 98% of 1950s exports deriving from agriculture. This became a significant limiter of future economic growth as it made the economy particularly vulnerable to price fluctuations. Therefore, while British development was uneven, its provision of basic national infrastructure transformed Sri Lanka into a linchpin of the empire’s industrial rubber complex, fuelling its unprecedented prosperity in the 1950s.

British fiscal stimulus redefined living standards by developing the decrepit rice paddies and reducing Sri

Lanka's reliance on imports. Ward's ordinance nine of 1856 began land rehabilitation by reconstructing the Uru-Bokka and Kirama dams after two successive revolts had rendered the central region unproductive. This provided an inexpensive and plentiful food supply by restoring one-third of the Magma Pattu rice paddies. This was implemented in conjunction with a grant aid system that provided financial and technical assistance for voluntary local labour. De Silvia described this as a blend of "humanitarianism and realism" that improved the peasantry's economic conditions, a sentiment supported by Governor Gregory who wrote that a "dying out population was now ... well-fed ... from the spread of irrigation". This increased the population by 169.8% between 1827 and 1871, changing the population's dynamics in favour of young workers by the 1950s. In this way construction projects encouraged local entrepreneurs to invest in an area fundamental to rice cultivation but previously limited by a sparse population. This directly created wealth for Sri Lanka's destitute, thereby stimulating economic growth. However, this only partially redressed the wider problem of a poorly developed manufacturing sector which comprised only 8% of the 1950 GDP, showing the limits of British colonial policy in creating the golden years. Therefore, while the development of the rice industry fundamentally altered Sri Lankan demographics favouring economic growth, it did little to solve Sri Lanka's limited industrial capacity.

Post-colonial factors

However, the 'golden years' cannot be explained by colonial policy alone, and powerful 1950s geopolitical developments were essential to providing its characteristic higher disposable income by elevating Sri Lanka's export prices and reducing competing production. Whist De Silvia suggests that British policy was the "catalyst" for prosperity, Godfrey Gunatillake argues that favourable economic conditions made "active policy ... [un]necessary". This was evident as the Korean war increased rubber prices from 2s to 6s per lb in 1950. Rubber brought lucrative US trade that flooded the Sri Lankan economy with extra commonwealth investment, pivotal to creating new industries. Consequently, the annual growth rate rose from 4.8% to 6.8% between 1946 and 1953, which was miraculous considering that social services consisted of 40% of the govern-

ment's budget, higher than even the industrial western nations. Furthermore, Sri Lanka, by exporting 100,000 tonnes, was the third largest rubber exporter behind Malaysia and Indonesia. Sri Lanka's high proportion of the global rubber market was largely the result of its unique physical isolation. Its distance and relative unimportance ensured that Britain, crippling in debt, could not justify enforcing its colonial rule. Contrastingly, Malaysia, Indonesia and Vietnam, its main competitors, were embroiled in conflict. For example, while Vietnam was suffering under 20,000,000 gallons of defoliants that eviscerated its rubber industry, Sri Lanka, between 1900 and 1946, increased its rubber acreage from 1,750 to 659,909 acres. Consequently, Sri Lanka was uniquely prepared to benefit from the Korean war. However, this would have been impossible if not for the British introduction of rubber in 1867 and its subsequent development. Therefore, while external forces put the wind in the metaphorical sails of the Sri Lankan economy, British colonial decisions played an undeniable role in 1950s prosperities.

Furthermore, while controversial, domestic economic policies built upon the foundations set by the British which encouraged economic growth by rapidly expanding manufacturing, contributing to the 'golden years'. The 1948 budget speech explains how the state allocated Rs 420 million to establish industries in steel, cement, caustic soda, hydrogenated coconut oil, paper and textiles. The construction of factories slowly substituted imports with local production, maximising exports and encouraging industrial diversification. This is evident in the increased proportion of manufacturing from 3.9% to 11.6% of the sectorial GDP which increased the number of available jobs by 2.2% between 1946 and 1953. This provided regular metropolitan employment kick-starting industrial urbanisation, whilst alleviating rural poverty. During the 1950s, import substitution was instrumental to creating economic confidence. However, Gunatillake argues that associated political agendas chained the economy to heavy public expenditure. This was exemplified by the 1950s 'colonisation' programmes that moved 30,000 Sinhalese

into traditionally Tamil areas, exacerbating ethnic tensions to little economic advancement. While post-colonial spending provided contemporaneous prosperity, its ignition of ethnic tensions would not only not only undermine the boom itself but lead to a civil war that would tear the very fabric of Sri Lankan society.

British colonial policy, when considered in conjunction with other economic forces, made a significant contribution to 1950s 'golden years'. While the British successfully developed Sri Lanka's infrastructure via the importation of rubber and tea, this in isolation was not significant enough to have caused the widespread prosperity of the 1950s. Conversely, without colonial stimulus, Sri Lanka would have lacked the infrastructure and investment to exploit the changing dynamics within the Asian geopolitical sphere. It was the interplay between these competing forces, along with an element of historical fortune, that produced the widespread prosperity and social change characteristic of the 1950s. That said, neither the earlier British nor the post-independence Sri Lankan governments created a durable economy, indicating that the 'Golden years' were partly a result of serendipity, or being in the 'right place at the right time' a term fittingly derived from Sri Lanka's historical name, Serendib.

The Sciences and the Humanities; enemies, just friends, or lovers?

John Jenkin, Scholar

I grew up in an unassuming Adelaide family: my father was a skilled electrician and expert handyman and my mother was a domestic-science teacher, both also capable at selected sports. My mother had been forced to retire when she married, a serious loss to the teaching profession but a boon for me. They provided a stable and loving family environment, and their Methodist background meant that they saved regularly to enable me to go to Princes for my secondary education.

The school then was quite unlike what it is today. Academically, science was king and, despite the fact that the school had two outstanding language teachers, most students concentrated on mathematics, physics and chemistry, with English being compulsory. A fellow student of mine, who was destined to become one of South Australia's foremost historians and PAC chronicler, the late Ron Gibbs, did foreign-language subjects at year-12 in a class of just three or four students. Other Humanities subjects were rarely mentioned, and there was little music. Sports were highly valued, although it was restricted to just a few of them.

There was some encouragement at the school for us to participate in extra-curricula activities. To get the most out of any institution, I learned, you need to be widely involved. I took part in football, cricket and rowing, the annual school play, inter-school debating, and the PAC Science Journal. Having met a gorgeous young lady during my time in year-12, I asked her to the Read and White, and we married four years later. Most of us married at a young age in those days!

Fortunately, I enjoyed the mathematics and physics teaching I received at Princes, and I obtained good results in the various tests and public examinations I took. Languages I found difficult, and I failed year-11 Latin, which was the only subject I dropped. Learning the extensive vocabulary killed my interest. I

have fond memories of my senior mathematics and physics teachers, Jimmy Duff and Ray Smith, and I was fortunate to belong to a school that emphasised the areas in which I had some ability.

Having enjoyed some success at school and concluding that I wanted to go to the university (only Adelaide in those days), I enrolled for a science degree, emphasising mathematics and physics. In 1960, I graduated with first-class honours in physics. My desire to be involved in the wider life of the university also blossomed; I played university cricket and football, was President of the Student Representative Council, represented Adelaide in intervarsity debating and took part in student theatre. Here I met a very broad cross-section of students and was challenged by their widely differing views.

Now at a career cross-roads and feeling that it was time for me to leave Adelaide and seek alternative inspiration, I was fortunate to obtain a scholarship to undertake a doctorate in the exciting new field of Nuclear Physics at the Australia National University in Canberra. It was not so long after WWII and the dropping of the first atom bomb. During this time, I married, and three years later I graduated with a wife and two young children.

Wishing to further my study of nuclear physics for peaceful purposes, I obtained a post-doctoral Research Fellowship at the Atomic Energy Research Establishment at Harwell, in Berkshire, England. We stayed there nearly three years. Then, anxious to extend my limited experience in the British/Australian system, I was fortunate to be awarded a second post-doctoral research position at the University of Minnesota in America. American society was, indeed, very different.

In education, for example, people and teaching are much more diverse, and subject specialisation comes much later, both of which I support.

Now it really was crunch time; where to go now? My wife and I decided that we wanted to return to Australia and that our children should grow up here. I had offers

from long-established institutions but I was looking for something more novel and challenging. I decided on La Trobe University in Melbourne, which had been teaching for only one year and had a new and unusual structure, offering strong encouragement for inter-disciplinary studies for both students and staff. It was a choice I have never regretted; although I now grieve that our universities have become managed businesses. Unfashionable subjects wither and die, foreign students with seriously inadequate English are admitted and graduate, and doctorates are awarded for poorly researched theses on unimportant topics.

I was responsible for the teaching of nuclear physics and particle or high-energy physics, which I firmly believe are taught best in an historical context. As the years rolled by, I also took courses in physics for music students and physics for biology and agriculture students. I found all of it interesting and rewarding. I knew nuclear physics research was unlikely to be possible in a new university, and I was thrilled to be invited to join a group investigating the electronic properties of materials (for example, why metal is an electrical conductor and plastic is an electrical insulator). I am pleased to say that we were successful, both locally and internationally.

Throughout these years, I was captivated by the academic studies going on around me in this new and unusual university. In addition, I took an interest in the student colleges, I was chairman of several important committees, I sat on the Library Committee, and my academic colleagues elected me to the University Council on three separate occasions. My parents and my school had taught me to stand up for things I thought were important, things that universities sometimes forget but that academic staff believe in passionately. For many years I sat on the Editorial Board of the journal *Historical Records of Australian Science*.

And during those active and challenging times I began to ask myself: who are these Nobel-Prize-winning scientists?; how did they come to discover what they discovered?; were they modest and pleasant or arrogant and nasty?; plus how did they get on with their colleagues and their partners? And important-

ly, do these things really matter? So, my research edged slowly towards the history and philosophy of science. I wrote some short articles that attracted attention, and staff from other areas of the university supported me. They taught me that what I had been told as a student – that anything outside science was second rate and inferior – was totally wrong. Indeed, I had discussions with historians and philosophers that illuminated science and its social impact in ways that were different, and often superior, to those offered by most of my scientific colleagues.

At this time, an opportunity to climb the university's corporate ladder arose, but it didn't appeal to me. Nothing could beat teaching and research, and I have remained wedded to it for the rest of my life. It is an extraordinary privilege, which I could not ignore. And so, I was granted permission to move from the physics department to a joint appointment in the history and philosophy departments, where I both taught and did research on the history and philosophy of science, and especially science in Australia.

It has been one of the highlights of my career, because the history of science in Australia is a rich and important story that needs to be told and appreciated more deeply. And there is one special story of physics here that is of pivotal, worldwide importance and that is largely unknown: the story of William and Lawrence Bragg. William Bragg was Professor of Mathematics and Physics at the University of Adelaide from 1886 until early-1909; here he fell in love with and married a daughter of Charles and Alice Todd; and here their children were born.



The Bragg family at their East Terrace home in Adelaide, circa 1902, William Bragg on the right, Lawrence Bragg on the left, Lawrence's mother (née Todd) and brother Bob (killed at Gallipoli) in the centre – from the Archives of the Royal Institution of Great Britain, London.

Their elder son, Lawrence Bragg, was educated at St Peter's College and the University of Adelaide, and together father and son won the 1915 Nobel Prize in Physics. Thereafter they dominated important areas of physics for much of the twentieth century. It is one of the most attractive and important stories in Australian history, and late in my career I enjoyed the privilege and excitement of writing a joint biography of father and son, which highlights the Adelaide years.

As I now approach the end of my life, I wonder how it all happened? I had encouraging parents and a marvellous wife and children, who all supported me. I went to a school that provided a springboard to the

future and to excellent universities, all of which I found congenial; and I was everywhere encouraged to see the bigger picture. I have no regrets, it has been a marvellous journey, and I would gladly do it all again!



1970-2000

To what extent was the Israeli government justified in launching a pre-emptive strike on Egyptian airfields at the commencement of the Six-Day War (5th of June 1967)?

Edmund Black, Student

The June 1967 Six-Day War was one of the three main Arab-Israeli wars of the 20th century and set the stage for the territorial conflicts in the Middle East that continue to this day. However, the legitimacy of Israel in pre-empting the conflict with a strike on Egyptian airfields is still debated. Whilst it can be argued that Israel was justified in doing so, based on its Arab neighbours' aggressive tendencies throughout the 1950s and 60s, this essay contends that the Israelis were not justified, and instead overreacted to Egypt's opportunistic political posturing, which was not legitimately bellicose.

Arab aggressions during the decade leading up to the Six-Day War were an important causal factor thereof, because they created a climate where any escalation necessitated the outbreak of war. These aggressions are exemplified by the terrorist attacks to which Israel was subjected during the 1960s, and the water crises of the 1950s and 60s. For example, the militant arm of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO), called al-Fatah, carried out attacks against Israeli targets from bases in Syria, Egypt and Jordan. Even though the Egyptian government remained neutral on the attacks and the Jordanians condemned them (Shemesh, 2008, p. 169), the Syrian government after its 1966 *coup d'état* actively sponsored them (Kamrava, 2005, p. 116). Whilst the Syrians claimed that they were always acting in retaliation, the provocations to which they made reference were agricultural activities in Demilitarised Zones (DMZs) (Segev, 2007, p. 209), or fishermen in the Sea of Galilee (Hajjar, 1999, p. 323). Crucially, their attacks were mostly on civilian targets, which meant that both Israel's outrage and eventual response can be considered justified. Additionally, all Arab governments attempted to prevent Israel from accessing a water supply. Even though the Jordan Valley Unified Water Plan, which was equally beneficial to both Israel and its Arab League neighbours, had

been devised in 1953 by US Ambassador Eric Johnston, the League refused to ratify the plan, because it constituted recognition of the state of Israel (Gat, 2003, p. 33). Instead, they attempted to divert the River Jordan according to their own needs, and to the detriment of Israel. Had their plan been successful, Israel's water supply would have decreased by 11% and the salinity of their main water source, the Sea of Galilee, would have increased by 60 ppm (Kobori and Glantz, ed., 1998, p. 129). Noteworthy, these past events' role in justifying Israeli actions during the Six-Day War are maintained by Israel's historical orthodoxy, the Old Historians. Figures such as Efraim Karsh suggest that the water crises were an instance where the "militant rhetoric" of pan-Arabism manifested itself in "concrete plans" (Karsh, Glickman and Inbar, 2017, p. 10). Importantly, Israel used these plans as a pretext for their initial strikes in the first stages of the Six-Day War, calling them an "infringement of their sovereign rights" (Murakami, 1995, p. 297). Therefore, given the escalation of Syrian-sponsored terror attacks, and other neighbouring nations' involvement in the water crises, Israel seems justified in pre-emptively striking Egypt and allowing the aggressions of their Arab neighbours to culminate in a war.

However, the Old Historians' approach overemphasises the ideological basis for Arab aggressions, and does not consider the importance of figures such as Egypt's President Gamal Abdel Nasser, whose political opportunism led to brinkmanship, despite it now necessitating the outbreak of war. During the 1950s and 60s, Nasser was faced with a number of costly disasters which forced him to consolidate his power through whatever mutual Arab animosity towards Israel already existed. Contemporaries such as Lucius Battle (quoted in Cashman and Robinson, 2007, p. 181), the US Ambassador to Egypt, noted that Nasser was willing to provoke a foreign policy crisis to decrease "mounting internal pressure against his regime", accepting "the risk that [Arab nations] might start a war with the Israelis". Nasser's actions within the Arab world during the 1950s left him without allies (with the exception of Algeria), in what is sometimes called the Arab

Cold War (Kamrava, 2005, p. 113). For example, his failed unification with Syria, the United Arab Republic, collapsed after the 1961 Syrian *coup d'état*, with diplomatic tensions remaining high afterwards. Significantly, Nasser was bound to his only remaining ally, Algerian leader Ahmed Ben Bella, as a “fellow revolutionary” (Kamrava, 2005, p. 113), with their shared anti-imperialist and anti-monarchist beliefs drawing Nasser into prolonged military involvement in the Yemeni Civil War (1962). This worsened Nasser’s diplomatic relations, since the monarchies of Saudi Arabia and Jordan backed their Yemeni counterpart. The war was also hugely costly for Egypt, with over 70,000 soldiers being deployed, 10,000 of whom became casualties (Ferris, 2013, pp. 193-4). Having thus incurred the anger of the military, Nasser became increasingly wary of a *coup d'état*, to the extent that he felt obliged to authorise plans by Field-Marshal Abdel Hakim Amer to preemptively strike Israel on the 27th of May (Oren, 2002, p. 92), even though he was fully aware that he was “not in a position to go to war” (quoted in Kamrava, 2005, p. 117). Instead, Nasser sought to regain control over the military by blocking Israeli passage through the Straits of Tiran, which the Israeli government had established as a *casus belli* after the 1956 Suez Crisis (Kamrava, 2005, p. 117). Tom Segev (2007, p. 248), of Israel’s New Historians movement, accurately attributes this to political necessity rather than ideology, drawing on the testimony of former Israeli premier David Ben-Gurion, who thought that the blockade would be “enough for Nasser”. This makes the Old Historians’ purported extreme ideological motivation impossible, since it would imply provocation with the intent of war – it is more likely that Nasser only wanted a short-term crisis, knowing that all-out war would be disastrous for Egypt and its neighbours. It thus seems less justifiable for Israel to force Nasser’s hand and drive him towards a war in which he did not believe he or any of his allies would actually participate.

Furthermore, the New Historians more accurately portray Israel’s culpability for both the aforementioned Arab aggressions and Nasser’s actions that directly catalysed the war. Whilst the Old Historians view the Israelis as “beleaguered victims of Arab aggression”, the New Historians note the Six-Day War as

the point at which Israelis can only be considered “occupiers” (Bregman, 2014, p. xxv). For example, after an al-Fatah landmine killed 3 policemen and wounded 6 near es-Samu on the Israel-Jordan border, Israel’s response can only be considered excessive and expansionary. Nearly 4,000 soldiers were mobilised, along with tanks and aircraft, in order to cross the border. Importantly, only one of their goals was avenging al-Fatah’s landmine: as well as this, they sought to attack Jordanian police posts and demolish houses in Hebron as a warning to the PLO (Segev, 2007, p. 237). Given that this event is often considered the “onset of the crisis culminating in the [Six-Day War]” (Finkelstein, 1995, p. 185), it is reasonable to regard the Israeli pre-emptive strike at the beginning of the Six-Day War as equally excessive and expansionary. This excess was not without precedent, either: several minor attacks from Syria on Israeli targets met with the wholesale destruction of Syrian MiG fighter planes in response, as part of a general tendency towards such air skirmishes favoured by the Israeli military (Segev, 2007, p. 210). Crucially, not only were these Israeli responses thus unjustified, but they were also made after Israel initially provoked al-Fatah’s attacks. For example, the 1949 armistice agreement between Israel and its Arab neighbours prohibited military action in its newly established DMZs as “a flagrant violation of [the] agreement” (The Avalon Project, n.d.). However, the Israeli agricultural activities that provoked attacks were generally conducted using tanks, or under military supervision (Segev, 2007, p. 193). Even if these could be dismissed as precautionary actions, Israel’s overbearing response still indicates that their eventual escalation to the outbreak of war was only justified to a moderate extent. Moreover, Israel had intended expansion into the territories it gained during the Six-Day War for many years. Even before the Suez Crisis, there had been plans for expansion into the Sinai Peninsula, Golan Heights and West Bank, all of which were occupied during the Six-Day War (Rubner, 2017, p. 172). In fact, the chief of staff of the Israeli Defence Force, Yitzhak Rabin, proposed only occupation of the Gaza Strip after the blockade, but this was rejected as being “too lim-

ited” (Rubner, 2017, p. 172). Given these expansionary tendencies, Israel’s pre-emptive strike can be viewed as the unjustifiable first step towards occupation, rather than a legitimate (or justified) pre-emption of aggression.

Thus, it can be seen that Israel’s pre-emptive strike at the commencement of the Six-Day War was only justified to a minor extent. At that time, the only nation to display legitimate belligerence is Israel itself, with its pre-emptive strike readily portrayable as a move towards occupation. Although damaging to Israel, Arab-backed terror attacks and water crises do not necessarily portray a legitimate desire for war with Israel, with Nasser’s opportunistic political posturing providing a more satisfactory explanation for the increase in tensions before the war.

Dr John Jenkin, A personal reflection.

David Cornish, Scholar

For nine years it was my privilege to be the President of the Historical Society of South Australia. The Society was founded in 1974 with the aims of presenting and publishing South Australian history which it does to this day. Its inaugural President was Ron Gibbs AM (PAC 1951-55).

Through Ron and my work at the College I met John Jenkin (PAC 1951-56) as they planned their 50-year reunion of leaving school. John excelled at the College and repeated Year 12 to be Captain of the School, remaining a Princes Man for the rest of his life.

When I retired as President, I requested that at my final meeting John Jenkin be the guest speaker. He was a world authority on the South Australian Nobel Prize winning physicists the Braggs and was finalising at the time William and Lawrence Bragg, Father and Son, *The Most Extraordinary Collaboration in Science* (2011, Oxford). John's topic was the application of sound wave technology for range finding by artillery during World War I as pioneered by Sir Lawrence Bragg, and problems associated with submarine detection as researched by his father Sir William Bragg.

Present that night was Rear Admiral Kevin Scarce, the Society's Patron and Governor of South Australia. This was no coincidence as I matched the Governor's interests with John's subject. It proved to be a good call as the Governor put aside his prepared vote of thanks and made personal and professional observations about John's topic. John was delighted that his presentation had been appreciated by such a perceptive man.

That night I was presented with the *Cyclopaedia of South Australia* Vol. 1 (1907) and Vol. 2 (1909), both beautifully restored by Art Lab and once the property of John Jenkin.

These rare volumes are a highlight of my personal library. They are not only significant in their own right, but personally significant as they were a gift to me that once belonged to a fine historian and scientist whom I considered a friend.

My last communications with John Jenkin concerned his contribution to this Journal. He said to me how delighted he was that his final published work would involve his old school, of which he was so proud. For John, his journey had come full circle and he was content that the conclusion of his career should be where it commenced in earnest in 1951.



L-R Dr John Jenkin, Rear Admiral Kevin Scarce AC, CSC, David Cornish, 26 March 2010



FACT VS FICTION

Hamilton vs Bohemian Rhapsody

Baily Lock, Student

Retellings of life stories and Historical events are a very popular form of storytelling, which has transcended various forms of media and literature. But how far can an artist take creative liberties? When retelling history, how far can the truth be bent for the benefit of an audience? Numerous historical retellings in film, theatre and television have contained historical inaccuracies for various reasons. Whether it be to tighten a life-long story or to give a specific actor more screen time, artists have been taking creative liberties with history for years. To compare the extent to which creators have taken creative liberties with historical events, two forms of storytelling will be compared, theatre and film.

Hamilton: An American Musical took Broadway by storm when it was released in mid 2015 and quickly became an internet sensation and household title as arguably the most influential musical of the decade. Written by its creator and star, Lin Manuel-Miranda, the show follows the life of Founding Father Alexander Hamilton and his journey from poverty to prosperity. Despite the show being praised for its modern storytelling of previously unpopular events in America's history, there were still large factual errors in the play. In the song *Aaron Burr Sir*, Alexander Hamilton and friend Aaron Burr arrive at a tavern where they encounter John Laurens, Hercules Mulligan and Marquis de Lafayette, who all go on to play larger parts in the American revolution as well as the show. The song quickly introduces the audiences to the five key players in act one, with each character using one verse to identify themselves to the audience. However, the song takes place in 1776 when in reality Hamilton would not meet several of these historical figures until much later in the revolution. The only person Hamilton had encountered at this point in time was undercover British spy Hercules Mulligan. This decision was made by Miranda to quickly introduce the audience to the main characters and com-

press the show's timeline. Despite its inaccuracies, the introduction to these characters does not have a major impact on the show and merely works as a plot device. Historical changes can also be seen in the song, *Satisfied* which involves the Schuyler sisters who Hamilton becomes romantically involved with throughout the show. The eldest sister, Angelica Schuyler, states "My father has no sons so I'm the one who has to social climb". In actuality, Phillip Schuyler had fifteen children, eight of which survived to adulthood. Included in this number were three brothers. In an interview with *Genius Lyrics*, Miranda said that he intentionally left this fact out of the show to give the character of Angelica more character motivation and responsibility to become her own woman throughout the show. This is another example of how tiny changes to historical accuracies won't have a large impact on the rest of the story and can be done to better fit the time constraints of telling such a story. Furthermore, the song *The Ten Duel Commandments*, a duel between John Laurens and General Charles Lee and foreshadows the climax of the show where Hamilton loses his life in a duel to Aaron Burr. To support this foreshadowing, Miranda took the creative liberty to change details of who was present at the duel. In the duel, Hamilton is the second to John Laurens, with Burr being the second to Charles Lee. In fact, Burr wasn't even present or aware of the duel, Major Evan Edwards was the second to Lee. Miranda made this change as Edwards didn't go on to play any part in the remainder of Hamilton's life, so he replaced him with Aaron Burr who would later enter a duel himself with Hamilton. Ultimately, while Miranda changed facts surrounding character interactions, all changes were made to fit the stories character arcs and compressed timeline.

Bohemian Rhapsody, directed by Bryan Singer, is a 2018 Academy Award winning biopic about the famous rock band Queen and their lead singer Freddie Mercury. Despite the film receiving praise for its leading performance, the film contains numerous historical inaccuracies. *Bohemian Rhapsody* changes the time and place when the band met. The film depicts Freddie Mercury meeting Roger Taylor and Brian May after one of their

concerts where their lead singer has just quit, to which Freddie offers to join the band. However, in contrast to *Hamilton*, which changed the time of its characters meeting to compress the timeline, by the time Taylor and May's previous singer had left, they had known Mercury for quite a long time. They were even sharing a flat together. This change was made to suit the film's character arc, with Mercury particularly overconfident when he first meets the band and viewing himself as above them. Another change which was made to the band's story was their break in 1982. The film portrays Mercury as the reason that the group disbanded, betraying the trust of his fellow band members to go and make his own personal album. In reality, this was a mutual agreement made by the band after the release of their 1982 album *Hot Space*. The film villainises Mercury's decision making him seem like the only member to make a solo album, when in fact, both May and Taylor released individual albums before the band's return in 1983. This decision was made to continue the growth of Freddie's character arc throughout the film of learning to appreciate his band members. However, the most interesting change made to history in the film is Mercury's announcement of his illness. *Bohemian Rhapsody* depicts Mercury revealing this information to his band members in the rehearsal period before their infamous Live Aid performance in 1985. Freddie Mercury was not diagnosed with AIDS until 1988. This was changed in the film to add emotional stakes to the film's climax performance and serve as the conclusion to Mercury's character arc in the film.

In contrast to *Hamilton*, *Bohemian Rhapsody* changes several facts of the band's history as well as their personal decisions to fit a narrative rather than telling the band's actual story. Whilst *Hamilton* does make changes to history, they are largely insignificant when compared to the rearranging of events in *Bohemian Rhapsody*. Both the film and play are a great representation of how creative liberty can be used when retelling historical events and stories, and how their reshaping can change key moments in famous legacies. While the decisions made in each respective project are understandable, *Bohemian Rhapsody* meddles with history slightly too much in order to fulfil its main characters arc by its finale live aid performance.

To what extent did short-term Serbian Nationalism lead to the outbreak of the Yugoslav Wars? (1991)

James Basheer, Student

Yugoslavia's bloody collapse was among the final of 20th century Eastern European. This investigation will involve the Yugoslav Wars - a series of separatist conflicts largely between Serbia, led by ruthless dictator Slobodan Milošević, and the individual Yugoslav republics that pursued independence. These conflicts ultimately caused the collapse of the Yugoslav state, however historiographical debate exists as to what extent the wars were caused by the nationalist aims of Serbia, one of the Yugoslav Republics. Serbian actions to undermine the Yugoslav democracy and assert dominance over the nation were the most significant short-term factor in the collapse of the nation. However, it was ultimately long-term ethno-religious and ideological divides that were most significant in the eventual collapse of the state as, ultimately, the individual republics of Yugoslavia could not coexist as a single nation. Additionally, failed economic policy was notable in the outbreak of one of the most violent wars in European history, and the eventual collapse of the country.

Resurgent Serbian nationalism was the key short-term factor in the outbreak of the Yugoslav Wars, as convincingly argued by historian Arnold Suppan (2003, p. 112), who attributes it as the primary reason for the collapse of Yugoslav democracy. Among the main causes of the separatist movements in the Socialist Republics was the installation of pro-Milošević leaders in Kosovo, Vojvodina and Montenegro to ensure a Serbian voting bloc, consisting of half of the eight members of the League of Communists (Karamanić, 2009, p. 1). As leader of the Serbian League of Communists, Slobodan Milošević rallied his supporters to "take to the streets" with the slogan "Strong Serbia, Strong Yugoslavia!" alienating citizens of the other republics, especially Slovenia and Croatia (Crnobrnja, 1996, p. 108). This action to dominate the League, as well as the clear nationalist sentiment from Belgrade, rebirthed the critique from federation that Yugoslavia was merely a veiled attempt to establish a state

of Greater Serbia. Eventually, a greater rift between the ethnic Serbs and Slovenes developed, resulting in the 1990 dissolution of the league into individual parties for each republic (Tempest, 1990). This removed a crucial unifying system which had allowed for peaceful negotiation of crises and was a major factor in the collapse of the state. Thus, Suppan is supported in this claim, as Serbian nationalism was highly significant in the collapse of the League of Communists, the effective end of Yugoslav democracy. Ultimately however, declarations of war from other Republics largely came in order to defend their land against Serbia, as President of Yugoslavia and Serbian representative to the League, Borisav Jović stated to Croatian politician Stjepan Mesić that the Serbs were "interested in Bosnia-Herzegovina... [especially] the 66%... which was Serb land" (Armatta, 2012, p. 13). This shows the nationalist aims of Serbia, and thus violent independence movements in Bosnia-Herzegovina became a manner of defence of autonomy, demonstrating Serbian nationalism as a key cause of the conflict in Bosnia. Serbian aims in Croatia were also clear, with soldiers posted in Croatia to train rebels and lead an insurgency in Zagreb. In 1991, Serbian General Miroslav Đorđević staffed an illegal military operation in Croatia to gain Serbian control, breaching Croatia's rights as an independent republic and showing the aggressive extent of Serbian nationalism (Armatta, p. 17). This led to Croatian discontent and moves towards independence, resulting in violent conflict. Ultimately, Nationalist Serbian actions to breach the rights of the Yugoslav Republics and assert its power were the main short-term cause of the Yugoslav Wars.

Short-term Serbian Nationalism was significant in the collapse of Yugoslavia. However, long-term ethno-religious and ideological divides were the main factor in the collapse of the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia, serving as fuel to be sparked by the later catalyst of Serbian Nationalism. Whilst short-term factors were significant in the collapse of the nation, ultimate-

ly Yugoslavia as a unified state could not survive in the long-term, due to unsurpassable divisions during the early years of the nation and before. Historian Lenhard Cohen (2008, p. 3) states that Yugoslavia was formed on a “centuries-old fault line between Islam, Orthodox Christianity and Catholicism.” This was particularly apparent during the Ottoman-Habsburg wars, which lasted over 250 years. The 1714 Treaty of Paffarowitz saw much of modern Serbia and parts of Croatia incorporated in the Habsburg empire, whilst Bosnia-Herzegovina remained part of the Ottoman empire. Because of this, Serbia spent most of the 18th and 19th centuries away from its Bosnian cousin, thus forcing their respective cultures to develop independent of one another (Hupchick, 2002, p. 248). This divide, resulting in Bosnia-Herzegovina developing under Islamic influence and Serbia under European, ultimately caused a rift greater than the connection of Balkan states. The Catholic and Orthodox states of Croatia and Serbia, and the Muslim Bosnia-Herzegovina could not exist as a single entity. Vast differences in culture and religion caused by the Ottoman-Habsburg Wars prevented a sustainable Yugoslavia from ever existing, as the Balkans could no longer be considered a single ethnic region. The structure of the government of Yugoslavia was heavily disputed, further showing the divisions in the country which lead to its eventual collapse. In the 1921 vote to determine the governmental structure, centralism defeated federalism receiving just 53% of the vote. The vote was marred by the Croatian delegates leaving the vote in disgust, expressing a clear lack of confidence for a united Yugoslav future (Jelavich, 2003, p. 100). This divide could not be overcome, with seven Prime Ministers and twenty-four cabinet reorganisations in the first ten years of the nation (2003, p. 99), a trend which rarely varied. Furthermore, Yugoslavia could not nationally assimilate through education, a critical component of other confederated European states, such as Germany (Jelavich, p. 94). This is shown through the primary history textbook in early Yugoslavia- *the History of the Serbian People [With a Review of Croatian and Slovenian History]*. Over three-quarters of the book, intended to educate all Yugoslav children, focused on the history of Serbia, neglecting the history of other South Slavic people (Jelavich, p. 110, 111). This failed to create a united identity within the Yugoslavia, causing Balkan people to identify with their own nationality rather than as Yugoslav. This led to the

nationalist movements that arose in the late 20th century, which ultimately caused the outbreak of war. Furthermore, disunity between the Yugoslav states was exacerbated by the WWII actions of the Croatian Fascist Utaše, which brought about the concept of ‘Serbophobia’ by killing between 200,000 and 500,000 Serbs (Yeomans, 2012, p. 18). These brutal past crimes were often used to justify later crimes by the Serbian Army against Croats and were a key provocation for anti-Croatian policies. Although short-term Serbian nationalism was the catalyst to the outbreak of the wars, long-term divides were the main factor in the conflict, as it was clear from federation and before that the Yugoslav people could not exist as a singular state.

Distinct from the simmering long-term national divides, the failure of economic policies was a notable short-term cause of the Yugoslav Wars. Upon the outbreak of war, the economy was devastated, with a contracting economy, 164% inflation and 16% unemployment (Theodora, 1992). This was a major factor for independence movements in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Slovenia. A key example of this was the Smederevo steel plant fiasco. Although 14,000 jobs were promised in 1963, the plant only opened in 1987 with between 7,000 and 8,000 fully employed workers. Despite making a modern equivalent of almost US\$100,000,000 loss in the first year alone, the plant continued its operations. Throughout the late 1980s, one-third of all Yugoslav capital was producing between 40% and 50% below capacity (Thomas, 1999, p. 25, 26). This saw mass unemployment and economic failings such as the Smederevo steel plant, leading to large scale protests, with over four million involved in 1988 alone (Cohen, 1995, p. 46). The late 1980s saw a sharp fall in income in Serbia and Kosovo. This began economic independence movements in the latter, with strong tensions between the ethnic Serbian and Albanian populations. Despite this, Thomas (p. 30) convincingly argues that these economic failures merely heightened a long-term issue- only 26% of Kosovo residents were ethnic Serbians upon federation, just 9.9% come 1991, compared to a far more dominant 81.6% eth-

nic Albanians. Thus, it can be drawn that whilst economic issues in Kosovo were a significant catalyst, long-term issues most impacted Serbian control, allowing for the independence of other republics and the beginning of Kosovo's path to independence. The centralised government's investment policy was a major catalyst in the nation's collapse. Collectivisation processes greatly limited land ownership for the nomadic transhumant population, a large part of the pre-war economy in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Vojvodina and Croatia. This was followed by forced attempts at industrialisation, with the great discontent of the farming population shown through the 1950 Cazin Rebellion (Sarajevo Times, 2016). This led to long-term decreases in the state's agriculture producing potential, eventually causing bread lines and rapid price rises. This prompted protests in Serbia and Croatia (Kifner, 1993), building to large-scale domestic unrest and eventual war. Thus, the conclusion can be drawn that the many issues which caused protests and divides within Yugoslavia came as a result of poor economic policy, and thus it was an important short-term factor in the outbreak of the conflict. However, as claimed by Thomas, long-term ethno-religious and ideological divides ultimately led to the outbreak of the Yugoslav Wars.

Long-term factors were the primary cause of the outbreak of the Yugoslav wars. Whilst short-term Serbian nationalism and economic factors provided contributing catalysts, distinctive differences and a divisive Yugoslav past could not be avoided. Thus, when Milošević's nationalist movement and poor economic policies came into their full effect, the result was the outbreak of the deadliest European conflict since World War Two.



BOOK REVIEWS

Hannibal: A Hellenistic Life – Book Review:


Mr Bean, Teacher

Macdonald immediately outlines in the text the key issue that plagues classical historians – the primary sources of which we base so much of our contemporary knowledge is littered with bias. Hannibal’s tale is, of course, no exception.

In fact, as Macdonald explicitly explains, the bias in the Ancient sources surrounding Hannibal is not what you would think and raises a fascinating learning point for sources in the Ancient world. Many speculate the Romans would be unkind to Hannibal in their stories, perhaps resenting him for his near conquest of the city or for such decisive massacres as Cannae or Trasimene. In fact, as Macdonald explains, the opposite is true. The plight of the modern historian is to try and weed out the positive bias towards Hannibal. To make the eventual Roman victory even grander, they often paint a picture of a foe who is near deific in historical descriptions.

In order to combat this, it is clear that Macdonald has done some significant research, with a reference list that spans nearly forty pages. She is scientific in her approach to this problem, often breaking at points in the narrative to discuss the reliability of the account. Even sometimes comparing and contrasting two to three sources together if there is simply no consensus as to which side is truer.

To compress Hannibal’s story into four hundred pages would seem like a daunting task to any historian, nevertheless, Macdonald has done a terrific job. Naturally, the majority of the text focuses around the Second Punic War (218 – 201BCE), in which after suffering humiliating defeat, reparation and the loss of Sicily and young Hannibal Barca promises his father to bring ruin to the new Mediterranean superpower – the Roman Republic.



What follows is, in all, a sad story. A man who by the burden of a vow forgoes any semblance of a peaceful or normal life and is instead defined by the war itself. His story and the story of the Punic war are intertwined in every way. He has no children, his father, brothers and eventually himself are all taken by the struggle of war against the Ancient superpower. Macdonald does well in explaining this, alongside filling in the gaps in the story with interesting cultural and geographical side notes.

My key criticism of the book does come in its hurried pace. For the sake of telling his story in this analytical way she does forgo a deeper insight when describing how these critical classical battles occurred. These stories have already been told many times however, and while Hannibal’s life was centred around war, an action-paced play by play rendition was clearly not Macdonald’s intention.

Instead what she has done so brilliantly here is paint a perspective that is often unseen by Western audiences. We see the Romans in the text as the Carthaginians did, oppressors. The book left me with a sombre feeling and a genuine empathy to what it would have been like to have to make the decision to fight and perish or submit and be conquered. Despite all its intense themes *Hannibal: A Hellenistic Life* is approachable, compact and thought-provoking. I highly recommend it to any who are interesting in Ancient and Classical history.

Volker Ullrich – Hitler Vol I: Ascent 1889-1939 & Hitler Vol II: Downfall 1939-45 - Book Review

Ron Pippett, Teacher

There have been almost 120,000 books published on Hitler and whilst I have not read them all, I am reasonably confident I have read the best of them. From William Shirer's masterful *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich* to what is often regarded as the seminal work on this subject, Ian Kershaw's *Hitler, 1889 – 1936: Hubris* and *Hitler 1936 – 1945 Nemesis*, there has been some fascinating research conducted by some excellent scholars all offering critical insights into this momentous era. These include excellent studies by Alan Bullock, Hugh Trevor-Roper, Karl Dietrich Bracher, Richard Evans, Richard Overy, Martin Gilbert, Antony Beevor and more recently Michael Burleigh and Australia's Paul Ham. Why this fascination with a German despot who died amongst the ruins of Berlin 75 years ago? Brilliant German historian, Joachim Fest, (whose book I patently remember reading way back in the early 1980s as a keen young History scholar) summed it up best.

“History records no phenomenon like him... No one else produced, in a solitary course lasting only a few years, such accelerations in the pace of history. No one else changed the world and left behind such a wake of ruins as he did.” (Fest, 1971)

In 2016, another brilliant German historian had his monumental work, *Hitler Vol I: Ascent 1889-1939* published in English and scholars, reviewers and PAC History teachers were not only impressed by the scale of research, but also by the authenticity of this work. Here Ullrich offered some very different perspectives on Hitler's personality and motives. Perhaps his meticulous interrogation of source material was assisted by his native German background or perhaps the generational passage of time allowed Ullrich to see a verifiable Hitler up close. Kakutani in the *New York Times* described this account of Hitler as a “...fascinating Shakespearean parable about how the confluence



of circumstance, chance, a ruthless individual and the wilful blindness of others can transform a country — and, in Hitler's case, lead to an unimaginable nightmare for the world.” At some risk, Ullrich has attempted to capture the human aspects of Hitler rather than present him as some satanic monster and rationalizes this in his introduction by suggesting that it actually “sheds new light on Hitler's specific style of rule.” (Ullrich, 2016) By teasing out the banality of Hitler and describing not just his fractious interactions with Wehrmacht Generals but also his relationships with servants, cooks and secretaries, we begin to comprehend the far more prescient picture of this compulsive, pernicious and menacing autocrat.

Once the translated version of Ullrich's *Hitler Vol 2: Downfall 1939 – 1945* became available early this year it was expeditiously acquired by a prominent PAC History identity. It did not disappoint. Ullrich picks up where he left off. At the conclusion of 1939, Hitler retained enormous popularity as his coveted rallies continued at Nuremberg, but Germany was at war and Ullrich contends that many Germans were less than thrilled about this prospect despite the very public displays of adulation.

Ullrich traces the inevitable decline of this sinister charlatan in a balanced manner. The implausible faith Germans put in Hitler and his disciples was like a ticking time bomb and Ullrich points to Stalingrad as the point of no return. Clearly Hitler's narcissism and inability to listen to his military experts was always going to take Germany to the abyss of obliteration.

“As is typical for many autodidacts, Hitler believed he knew better than specialists... and treated them with an arrogance that was but the reverse of his own limited horizons.” (Ullrich, 2020)

Hitler would often refer to his own Great War experience whenever a foolhardy commander questioned him. However, Ullrich does document Gen. Kurt Zeitzler as responding with “My Fuhrer may I point out that I went into the field with a gun on my shoulder in August 1914, was promoted to a lieutenant that year, led a company for two years and was wounded twice.” Brave man! Hitler responded with, “Let’s move on.” (Zeitzler would eventually be dismissed from the German Army, but survived the war and went on to live a long life.)

However, the most fascinating chapter, entitled ‘The Road to the Holocaust’ quotes two of Hitler’s Generals describing him as a “brutal, hateful bully” as he shared with them his plans for a post-war Europe. His vision involved an apocalyptic nightmare where Russian cities would be wiped off the face of the earth and any survivors would become slave-labourers, their children receiving no education and minimal food. Of course, we actually see this cataclysm eventuate through the activities of the SS Einsatzgruppen. *“Entire Jewish communities in the occupied parts of the Soviet Union became targets for the death squads. Massacres of thousands of victims were an everyday occurrence.”* (Ullrich, 2020)

Though what is particularly noteworthy is Ullrich’s contention that the Wehrmacht were very much acquiescent of these atrocities in the USSR and even assisted at times. Furthermore, in attempting to explain the compliance of most Germans, Ullrich cogently states:

“The murder of millions, planned with bureaucratic thoroughness and carried out in partly factory-like fashion – the singular dimensions of the crime taxed the imagination of even those who believed Hitler capable of all sorts of evil.” (Ullrich, 2020)

Interesting that Ullrich is very dismissive of Albert Speer’s account of the final weeks of Hitler’s regime – yet views Traudl Junge’s testimony as far more reliable. It is certainly quite edifying to see how an esteemed historian selects and assesses his sources – a lesson for all students of History of course. In his final chapter, Ullrich considers Hitler’s place in History and has this to say,

“In the end the Reich lay in ruins and the German national state... perished in an orgy of violence and criminal atrocities. The moral trauma Hitler left behind lasted more than Germany’s temporary loss of its status as a sovereign nation...” (Ullrich, 2020)

The combined *Hitler Vol I: Ascent 1889-1939* and *Hitler Vol II: Downfall 1939-45* is a profound work, certainly worth reading whether you know much about the Third Reich or not and there is definitely a uniquely German flavour here that is both enlightening and heartening. However, as these combined works approach 2000 pages, it might be some time before I tackle another sizeable study of this most sinister individual.


On the Trail of Genghis Khan by Tim Cope - Book Review

Myles McEwen, Student

In June 2004, inspired by the nomadic Mongols of the 13th century, who under Genghis Khan set out to build the largest land empire in history, Australian Tim Cope set out to ride 10,000 km on horseback from Mongolia to Hungary. Cope's unbelievable adventure explores the fascinating relationship between man and horse and the ancient nomadic lifestyle in the Eurasian steppe. Over 511 pages, Cope's three- and a half-year journey through vast landscapes inspired by the extraordinary feat of the Mongols pushes readers understanding and comprehension of a lifestyle we will never truly apprehend.

The first point which instantly grappled my attention in "On the Trail of Genghis Khan" was on the first page. Cope's description of the "sharp songs floating through the cleansed air from unseen birds" and how "horse's hooves pressed into soft ground was steady as a heartbeat" took me straight to the environment of the Mongolian steppe. I fell into the eyes of Cope just like he fell into the eyes of the ancient nomad. The true authenticity of Cope's adventure drove my thoughts into all kinds of directions. I began to visualise Cope writing and thinking after a long day riding on horseback, calmly starrng into the horizon, as every detail of his adventure was written down in perfect detail. Cope's perspective is one like no other, one that instantly resonated with me, and one I wish could resonate with everyone. Especially in this current period, this book is as significant as ever. Global issues, whether it be climate change, Trump's next tweet or the devastating environmental effects of those profit loving companies; these issues continue to sweep society whilst an obsession with digital content blinds humanities connection with the natural world. The most upsetting aspect about Cope's journey is the realisation of societies lack of spiritual, cultural and environmental connection in parts of the world.

One of the most notable aspects of Cope's adventure which especially stood out to me were the impacts of industrialisation on the nomadic lifestyle and environment. I began to realise that not only were there hundreds of kilometres of empty, untouched land across the Eurasian steppe but individuals and families which continued to uphold a fading nomadic lifestyle. The effects of industrialisation merged both the ancient living style and modern, mechanised ways; creating an unforgettable juxtaposition of life which, I believe, is the one of the key ideas to take away from Cope's journey. The second idea which brought a true smile to my face was man's relationship between animals, not only between horse but other animals like Cope's Kazakh dog, Tigon. Cope noted that there "*was no better explanation for my journey than the reward of riding with my steeds, Tigon running by their hooves, as we sailed over the open steppe*". This summed it all up. The third point that resonated with me was the harsh nature of Cope's journey. A range of events left me stunned and, in some moments, left tears in my eyes. An unforgettable moment, in a small village where Cope spent 15 months sick and confined, was Tigon's survival from near



death. These events struck me, and I began to see this story as symbolic of the nomadic lifestyle which continues to struggle for survival in today's world.

Cope's journey is magnificent. It reignited that sense of adventure that seems to disappear in ordinary life and highlighted the beautiful, shocking, calm and terrifying nature of nomadic lifestyle.

Overall, a worthy read, even when the extensive material can feel rather repetitive, Cope delivers an emotional, spectacular story of his travels delving into the vivid juxtaposition between modern civilisation and nomadic lifestyle.

References

Alex Titus

- Coward, Walter (1980) *Irrigation and Agricultural Development in Asia: Perspectives from the social sciences*, Cornell University Press,
- De Silvia, K.M (2007) *Sri Lanka Troubled Inheritance*, Illustrated edition, International Centre of Ethnic Studies, Kandy, Sri Lanka
- De Silvia, K.M, (1981) *A history of Sri Lanka*, Illustrated edition, Oxford U.P., Delhi, India
- Gregory, William (1894), Sir William Gregory, K. C. M. G., formerly member of Parliament and sometime governor of Ceylon, an autobiography. FIRST EDITION. London: J. Murray
- Herath H. M. G. (1984) *The Rubber Industry in Sri Lanka: Dilemmas in Development Policy*, Asian Survey Vol. 24, No. 8. University of California Press, California.
- Lakshman Wiligamage and Tisdell Clement, (2000), *Sri Lanka's Development Since Independence: Socio-economic perspectives and analysis*, Huntington, NY
- Manogaran Chelvadurai, (1987), *Ethnic Conflict and Reconciliation in Sri Lanka*, University of Hawaii Press^[1].
- Peebles, Patrick, 2006, *The history of Sri Lanka*, Greenwood Press, University of Missouri, Kansas City.
- Punchihewa Gamini (2012) *Souvenirs of a Forgotten Heritage*, STAMFORD LAKE PUBLICATION
- Snodgrass, Donald (1966), *Ceylon: An Export Economy in Transition*, Irwin, 1966
- Wickramasinghe, Nira (2015), *Sri Lanka in the Modern Age: A History*, Oxford University Press.
- Wright, Arnold, (1999) *Twentieth Century Impressions of Ceylon: Its History, People, Commerce* Asian Educational Services, Asian Educational Services, New Delhi
- Journal articles:
- B. Asoka (1982) 'The establishment and consolidation of the plantation economy in Sri Lanka', *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, 14:3, 2-22,
- Ceylon Heritage (2012) 'RUBBER PRODUCTS'. [ONLINE] Available at: <http://www.matrix-edu.com/MATRIXTES/ceylon/coir/rubber.html>. [Accessed 3 May 2020].
- Kelegama, S. (2000) 'Development in Independent Sri Lanka: What Went Wrong? Economic and Political Weekly', Vol. 35, No. 17, 1477-1490.
- Leelaratne, T. P. G. N., Gunawardena, Wasuwat Ananda, (1980) 'The Rubber Industry in Sri Lanka: Bleak 80's outlook Bright 90's prospects', *Economic Review*.
- S.N, (1952), 'Rubber Production and Prices', *THE ECONOMIC WEEKLY*, August 2.
- Athukorala, P. and Jayasuriya, S., 2012. 'Economic Policy Shifts in Sri Lanka: The Post-Conflict Development Challenge'. 1st ed. Arndt-Corden Department of Economics Crawford School of Public Policy: ANU College of Asia and the Pacific.
- Athukorala, Prema-chandra and Jayasuriya Sisira (2012) 'Economic Policy Shifts in Sri Lanka: The Post-Conflict Development Challenge', Arndt-Corden Department of Economics Crawford School of Public Policy ANU College of Asia and the Pacific.
- Athukorala, Prema-chandra, (2014) 'Sri Lanka's Post-Conflict Development Challenge: Learning from the Past', Arndt-Corden Department of Economics Crawford School of Public Policy: ANU College of Asia and the Pacific, [ONLINE] Available at: https://acde.crawford.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/publication/acde_crawford_anu_edu_au/2016-06/acde_wp_econ_2014_05.pdf
- Athukoralav, P., 2017. 'THE SRI LANKAN ECONOMY CHARTING A NEW COURSE', 1st ed. Mandaluyong: ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK. [ONLINE] Available at: <https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/373316/sri-lankan-economy.pdf>
- Dheerasinghe, K.G.D.D. 2010, 'Recent trends in the emerging economy of Sri Lanka. Central bank of Sri Lanka' [ONLINE] Available at: https://www.cbsl.gov.lk/sites/default/files/cbslweb_documents/publications/other-pub/60th_anniversary_recent_trends_in_the_emerging_economy_of_sri_lanka.pdf. [Accessed 1 May 2020].
- Gunatillake Godfrey (2000), 'Development policy regimes', Marga institute, centre for development studies in Sri Lanka, Colombo
- Jayasuriya, Sisira, (2009) 'Distortions to agricultural incentives in Sri Lanka', *Agricultural Distortions Working Paper 31*, World Bank's Development Research Group.
- Miguel, Edward and Roland, Gerard, (2005) 'The long-term impact of bombing Vietnam' University of California, Berkeley Department of Economics [ONLINE] Available at: https://eml.berkeley.edu/~groland/pubs/vietnam-bombs_19oct05.pdf [Accessed 3 May 2020].
- Thasfiha, Jinnah, Arachchige Udara and Dissanayaka, Dilsha 2020, 'Sri Lankan Tea Industry', University of

Sri Jayewardenepura

Government sources

Jayewardene Junius Six-year plan for Ceylon Sri Lanka Minister for finance Dept. of Information, Secretariat, [1948]

Mazumdar, Sucheta, (1981), Sri Lanka: Problems of an Export Economy in the Post-Colonial Period, Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East (1981)

Nanayakkara, Wimal (2006) POVERTY IN SRI LANKA - ISSUES AND OPTIONS, Department of Census and Statistical Colombo 7, Sri Lanka

Archie McEwen

Gallipoli 1981, DVD, Village Roadshow/Paramount Pictures, Australia. A Peter Weir film.

Pilot Training and Selection 2017, television program, YouTube, 24 January.

Bean, C n.d., Official History, 1914-1918 War: Charles Bean, Australian War Memorial, Australia, viewed 10 May 2020, <<https://s3-ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/awm-media/collection/RCDIG1066753/bundled/RCDIG1066753.pdf>>.

Fitzsimons, P 2014, Gallipoli, William Heine-mann, Australia.

Prince Alfred Chronicles 1908, No. 90/91/92 edn, Prince Alfred College, Adelaide, viewed 12 April 2020, <<https://paoca.com/#pacchronicles>>.

Air & Space 2008, The Few, the Brave, the Lucky, N.D, viewed 10 March, <<https://www.airspacemag.com/history-of-flight/the-few-the-brave-the-lucky-45053770/>>.

Australian War Memorial 2015, Revisiting the Charge at The Nek, Australia, viewed 10 March, <<http://www.awm.gov.au/articles/blog/revisiting-the-charge-at-the-nek>>.

Australian War Memorial n.d., Quinn's Post, Australia, viewed 12 April, <<https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/PL71>>.

Bae Systems n.d., Airco DH.2, N.D, viewed 10 March, <<https://www.baesystems.com/en/heritage/geoffery-dehavilland-s-first-design-for-airco----->>.

Birtwistlewiki 2020, HMAT A47 Mashobra, Australia, viewed 12 April, <https://www.birtwistlewiki.com.au/wiki/HMAT_A47_Mashobra>.

Bureau of Meteorology 1891, Weather Station Directory, Australia, viewed 12 April, <<http://www.bom.gov.au/climate/data/stations/>>.

Light Horse Organisation n.d., 10th Light Horse Regiment, Australia, viewed 10 March, <<http://www.lighthorse.org.au/10th-light-horse-regiment/>>.

N.D 2013, Lost Hospitals of London, United Kingdom, viewed 10 May 2020, <<http://ezitis.myzen.co.uk/kchdenmarkhill.html>>.

National Geographic 2015, THE CHARGE AT THE NEK, N.D, viewed 10 March, <<https://www.nationalgeographic.com.au/history/the-charge-at-the-nek.aspx>>.

NT GOV 2020, NT pastoral industry, NT Government, Northern Territory, viewed 12 April, <<https://dtsc.nt.gov.au/arts-and-museums/northern-territory-archives-service/archives-subject-guides/nt-pastoral-industry>>.

State Library of South Australia n.d., (Used for numerous images), South Australia, viewed 12 April, <<https://collections.slsa.sa.gov.au/resource/B+44384>>

The Aerodrome 1998, RFC Pilot Training, N.D, viewed 10 May 2020, <<http://www.theaerodrome.com/forum/showthread.php?t=23225&garp=7>>.

The Aerodrome 2018, 100 years ago- the missing months, viewed 10 May 2020, <<http://www.theaerodrome.com/forum/showthread.php?t=70914>>.

The Conversation 2015, Flies, filth and bully beef: life at Gallipoli in 1915, Australia, viewed 10 May 2020, <<https://theconversation.com/flies-filth-and-bully-beef-life-at-gallipoli-in-1915-39321>>.

Virtual War Memorial n.d., John Godlee, Australia, viewed 12 April, <<https://vwma.org.au/explore/people/81872>>.

Wikipedia 2020, Airco DH.2, N.D, viewed 10 March, <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Airco_DH.2>.

Wikipedia 2020, No. 32 Squadron RAF, N.D, viewed 12 April, <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/No._32_Squadron_RAF>.

Wikipedia n.d., RMS Franconia, N.D, viewed 10 March, <[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RMS_Franconia_\(1910\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RMS_Franconia_(1910))>.

James Basheer

GDP/GNP Growth Rate % - Flags, Maps, Economy, Geography, Climate, Natural Resources, Current Issues, International Agreements, Population, Social Statistics, Political System. GDP/GNP Growth Rate % - Flags, Maps, Economy, Geography, Climate, Natural Resources, Current Issues, International Agreements, Population, Social Statistics, Political System | https://www.theodora.com/wfb/1992/rankings/gdp_gnp_growth_rate_pct_0.html.

Inflation Rate % - Flags, Maps, Economy, Geography, Climate, Natural Resources, Current Issues, International Agreements, Population, Social Statistics, Political System. Inflation Rate % - Flags, Maps, Economy, Geography, Climate, Natural Resources, Current Issues, International Agreements, Population, Social Statistics, Political System | https://www.theodora.com/wfb/1992/rankings/inflation_rate_pct_1.html.

Unemployment Rate % - Flags, Maps, Economy, Geography, Climate, Natural Resources, Current Issues, Interna-

tional Agreements, Population, Social Statistics, Political System. Unemployment Rate % - Flags, Maps, Economy, Geography, Climate, Natural Resources, Current Issues, International Agreements, Population, Social Statistics, Political System Available at: https://www.theodora.com/wfb/1992/rankings/unemployment_rate_pct_1.html.

Brown, C., 1995. Playing the "communal Card": Communal Violence and Human Rights. 1st ed. New York City: Human Rights Watch.

Cohen, L. and Dragović-Soso, J., 2008. State Collapse in South-Eastern Europe- New Perspectives on Yugoslavia's Disintegration. 1st ed. United States of America: Purdue University.

Cohen, L., 1995. Broken bonds: Yugoslavia's disintegration and Balkan politics in transition. 2nd ed. United States of America: Westview Press.

Crnobrnja, M., 1994. The Yugoslav Drama. 2nd ed. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.

Hupchick, DP., 2002. The Balkans from Constantinople to Communism. 2nd ed. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Karamanić, S., 2009. Serbia, anti-bureaucratic revolution, 1987-1989. 1st ed. Munich: Wiley Online Library.

Lebor, A., 2004. Milošević, A Biography. 1st ed. United States of America: Yale University Press.

Naimark, N., Case, H., Djordjevich, D. Bracewell, W., Wolff, L., Krekic, B., Vucinich, W., Jelavich, C., Suppan, A., Rossos, A., Emmert, T., Fine, John., Stokes., G., 2003. Yugoslavia and its Historians: Understanding the Balkan Wars of the 1990s. 1st ed. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.

Shatzmiller, M., 2002. Islam and Bosnia: Conflict Resolution and Foreign Policy in Multi-Ethnic States. 1st ed.

Canada: McGill-Queen's University Press.

Thomas, R., 1999. *The Politics of Serbia in the 1990s*. 1st ed. New York: Colombia University Press.

Wately, S., 1732. *A General Collection of Treaties of Peace and Commerce, Manifestos, Declarations of War, and other Public Papers, from the End of the Reign of Queen Anne to the Year 1731*. 2nd ed. London: J. J. and P. Knapton et al.

Yeomans, R., 2012. *Visions of Annihilation: The Ustasha Regime and the Cultural Politics of Fascism, 1941-1945*. 1st ed. Pittsburgh, United States: University of Pittsburgh.

Kifner, J., 1993. *For Belgrade's Broken Middle Class, War Brings Chaos and Bread Lines*. *The New York Times*, 19 December 2019.

The only organized Rebellion of the People against the Government in Tito's Yugoslavia. *Sarajevo Times*, 7 May 2016.

Tempest, R., 1990. *Communists in Yugoslavia Split into Factions*. *Los Angeles Times*, 23 January 1990.

Armatta, J., (2012). *Historical Revelations of the Milošević Trial*. In the *International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible (ICTY) for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991*. The Hague, Netherlands, 25 May 1993-31 December 2017. *South-Eastern Europe: Independent*. P. 13, 17.

Jaxin Browne

Truman, H, August 1945, *Truman Statement on Hiroshima*, [online] available at: <https://www.atomicheritage.org/key-documents/truman-statement-hiroshima>, [Accessed 13 Oct. 2019]

MacEachin, Douglas. *"The Final Myths of the War With Japan: Signals Intelligence, U.S. Invasion Planning, and the A-Bomb Decision."* Center for the Study of Intelligence, December 1998.

Allen, T. and Polmar, N. (1995). *Code-name downfall*. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Nps.gov. (2019). *Harry S Truman's Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb* (U.S. National Park Service). [online] Available at: <https://www.nps.gov/articles/trumanatomicbomb.htm> [Accessed 22 Nov. 2019].

Monitor, T. (2005). *What Truman was thinking when he decided to drop the bomb*. [online] *The Christian Science Monitor*. Available at: <https://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0802/p17s01-bogn.html> [Accessed 20 Nov. 2019].

Kauffman, J, October 2005, *Atomic Bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki*, [online] available at: <http://www.nmsd.wednet.edu/userfiles/-4/my%20files/kauffman.pdf?id=634>, [Accessed 12 Oct. 2019]

Aph.gov.au. (2019). [online] Available at: <https://www.aph.gov.au/binaries/library/pubs/cib/1994->

Ethan Hayes

Broadbridge, S, n.d., *Economic and Social Trends in Tokugawa Japan*, Cambridge University Press, https://www.jstor.org/stable/311738?read-now=1&seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents

Encyclopedia of Britannica, n.d., *The Fall of the Tokugawa*, <https://www.britannica.com/place/Japan/The-fall-of-the-Tokugawa>

Gordon, A, 1952, *A Modern History of Japan, from Tokugawa Times to Present*

Hauser, W.B, 1983, *Some Misconceptions about the Economic History of Tokugawa Japan*, *Society for History Education*, https://www.jstor.org/stable/493721?read-now=1&refreqid=excelsior%3Aa53510a6936c034c696669e8f0fb61b2&seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents

- Hays. J, 2009, Decline of the Tokugawa Shogunate, Facts and Details, <http://factsanddetails.com/japan/cat16/sub107/entry-5326.html>
- Hillsborough. R, 2014, Samurai Revolution: The Dawn of Modern Japan Seen Through the Eyes of the Shogun's Last Samurai, Tuttle Publishing
- Howland. D.R, 2001, Samurai Status, Class, and Bureaucracy: A Historiographical Essay, Association for Asian Studies, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2659697?read-now=1&refreqid=excelsior%3A7648b3ebe-aa1ec2a97e819e5f7a8c221&seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents
- Huffman. J.L, 2004, Modern Japan – A History in Documents, Oxford University Press
- Lumen.org, From the Edo Period to Meiji Restoration in Japan, <https://courses.lumenlearning.com/boundless-worldhistory/chapter/from-the-edo-period-to-meiji-restoration-in-japan/>
- Maxey. T, 2016 Cultural History of Late Tokugawa Japan, Museum of Fine Arts, Boston, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E5KMdvS9l64>
- McCargo. D, 2013, Contemporary Japan, Palgrave Macmillan
- SCMP Reporter, 1998, Collapse of the Tokugawa Shogunate, SCMP, <https://www.scmp.com/article/266208/collapse-tokugawa-shogunate>
- Takano. Y, n.d., Foreign Influence and the Transformation of Early Modern Japan, <http://history.emory.edu/home/documents/endeavors/volume3/YayoriTakano.pdf>
- Tokugawa. T, 2007, The Edo Inheritance, International House of Japan
- Totman. C, 1975, Tokugawa Yoshinobu and Kobugattai, A Study of Political Inadequacy, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2383976?read-now=1&seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents
- Watkins. T, n.d., The Fall of the Tokugawa Shogunate, Silicon Valley & Tornado Valley, <https://www.sjsu.edu/faculty/watkins/tokufall.htm>

Edmund Black

- Bregman, A. (2014). Cursed Victory: A History of Israel and the Occupied Territories. London: Penguin Group.
- Cashman, G. and Robinson, L. C. (2007). An Introduction to the Causes of War: Patterns of Interstate Conflict from World War I to Iraq. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
- Ferris, J. (2013). Nasser's Gamble: How Intervention in Yemen Caused the Six-Day War and the Decline of Egyptian Power. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
- Finkelstein, N. (2003). Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict. New York City, NY: Verso Books.
- Gat, M. (2003). Britain and the Conflict in the Middle East, 1964–1967: The Coming of the Six-Day War. Westport, CT: Praeger/Greenwood.
- Gershoni, I., Singer, A. and Erdem, Y. H. (ed., 2006). Middle East Historiographies: Narrating the Twentieth Century. London: University of Washington Press.
- Kamrava, M. (2005). The Modern Middle East: A Political History since the First World War. London: University of California Press, Ltd.
- Oren, M. B. (2002). Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
- Rabil, R. G. (2003). Embattled Neighbours: Syria, Israel, and Lebanon. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Segev, T. (2007). *1967: Israel, the War and the Year that Transformed the Middle East*. New York City, NY: Metropolitan Books.

Shemesh, M. (2008). *Arab Politics, Palestinian Nationalism and the Six-Day War*. Eastbourne, United Kingdom: Sussex Academic Press.

Hajjar, S. G. (1999). *The Israel-Syria Track in Middle East Policy*, Volume 6, Issue 3.

Kobori, I. and Glantz, M. H. (ed., 1998). *Central Eurasian Water Crisis*. Tokyo: United Nations University Press.

Karsh, E., Glickman, G. and Inbar, E. (2017). *Rethinking the Six-Day War*. Tel Aviv, Israel: Begin-Sadat Centre for Strategic Studies.

Murakami, M. (1995). *Managing Water for Peace in the Middle East: Alternative Strategies*. Tokyo: United Nations University Press.

Rubner, M. (2017). *Book Review. The Six-Day War: The Breaking of the Middle East in Middle East Policy*, Volume 4, Issue 3.

The Avalon Project (n.d.). *Israeli-Syrian General Armistice Agreement, July 20, 1949*. [online] Available at: <https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/arm04.asp> [Accessed 20 May 2020].

George Bartley

Bytwerk, R. (1998). *Goebbels on the Jews (1941)*. [online] research.calvin.edu. Available at: <https://research.calvin.edu/german-propaganda-archive/goeb1.htm> [Accessed 30 Jun. 2020].

Hambling, D. (2016). *The 20 Most Important Battles of World War II*. [online] *Popular Mechanics*. Available at: <https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/g2652/most-important-battles-world-war-ii/>.

Hart, B. (n.d.). *Battle of France - The invasion of the Low*

Countries. [online] *Encyclopedia Britannica*. Available at: <https://www.britannica.com/event/Battle-of-France-World-War-II/The-invasion-of-the-Low-Countries#ref342849> [Accessed 30 Jun. 2020].

Haskew, M.E. (2018). *Nazi War Machine: Inside the German Army*. [online] *Warfare History Network*. Available at: <https://warfarehistorynetwork.com/2018/12/26/nazi-war-machine-inside-the-german-army/> [Accessed 27 Jun. 2020].

Jaworski, T. (2017). *World War II and the Industrialization of the American South*. *The Journal of Economic History*, 77(4), pp.1048–1082.

Maury Klein (2015). *A call to arms : mobilizing America for World War II*. London: Bloomsbury.

Pringle, R. (2019). *Central Intelligence Agency | History, Organization, Responsibilities, Activities, & Criticism*. In: *Encyclopædia Britannica*. [online] Available at: <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Central-Intelligence-Agency>.

Stefanski, V. (2019). *Forced Labor – Background*. [online] *Zwangsarbeit-archiv.de*. Available at: <https://www.zwangsarbeit-archiv.de/en/zwangsarbeit/zwangsarbeit/zwangsarbeit-hintergrund/index.html>.

Uh.edu. (2019). *Digital History*. [online] Available at: http://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/dispatch_textbook.cfm?smtID=2&psid=3491 [Accessed 27 Jan. 2020].

UK Parliament. (2020). *Conscription: the Second World War*. [online] Available at: <https://www.parliament.uk/about/living-heritage/transformingsociety/private-lives/yourcountry/overview/conscriptionww2/>.

UPI. (n.d.). *Hitler orders military conscription in Germany*. [online] Available at: <https://www.upi.com/Archives/1935/03/16/Hitler-orders-military-conscription>

-in-Germany/5124911384073/.

Ushmm.org. (2012). The German Military and the Holocaust. [online] Available at: <https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/the-german-military-and-the-holocaust>.

Wilson, M.R. (2020). The 5 WWII Lessons That Could Help the Government Fight Coronavirus. [online] POLITICO. Available at: <https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/03/19/coronavirus-defense-production-world-war-two-lessons-135814> [Accessed 12 Jun. 2020].

www.bbc.co.uk. (2014). BBC - WW2 People's War - Timeline. [online] Available at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/history/ww2peopleswar/timeline/factfiles/nonflash/a6651425.shtml> [Accessed 28 Jun. 2020].

Liam Hindshaw

Alam, Muzaffar. The Crisis of Empire in Mughal North India: Awadh and the Panjab. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1986.

Ali, Athar. The Mughal Nobility under Aurangzeb. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997.

Chandra, Satish. Parties and Politics in the Mughal Court 1707-1740. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2001.

Durant, W., 1935. The Story Of Civilization. New York: Simon and Schuster.

Habib, I., 2014. The Agrarian System Of Mughal India, 1556-1707. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Manucci, N. and Irvine, W., 1981. Storia Do Mogor Or Mogul India. New Dehli: Oriental Books Repr. Corp.

Mustaidd Khan, 2008. Maa sir-I-lamgiri. Kolkata: The Asiatic Society.

Richards, J. F. The New Cambridge history of India. The Mughal Empire. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.

Sarkar, J., 1924. History Of Aurangzib Based On Original Sources.

Subramanian, L., 2010. History Of India, 1707-1857. New Delhi: Orient BlackSwan.

Wolpert, S., 2009. A New History Of India. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Chandra, S., 1969. Jizyah And The State In India During The 17Th Century. [online] jstor.org. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/3596130?read-now=1&refreqid=excelsior:3a5a6d672f8ab50285b1f9531653239e&seq=5#page_scan_tab_contents [Accessed 15 May 2020].

Gupta, S., 1993. THE "AGRARIAN CRISIS" OF MUGHAL EMPIRE AND AGRARIAN CONDITIONS (C.1650 -1750). [online] jstor.org. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/44142962.pdf?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents [Accessed 25 May 2020].

Richards, J., 1976. The Imperial Crisis In The Deccan. [online] jstor.org. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2053981?read-now=1&refreqid=excelsior:646332f2cef398d9ab052ea44378d64b&seq=2#page_scan_tab_contents [Accessed 19 May 2020].

Richards, J., 1990. The Seventeenth-Century Crisis In South Asia. [online] jstor.org. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/312726?seq=11#metadata_info_tab_contents [Accessed 27 May 2020].

James Newman

Barton, Sir D.P., 1925. Bernadotte, Prince And King, 1810-1844. London: J. Murray.

- Bodart, G., 1916. *Losses Of Life In Modern Wars, Austria-Hungary, France*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Clodfelter, M., 2002. *Warfare And Armed Conflicts*. 2nd ed. Michigan: McFarland.
- Dodge, T., 1904. *Napoleon's Invasion Of Russia*. Riverside Press.
- Lefebvre, G. and Roberts, A., 1939. *Napoleon*.
- Lieven, D., 2017. *Russia Against Napoleon: The Battle For Europe, 1807 To 1814*. London: Penguin Books Ltd.
- Ropes, J., 1885. *The First Napoleon; A Sketch, Political And Military*. Boston.
- Sommerville, D., 1999. *Revolutionary And Napoleonic Wars*. Austin, Tex.: Raintree Steck-Vaughn.
- Rose, A., 2005. *Napoleon's Campaign in Russia Anno 1812*. [online] Available at: <<http://dominiopublico.mec.gov.br/download/texto/gu007973.PDF>> [Accessed 17 June 2020].
- David, S., 2012. *All For The Want Of A Winter Horseshoe*. [online] BBC News. Available at: <<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-16929522>> [Accessed 16 May 2020].
- Kuhn, A., 2008. *Rivers And The Destruction Of Napoleon's Grand Army*. [online] Napoleon-series.org. Available at: <https://www.napoleon-series.org/military-info/battles/1812/Russia/c_bridges.html> [Accessed 16 May 2020].
- Kushchayev, S.V, 2020, *Two bullets to the head and an early winter: fate permits Kutuzov to defeat Napoleon at Moscow*. [online] thejns.org. available at: <<https://thejns.org/focus/view/journals/neurosurg-focus/39/1/article-pE3.xml?body=fullText>> [Accessed 25 May 2020]
- Henry Nind***
- Goebbels, J. and Taylor, F. (1982). *The Goebbels diaries*. New York: Putnam.
- Kershaw, I. (2014). *Hitler*. Hoboken: Taylor and Francis
- Levinthal, D. (1996). *Mein Kampf*. Santa Fe, N.M: Twin Palms.
- Shirer, W. (2012). *The rise and fall of the Third Reich*. [Place of publication not identified]: RosettaBooks.
- Stewart, V. (2002). *Three against one*. Santa Fe, NM: Sunstone Press.
- Abidor, M. (2017). *Brownshirt Violence and the Nazi Machine*. [online] Jewish Currents. Available at: <https://jewishcurrents.org/brownshirt-violence-and-the-nazi-machine/> [Accessed 17 Feb. 2020].
- BBC Bitesize. (2020). *The Spartacist Revolt - Weimar Germany - National 5 History Revision - BBC Bitesize*. [online] Available at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/bitesize/guides/zh9p34j/revision/5> [Accessed 22 Feb. 2020].
- Brown, C. (1922). *New York Times*.
- En.wikiquote.org. (2020). *Ernst Röhm - Wikiquote*. [online] Available at: https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Ernst_Röhm [Accessed 22 Feb. 2020].
- Encyclopedia.ushmm.org. (2020). *The Enabling Act*. [online] Available at: <https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/the-enabling-act> [Accessed 23 Feb. 2020].
- Fcit.usf.edu. (2020). *The Concentration Camp: The Beginning of Protective Custody (Part 2 of 5)*. [online] Available at: <https://fcit.usf.edu/holocaust/resource/document/DOCCA2.htm> [Accessed 23 Feb. 2020].
- Historylearningsite.co.uk. (2020). [online] Available at: <https://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/nazi-germany/newspapers-in-nazi-germany/> [Accessed 23 Feb. 2020].
- Kempka, E. (2020). *GHDI - Document*. [online] Ghdi.ghi-dc.org. Available at: <http://ghdi.ghi-dc.org/>

sub_document.cfm?document_id=1500 [Accessed 22 Feb. 2020].

Spartacus Educational. (2020). Night of the Long Knives. [online] Available at: <https://spartacus-educational.com/GERnight.htm> [Accessed 22 Feb. 2020].

Spartacus Educational. (2020). Unemployment in Nazi Germany. [online] Available at: <https://spartacus-educational.com/GERunemployment.htm> [Accessed 23 Feb. 2020].

Vanderbilt Historical Review. (2020). Enabling Hitler. [online] Available at: <http://vanderbilthistoricalreview.com/enabling-hitler/> [Accessed 23 Feb. 2020].

Daniel Mills

Bor'be, O., 1927. s Detskoi Besprizornost'iu. Utverzhdennoe Kollegiei NKP Postanovlenie Vserossiiskogo S"ezda Zav. ONO," in S. S. Tizanov, M. S. Epshtein, eds., Gosudarstvo i obshchestvennost' v bor'be s detskoi besprizornost'iu (Moscow, Leningrad, 1927):

Clements, B., 1982. Working-Class and Peasant Women in the Russian Revolution, 1917-1923. *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society*, 8(2), pp.215-235.

Duboshinskii, N.O., 1925. "Sotsial'nyi Sostav Prostitutsii," *Rabochii sud*, 3-4 (1925): 127-128

Goikhbarg, A., 1918 "Pervyi kodeks zakonov RSFSR," *Proletarskaia revoliutsiia i pravo*, No. 7, p. 7

Goldman, W., 1993. *Women, The State And Revolution*. Cambridge, GBR: Cambridge University Press.

Gromov, I., 1924. "Pravo Ne Byt' Mater'iu," *Sud idet!*, (The Right Not To Be A Mother," *The Court Comes!*)

Ilic, M., 1999. *Women Workers In The Soviet Interwar Economy*. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan Press in association with Centre for Russian and East European Studies, University of Birmingham.

Kanatchikova, B., 1921. "Svodka raboty zhenotdelov po 15 guberniiam," *Kommunistka*, 1921, no. 11-12, pp. 40-41

Krupskaia, N., 1920. "Voina i Detorozhdenie," *Kommunistka*, 1—2 (1920): 18.

Lapidus, G., 1979. *Women In Soviet Society*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Lenin, V., 1919. *Lenin Collected Works, Volume 29*, pp. 408-34. Transcribed by Ken Campbell. Progress Publishers.

Lenin, V., 1919. The Tasks Of The Working Women's Movement In The Soviet Republic. *Lenin's Collected Works, 4th English Edition*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1965, Volume 30, pages 40-46

Lenin, V., 1992. *The State And Revolution*. London: Penguin.

Lubnyi-Gertsyk, L., 1928 "Estestvennoe Dvizhenie Naseleniia SSSR za 1926," *Statisticheskoe Obozrenie*, 8 (1928): 85. On prerevolutionary divorce, *Estestvennoe dvizhenie naseleniia RSFSR za 1926 god* (Moscow, 1928):

Markus, B., 1928 "Zhenskii Trud v SSSR v 1924 gody," *Kommunistka*, 4 (1925): 49; and A. G. Rashin, *Zhenskii trud v SSSR* (Moscow, 1928): 39, 37.

Randall, A., 2004. Legitimizing Soviet Trade: Gender and the Feminization of the Retail Workforce in the Soviet 1930s. *Journal of Social History*, 37(4), pp.965-990.

Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR), 1921. *The marriage laws of soviet Russia: complete text of first code of laws of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic dealing with civil status and domestic relations, marriage, the family and guardianship (Kodeks zakonov o brake, sem'e i opeke RSFSR (1918)*. New York : Russian Soviet Government Bureau, 1921

Sokolova, O., 1921. *Opyt vovxlecheniia krest'ianok Penzenskoi ggubernii v Sovetskoe stroitel'stvo*," *Kommunistka*, 1921, no. 12-13, p. 67.

Wheatcroft, S., 1985. *Statistical Sources for the Study of Soviet Social History in the Prewar Period*. *Russian History*, 12(1), pp.217-246.

Ron Pippett

Bracher, Karl, D. *The German Dictatorship: Origins, Structure and Consequences of National Socialism*. London: Penguin Books

Bullock, Alan (1962) [1952]. *Hitler: A Study in Tyranny*. London: Penguin Books.

Trevor-Roper, Hugh (1988) [1953]. *Hitler's Table-Talk, 1941–1945: Hitler's Conversations Recorded by Martin Bormann*. Oxford: Oxford University

Evans, Richard J (2003). *The Coming of the Third Reich*. New York: Penguin Books

Evans, Richard J. (2005). *The Third Reich in Power*. New York: Penguin Books.

Evans, Richard J. (2008). *The Third Reich At War*. New York: Penguin Books.

Fest, Joachim C. (1970). *The Face of the Third Reich*. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson

Fest, Joachim C. (1974) [1973]. *Hitler*. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.

Fest, Joachim C. (1977) [1973]. *Hitler*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Ham, Paul. (2017) *Young Hitler - The Making of the Fuhrer Australia*: Penguin

Hitler, Adolf (1999) [1925]. *Mein Kampf*. Trans. Ralph Manheim. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Kershaw, Ian (1999) [1998]. *Hitler: 1889–1936: Hubris*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.

Kershaw, Ian (2000a) [1985]. *The Nazi Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation* (4th ed.). London: Arnold. ISBN 978-0-340-76028-4.

Kershaw, Ian (2000b). *Hitler, 1936–1945: Nemesis*. New York; London: W. W. Norton & Company. ISBN 978-0-393-32252-1.

Overy, Richard (1999). "Misjudging Hitler". In Martel, Gordon (ed.). *The Origins of the Second World War Reconsidered*. London: Routledge. ISBN 978-0-415-16324-8.

Overy, Richard (2005). *The Dictators: Hitler's Germany, Stalin's*

Russia. London: Penguin Books. ISBN 978-0-393-02030-4.

Overy, Richard (2005). "Hitler As War Leader". In Dear, I. C. B.; Foot, M. R. D. (eds.). *Oxford Companion to World War II*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-280670-3.

Rees, Laurence (1997). *The Nazis: A Warning from History*. New York: New Press

Rosenbaum, Ron (1999). *Explaining Hitler: The Search for the Origins of His Evil*. London: Harper Perennial.

Shirer William L. (1960). *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich*. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Ullrich, Volker (2016) *Hitler Vol I: Ascent 1889-1939* London: Bodley Head Penguin – Random House

Ullrich, Volker (2020) *Hitler Vol II: Downfall 1939-45* London: Bodley Head Penguin – Random House

Regan Nelson

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zc3Y-dU_GjM

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LsxmsHBRl1M&list=PLhyKYa0YJ_5DTz_FAbdQyXo9TZdx1hTWf&index=2

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KnJDZpi3EBI&list=PLhyKYa0YJ_5DTz_FAbdQyXo9TZdx1hTWf&index=3

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bKnIfv7wKk0&list=PLhyKYa0YJ_5DTz_FAbdQyXo9TZdx1hTWf&index=4

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jCFt0CQ8aEk&list=PLhyKYa0YJ_5DTz_FAbdQyXo9TZdx1hTWf&index=5

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G9bqCd7sRg0&list=PLhyKYa0YJ_5DTz_FAbdQyXo9TZdx1hTWf&index=6

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jCFt0CQ8aEk&list=PLhyKYa0YJ_5DTz_FAbdQyXo9TZdx1hTWf&index=5

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jCFt0CQ8aEk&list=PLhyKYa0YJ_5DTz_FAbdQyXo9TZdx1hTWf&index=5

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jCFt0CQ8aEk&list=PLhyKYa0YJ_5DTz_FAbdQyXo9TZdx1hTWf&index=5

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jCFt0CQ8aEk&list=PLhyKYa0YJ_5DTz_FAbdQyXo9TZdx1hTWf&index=5

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jCFt0CQ8aEk&list=PLhyKYa0YJ_5DTz_FAbdQyXo9TZdx1hTWf&index=5

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Otto_von_Bismarck

<https://www.britannica.com/biography/Otto-von-Bismarck>

