



PRINCE ALFRED COLLEGE

*HOT
TAKES
OF
HISTORY*

2023 HISTORY JOURNAL

The Team



Back row: Nicholas Whyte, Aryan Parwal, Marco Wirth, Sidhak Dhingra, Charlie Gibbon, Tom Turnbull, Nic Warne

Front row: Rijak Dhingra, Regan Nelson, Connor Stone

Absent: William Benecke, Nicholas Henchcliffe, Francesco Ciampa, Hamish Penhall

Special thanks: Mr Pippett, Mrs Sexton, Mr Bean

Foreword

“HISTORY GIVES ANSWERS ONLY TO THOSE WHO KNOW HOW TO ASK QUESTIONS.”

Clearly Holborn’s observation very much applies to this year’s journal with our theme of ‘History Hot Takes’ whereby students ask those essential questions which are so important when analysing and assessing great historical events. The articles that follow do this superbly and our gratitude is extended to all contributors.

I mentioned on these pages back in 2017 that no journal dealing with matters historical at Prince Alfred College should be launched without paying tribute to the College’s foremost historian, Ron Gibbs. The Gibbs’ family have been unwavering supporters of the journal and we genuinely appreciate this commitment, whilst also recognising Ron’s brilliant work as the pre-eminent College historian.

Certainly, it is with great pride that we launch our seventh edition of the PAC History Journal and recognise the tremendous commitment of the committee who have met most Thursday lunchtimes this year, in addition to many extra hours beyond this to get the journal on its feet. Can I also pay special tribute to my esteemed colleague, Ms Jacque Sexton, who inspired, encouraged and very occasionally, cajoled the group into action each week. An admirable team effort by all.

RON PIPPETT, HISTORY JOURNAL 2023

“HISTORY IS AN ARGUMENT WITHOUT END.”

This year’s edition of the history journal aims to realise what Geyl astutely observed almost a century ago. As young historians, we often encounter the varying perspectives and interpretations of a single event, yet how often do we truly investigate the facts for ourself? Not often enough. This year we have set out to embolden the PAC community to create their own piece of history. It is now our turn, as future historians, to contribute to this argument that Geyl refers to. After all, if there is one thing I have learned about history this year, it is the seemingly infinite scope for revisionism.

With that, I hope this year’s theme of Hot Takes provides both entertaining and insightful historical inquires. Further, I would like to thank the committee for their outstanding work towards this year’s journal. Finally, I would also like to thank the college, in particular the History department, for their continual support of the Journal. Enjoy!

SIDHAK DHINGRA, CO-GENERAL SECRETARY

“HISTORIANS ARE THEMSELVES THE PRODUCTS OF HISTORY”

Ever since joining PAC in 2010, I have been astonished by the variety of co-curricular opportunities afforded to students. From camps and ensembles, to sports, and most importantly the History Journal, I have been blessed to attend a school that values excellence and perseverance so dearly.

In my opinion, these principles are perfectly embodied in this year’s publication. At over 50 pages of the school’s hottest takes, it is both one of the largest journal editions yet, and also a testament to the skill and poise in which Princes Men approach the study of history.

PAC is truly blessed to have students as curious, considerate, and knowledgeable as they are, so I leave the History Journal in good hands (and expect an invite next year!).

CHARLIE GIBBON, CO-GENERAL SECRETARY



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Premier's ANZAC Spirit Award (Aryan Parwal)

'It's not the size of the person in the fight, it's the size of the fight in the person.' -Mark Twain

In the early, freezing hours of the 20th July 1886, the first of many fighters was born to Reverend John Blacket and Mrs Martha Jane (nee Fidler). John Weasley Blacket II was born in his parent's large house in Gumeracha, South Australia, a mere ten kilometres from Lobethal. John was one of fourteen children born to John and Martha. (Geni, 2018)



Figure 1: John Blacket in his official uniform pre-war
(Virtual War Memorial, n.d.)

In January 1901, at the young age of fourteen John Blacket II attended Prince Alfred College between the years 1901 and 1905 under the headmastership of Mr Freddric Chapple and during his last year, he was made captain of the boarding house. He was the eldest of nine brothers in his family who were all educated at Prince Alfred College. John had three siblings who served in the war: Maurice, Samuel, and Joseph.




Figure 2: John Blacket's enrolment card. The black and red diagonal lines indicate both war served, and war fallen. (Prince Alfred College Archives, n.d.)

Although there is no record of John playing sports at school, he loved playing football and played three seasons in the SANFL with Norwood between 1907 and 1909. He mainly played centre-half back and at the end of his SANFL career, he had played a total of eleven games. (Australian Football, n.d) While at the University of Adelaide, John played football in years 1908 to 1914 where he captained the A grade side, he also played A grade cricket for the University Cricket Club only to achieve a double blue in football and cricket in 1912 and 1915 respectively. (The University of Adelaide, n.d) So quite a sporty individual.

After leaving Prince Alfred College in May 1905, John pursued higher studies at the University of Adelaide from 1909 to 1913 completing his degree in teaching and becoming a qualified teacher. He returned to Prince Alfred College as a master and by 1910 was playing an active role in Cadets. During his teaching tenure, John heard about the outbreak of war on 4th August 1914 and knew that he needed to give back to the country that had given him so much. He then applied for a position in the Australian Imperial Forces on the 30th January 1915.



Figure 3: John Blacket in his Norwood kit prior to his last game. (Australian Football, n.d.)



After signing up for the AIF John was required to undergo medical examinations where he was found to be free from a wide range of conditions that would make him “unfit for the duties of a soldier”. Apart from being checked for any medical conditions, John was checked for any tattooed letter like D or BC with which the British Army marked deserted and those of “bad character”. The medical officer who examined John stated that he “[could] see the required distance with either eye; his heart and lungs [were] healthy; he [had] free use of his joints; and he declares he is not subject to fits of any description. I consider him fit for active service”. Not surprising for such a sportsman (Memories, Australian War Stories, 2022)



Figure 4: The famous Aussie slouch hat (Army Museum of South Australia, n.d.)

Volunteers such as John were sent to training camps, which were essentially established military bases on secluded farms, parklands, and sporting grounds around Australia to prepare them for one of the hardest experiences in their life. They were given basic military training including the use of rifles and small arms. Volunteers were also put through great physical tests between training sessions, which tested their fitness, strength, and endurance. After passing training John was issued with uniform: a khaki woollen jacket, heavy cord breeches and the famous slouch hat – turned up on the left and features a plain khaki band, chinstrap and “rising sun” badge. John was initially appointed to the 10th Battalion before being transferred to the 24th and later the 27th Battalion where he remained. His Initial rank in his Battalion was Adjutant Lieutenant but he later became Captain of the 27th Infantry Battalion.

After completing training, medicals and receiving his uniform, John left his hometown with the 27th Battalion as a Lieutenant on HMAT Geelong. This vessel was also transporting the 7th field Ambulance unit and another 252 soldiers from Freemantle, Australia. The boat set off to Egypt for two months of training in June and then landed at Gallipoli on the 12th September. During this period, John was promoted and made captain after being given the role of Lieutenant. (BristleWiki, n.d.)




Figure 5: HMAT Geelong. This boat served the AIF throughout World War One, and was capable of housing a total of 320 passengers (BristleWiki, n.d.)

After landing at Gallipoli, John quickly understood the harsh reality of fighting for his country in such times. The conditions at Gallipoli were nowhere near what he had previously experienced, and all men found the conditions difficult. The ongoing noise of distant shell fire kept many awake during the night and commonly caused mental trauma such as PTSD, which affected many, post-war. After going back and forth through the trenches the soldiers would often suffer trench foot because of prolonged exposure to cold and damp temperatures and putting their feet in unsanitary conditions. Alongside the poor living conditions, the soldiers were provided with food that would sometimes replace the calories they had lost that day on the battlefield. An Australian soldier’s diet would comprise of food such as “bully or corned” beef, bread and the hard yet famous “ANZAC biscuits”. (Imperial War Museums, n.d) Although these conditions were not what he had expected he continued to persevere through these tough times.



Figure 6: An image of the effect of trench foot (Cleveland Clinic, n.d.)

Although there is not much information about what John explicitly did at Gallipoli, the 7th Brigade, which included the 27th Battalion, has some documented information on their involvement and roles in battles. After landing on the peninsula, the 7th Brigade immediately came to the assistance of the weary New Zealand and Australian division. After two weeks of intense battle John was partially wounded and was taken to England. (Trove, 2017) While the 27th Battalion had a relatively quiet time at Gallipoli they would later go on to fight in different places in Europe. After leaving Gallipoli only suffering light casualties the Battalion left for Egypt where John was reunited with his Battalion. As per the 22nd July 1916 article and his mates in the 27th Battalion, John was a prominent athlete from his sporting career and so was able to make a speedy recovery. (Biographical Particulars – the late captain J.W.Blacket – The Advertiser, n.d)



Figure 7: An image of the entire 27th Battalion (State Library South Australia, 2016)

Completing their allocated task in Egypt was done with ease despite the brutal conditions and the rough weather and from there the Battalion proceeded to France as part of the 2nd Australian Division. The 27th Battalion quickly entered the front-line trenches for the first time on the 7th April 1916. Here the 27th Battalion took part in their first major battle in Pozieres France, between the 28th July and the 5th August. The decision to send a portion of the AIF to Europe to take part in trench warfare along the Western Front in France and Belgium was made in the early months of 1916. The 27th Battalion initially entered the front line on 7th April 1916, as the Australians took control of a peaceful region close to Armentières while still being a part of the 7th Brigade. (Australian War Memorial, n.d)



Figure 8: The image above shows the horrific conditions the 27th Battalion among many other Battalions experienced while fighting on the Western Front (Encyclopedia Britannica, n.d.)

Unfortunately, this is where the story ended for Captain John Blacket. John was killed in action at Fromelles near Armentieres on the 4th July 1916 aged 29, four days before the 27th Battalion was ordered to march to the Somme to support the 1st Australian division who were fighting around Pozieres. The letter sent home to John's father by Lieutenant Colonel Dollman said "He was closely associated with me in the formation in the battalion and his work, was worth of him...Only a few minutes before your son's death, he gave his steel helmet to a private who had almost been covered with earth thrown up by a shell. [This] was an act that became the man, and was keeping with the reputation he had among the officers." When John saw that others were in danger, he would often put his life in danger to protect his mates, such an act displays immense courage and the mateship between himself and the 27th Battalion could only have been nothing but strong. He was later buried in Belgium at La Plus Douve Farm Cemetery, Plot I, Row I, Grave No.9 where he rests to this day. (Virtual War Memorial Australia, n.d) Many years after John's death, Prince Alfred College named one of their college houses "Blacket House" in memory of him, the school also put up a plaque in the history and geography teacher's staff room to pay tribute to him.

'A hero is someone who has given his or her life to something bigger than oneself'
- Joseph Campbell

RIP Captain John Wesley Blacket.



Figure 9: John Blacket's grave (Australian War Memorial, n.d.)

Premier's ANZAC Spirit Award (Marco Wirth)

Not every man can come home and say they've made a difference in life. But those who fall with their chins raised and eyes forward can rest in peace.

"...Every step toward the goal of justice requires sacrifice, suffering, and struggle; the tireless exertions and passionate concern of dedicated individuals."

-Martin Luther King, Jr.

On the 28th of April 1896 in Goodwood, Adelaide in the humble home of Edwin and Elizabeth Rushton, the third child and first son of the Rushton family, Cyril Edward Rushton was born (see figure 1). Mr and Mrs Rushton would have two more children, although unfortunately lost their infant son Mervyn only a few months after birth, preventing them from having any more children. Cyril would grow up with his two older sisters and younger brother and attended Goodwood Primary School until his 14th birthday when he was enrolled at Prince Alfred College (see figure 3) to complete his education under headmaster Frederic Chapple.



Figure 1: Sap. C.E. Rushton
(Virtual War Memorial, n.d.)



Figure 2: Glenelg Railway Company Train in Althorpe Place, Glenelg. One of many trains Cyril would have tended to (State Library, n.d.)



Figure 3: Prince Alfred College 1910, the year Cyril Rushton enrolled (State Library, 1910)

After graduating Cyril would seek out a job at the railway company having found he was more than skilled in hands on work (see figure 2). Whilst there is very little documented about Cyril during this period of his life there is no doubt Cyril was under pressure from all around him to enlist as war broke out. He was of age and a strong capable young man and at a time of elevated patriotism Cyril, like many others had high expectations placed on him.

The Department of Veterans Affairs states how "Men were encouraged and often pressured to enlist" (Department of Veterans Affairs, n.d). This would likely have affected Cyril's choice; however, his steadfast personality of courage and perseverance would see him to the lines soon enough.

War erupted in Europe and on August 4th, 1914, Australia entered the theatre with 20,000 able young men ready to fight for the greater British Empire. However, at first Cyril didn't wish to fight. He had a job in the railway industry and with his mother objecting to losing a second child, Cyril opted out. In fact, it wasn't until early May 1917, that Cyril would enlist, as he simply could not stand by any longer and see his fellow countrymen fall.

He was attached to the 16th Reinforcements, 5th Divisional Signalling Company (see figure 4) and departed for Sydney in August, aged 21. Within the month Cyril Rushton would arrive at the heart of the empire he fought for on board the HMAT Anchises A68 (see figure 5), one of the most modern passenger and cargo ships of its time. According to the Advertiser, "He spent several months attached to signalling training schools" (The Advertiser, 1918), in preparation to become a Sapper. The Australian War Memorial describes Cyril and his comrades, "Engineers, also known as sappers, were essential to the running of the war...their responsibilities included constructing the lines defence, temporary bridges, tunnels and trenches" and any other mechanical problem that should arise amongst the Allied trenches (see figure 6).




Figure 6: Sergeant Major James Johnson's diary design of the 'Johnson Shower'. One of many ingenuities Cyril would have deployed during his own service. (Australian War Memorial, n.d.)



Figure 7: 2nd Divisional Signalling Company. Cyril Rushton's company of Sappers. (Virtual War Memorial, n.d.)



Figure 4: 5th Divisional Signalling Company. Rushton's first Company. (Britwhistle, 1917)



Figure 5: HMAT Anchises A68, Rushton's way of reaching England (Britwhistle, 1917)

It wasn't long until Cyril was watching Britain fade out of view and he arrived in France to finally join the fight against the Austro-Hungarian and German armies now as a part of the 2nd divisional signalling company (see figure 7). Deployed along the Somme river, where fights had been raging with bloodshed for some time, Cyril was put to work immediately. His skills with his hands were displayed time and again as he ran up and down the line trying to brace dugouts and trench alike from caving in. Cyril valiantly expended every ounce of his being into protecting those around him. As the German line began to weaken, the Allied forces gathered to break through.

It wasn't long until Cyril was watching Britain fade out of view and he arrived in France to finally join the fight against the Austro-Hungarian and German armies now as a part of the 2nd divisional signalling company (see figure 7). Deployed along the Somme river, where fights had been raging with bloodshed for some time, Cyril was put to work immediately. His skills with his hands were displayed time and again as he ran up and down the line trying to brace dugouts and trench alike from caving in. Cyril valiantly expended every ounce of his being into protecting those around him. As the German line began to weaken, the Allied forces gathered to break through.

Cyril and his fellow Sappers were sent to prepare the bridge over the river at Mont Saint-Quentin, a "perfect observation point and vital strategic area" (Australian War Memorial), ready for the infantry to cross (see figure 9). In the final charge as bullets rained, on the 31st of August 1918, aged 22, Cyril Edwin Rushton's life was cut short just two and a half months before the war was to end, shot serving his country. His gallant nature would be recognised with the British War Medal and Victory medal (see figure 8), as his fellow sappers and brothers in arms defeated the German army at the Somme. Few remember the sacrifice of such men, and Cyril would be buried at Hem Farm Military Cemetery in Hem Monacu, France, far from his home and far from his family (see figure 10). However, his mother Elizabeth would never forget, and his brother Maurice would serve in WW2 as a Sergeant in honour of his fallen brother.



Figure 8: Victory (Right) and British War Medal (Left) which Rushton's family received on his behalf. (Australian War Memorial, n.d.)



Figure 9: Capture of Mont St Quentin by Australian WW1 artist Fred Leist in 1920. (Australian War Memorial)



Figure 10: Hem Farm Military Cemetery, Hem Monacu, France. (Commonwealth War Graves Commission, n.d.)



Figure 11: Prince Alfred College Archives Series 530 PAOCA Football Club Country Team 1932

Time passed and just as the Rushton name was beginning to fade from the pages of history, Cyril's old school Prince Alfred College would begin the formation of a tradition known as the Rushton Cup, a football match between boarders and dayboys, as well as a new school house to incorporate the many boarders of the school (see figure 11). Rushton house was home to hard workers and loyal friends, young men who were selfless in every way, for it was home to those who upheld a piece of that which their namesake had. For Rushton house was the final legacy of Sap. Cyril Edwin Rushton.

Defining perseverance and courage can be done in multiple ways. Many choose to use their words and cunning minds to fool others into thinking they are qualities of gods. Qualities man simply cannot obtain unless they have an otherworldly capability. But Cyril Rushton is perhaps the best example of what perseverance, courage and mateship truly looks like. He was not an amazing soldier who dived on grenades and turned the war all by himself. He operated as a repairman. Someone who stops at nothing not so he himself can be awarded, but to lift the achievements of those around him to their full potential. This is one of the most courageous and unselfish things a person can do. For what is more heroic than sacrificing one's own comfort and praise to see another shine brighter. Cyril Rushton entered the workforce as a railway worker. Even then he would work for the benefit of others, making sure trains and tracks stayed running. He joined the army as a Sapper, he would not fight to vanquish the enemy but would fight to shield his own from danger as best he could. Even to his death Cyril Rushton fought to defend those around him, he died so others may live. Although he would have been filled with terror every moment, he was still willing to make the ultimate sacrifice which is the greatest example of courage anyone can give.

Perseverance was within not only Cyril but the entire Rushton family. Through every hardship, from baby Mervyn's death to Cyril and Maurice fighting in separate wars the entire family pushed through fighting to take every step forward. Cyril grew up around greatness, not of flashy accomplishments but of the human spirit. Perseverance is a quality Cyril took to the line and no doubt instilled within others just as his family had to him. He never gave up on either people or problems. Attending signalling school before going to the line, doing everything he could to prepare for what he surely knew would be the greatest challenge of his life. Refusing to quit he worked his hands to the bone mending, building and maintaining the Allies frontline at the Somme. Not once did Cyril fail to meet or even exceed the expectations placed on him. Cyril Rushton was resilient in every way to the very end and perseverance was simply an accomplice to the rest of his personality.

Cyril Rushton upheld the ANZAC spirit not by performing great deeds to enhance his own reputation but by selfless and unwavering practical support to those who depended on him. Cyril Edward Rushton was the true embodiment of all the ANZACS stood for and should be recognised and remembered with appreciation by those of us who enjoy the freedom provided by his ultimate sacrifice for his country and the contributions made by those who fought alongside him.

Rest In Peace Cyril E. Rushton 1896-1918.

Part B

In my first stages of considering the Premier's Anzac Spirit Prize I was immediately intrigued at the thought of researching an ANZAC in more depth than I have ever previously thought to do. I originally wanted to write about Sir George Hubert Wilkins, a war-time photographer. However, Wilkins was a profound man with multiple books written of his adventures and the competition aims to research lesser-known soldiers. I was frustrated about having to decide on another ANZAC, yet I was intrigued to find someone who wasn't as well known.

I turned to my school and its old scholars who had served. 6 individuals were brought to my attention by my history teacher Mr Ron Pippett, all of whom had given their lives in service to their country during World War 1. These 6 persons, Delbridge, Rushton, Blackett, Oldham, Hemsley, and Stanton were the 6 names given to the old school house system in place from 1981 until a new system was introduced in 2004. I am in Cotton House which is the current blue house at Prince Alfred College which is the same colour as Rushton House previously. This is why I decided to research Rushton as a sort of "legacy" of my school house colour.

The next and perhaps greatest challenge came in the form of finding Rushton's first name as unfortunately this was not included in the naming of the school house. I found it was Cyril through the honour roll on the Australian War Memorial website after searching for the last name Rushton and finding only one who both served in WW1 and attended PAC. With his full name I was able to work with the school archivist, Kate Pulford who was able to assist me with valuable resources about Rushton's life and time at the school through to his death in France.



It was then a matter of scouring the internet for credible sources about a seemingly forgotten man. Rushton had little to see on the surface but after looking further into each aspect of his life I was increasingly impressed by the deeds and actions of our old scholar. This strategy of picking one aspect of his life and finding all I could about that one fact proved incredibly useful. I was able to find his relatives and their basic information such as births, deaths, and marriages, which in turn uncovered even more about Cyril.

The next stage was to structure the information I had found in a suitable format. I wished to tell Cyril's experience in way that was entirely factual, and interesting as well as adhere to the mark scheme. One of my goals when formatting was to have a variety of photos from both primary and secondary sources. I knew photos directly of Rushton would be scarce if any, but I was thrilled with the amount of effort that has gone into documenting the war. In fact, the entire experience has given me a deeper appreciation for all who served.



America Should Never Have Visited the Moon (Oliver Fenton)

On September 12, 1962, American President John F. Kennedy made his “We choose to go to the Moon” speech. “We choose to go to the Moon in this decade and do the other things, not because they are easy, but because they are hard; because that goal will serve to organise our and measure the best of our energies and skills, ... we intend to win”. Less than 7 years later, on 20 July 1964, the first crewed mission to the Moon, Apollo 11 of the United States, touched down. No other country has landed a manned mission to the Moon since.

However, that doesn't mean other countries weren't trying. On the 4th of October 1957, the Soviets launched the world's first satellite, Sputnik 1, into orbit. On April 12, 1961, Russian Yuri Gagarin was launched into orbit and became the first man in space. 1962 was the peak of the Cold War, with the Cuban Missile Crisis happening one month after Kennedy's speech, and this further cemented the American desire to win the space race and show the Russians that the US is superior to them. The Apollo project, in effect, was just egotistical America doing nothing to diffuse the thin ice that the world was resting on. During this period, the world was on the brink of a nuclear war and racing to go to space resulted in the USSR becoming very hostile to the Americans. When faced with the threat of a nuclear war, it is imperative to keep both sides neutral with each other, and not exacerbate the situation like the Americans did.

Between 1960 and 1973, an estimated \$25.8 billion US dollars was spent on the NASA Apollo Project alone, not counting other ongoing NASA projects. Adjusted for inflation, this is equivalent to over \$399 billion Australian Dollars. This is an astonishing amount of money that was spent on the missions. Millions of American citizens would have borne the brunt of this cost. In 1966, 4.41% of the federal budget was dedicated to NASA alone. Per person in 1966, this would have been an average of around \$709 adjusted Australian Dollars of tax spent on NASA. The percentage of the federal budget remained high for the period of the Cold War, and taxpayers would have suffered greatly because of their spending on something that doesn't protect them if a nuclear war breaks out.

In conclusion, it was a mistake for America to visit the Moon during the Cold War. They had much higher priorities than to race Russia to a solely symbolic victory, and the taxpayers of America suffered greatly because of the spending of the federal budget on NASA. While Apollo 11 did carry the message that capitalism is better than communism, it was not necessary for the moon landing to occur during the cold war, and the spread of communism could have been stopped in many other more effective and cost-friendly ways.



Figure 1: American Astronaut Neil Armstrong saluting beside the US flag

The Black History of Coffee

(Alex Bean)

The global history of the world's most popular beverage has a dark past, worthy of reflection.

Alexander Bean.

In every way the History of coffee is Black. Both in how drink was originally domesticated, and certainly in how it became mass produced in the 18th century. This beverage was first cultivated in Africa, popularised in the Middle East, and would move on to become a drink synonymous with civility in Europe. As is present, the further one studies a subject in History, coffee's dark past is revealed, filled with stories of hilarity, peculiarity and more importantly, cruelty.

The earliest instances of human beings consuming coffee come from Ethiopia. It's a story so old, as much ancient history does, that it has become partly mythologised to the point where reality meets fiction (Poitras, 2016). According to legend, an Ethiopian goat herder named Kaldi saw his herd chewing on the plant and seemed unnaturally energised (Weinberg and Bealer, 2001). After harvesting and cooking the leaves as tea, Kaldi would go on to plant and cultivate it, and eventually sell it.

After transportation through trade into the Ottoman Empire in the 15th century we start to see the emergence of Coffee Houses, of course, known more contemporarily as coffee shops. Fascinatingly, some argue it was due to the lack of bars and wineries within the Ottoman Empire that coffee houses exploded as a cultural phenomenon (Rotondi, 2020). The Ottomans monopolised the trade by preventing active seeds being sold outside of Arabia's borders, though at some stage it reached Europe through trade with the Venetians by the opening of the first European coffee house in 1647, (City of Vienna, 2022).

Through England and France in the Enlightenment we observe the evolution to Europe's hyper-obsession with the drink. There is no coincidence either, that this beverage and the greatest explosion of philosophising, political reform and scientific discovery coincides with the popularity of coffee. In 1652 Pasqua Rosee opened the first coffee shop in London, (Ellis, 2004), and it was a verifiable success. From here, coffee becomes present to such a large extent in intellectual conversation that coffee shops became colloquially known as "penny universities" (History.com, 2023). It was a drink that inspired and drew feverous addiction, and it was a perfect storm for a society whose previous favourite beverage was "beer soup" (Reilly, 2018). In France, the famous Voltaire supposedly drank up to fifty cups of coffee a day. (Koerner and Brendan, 2005).

So far, so good. In looking at this history and examining these stories subjectively, where could the cruelty come in? Coffee seems to be a central beverage to the Enlightenment, an Ethiopian grand myth, and symbolic of a much more culturally diverse past than we tend to realise. Unfortunately, there is also no coincidence that the ability for intellectuals to create their philosophising, political reform and scientific discovery was also bought from the freedom and exploitation of millions of individuals. As we know, the turn of the 17th century also coincides with the rise of global imperialism and of course, the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade.

Estimates vary, but most conclude that between the 16th and 19th centuries, 11 to 20 million Africans were enslaved and sold to European powers (M'Bokolo, 1998). Putting aside the immeasurable amount of inherent exploitative labour seen from colonial powers, slavery was undeniably a key source of production for staple goods in the European and American worlds. African slaves would be forced to work as servants or on tobacco, sugar, cocoa, cotton, and finally, coffee plantations, (Herbert, 2009).



Figure 1: Venice's oldest coffee house, *Florian*, which has been continuously operating since the 17th century

Some estimates state that during the peak of the European coffee craze, which was simultaneously peaking with African slavery, over half of the world supply of coffee came from French Haitian slaves. The Portuguese colony of Brazil in 1800, at this stage a major colonial and slaving power, had enslaved roughly two million and accounted for 30% of the world's coffee supply (Gilman, 2020). The history of coffee entering the European sphere is not only intertwined with slavery, it was enabled by slavery. The likelihood of a Londoner walking into a Coffee House and buying a long black with no connection to the most widespread, vile, practise in human history was virtually impossible.



Figure 2: Coffee fields of Haiti

Tragically, there are echoes of this past in today's global supply of coffee. The world's biggest coffee supplier is still, ironically, Brazil (Investopedia, 2023). Yet today, workers on average earn less than 2% of the retail price for their labour (Melville, 2020). Consequentially, there are stories of child labour, disease, even corporal punishment being enacted as authorities of coffee producing districts are reticent to punish these farm owners. Those that work on modern plantations in Brazil are commonly trafficked and debt bonded, and very commonly Black or Indigenous. Is this an echo, or a literal reflection of the past? Whilst we know that slavery was finally abolished globally with the end of the Confederacy in 1865, it didn't end, it simply evolved into a new, clandestine, and undercover form.



Figure 3: Coffee in its modern form

It is both frightening and abhorrent that of all the coffee farmers today, 71% live in extreme poverty (Gilman, 2020). Most notoriously Nestle, the world's largest supplier of coffee, cannot "guarantee" that its beans are not produced by farms that abuse child labour (Hodal, 2016).



Figure 4: Various Nestle coffee products from their "Nescafé" branch

Ultimately, it is vital to remember two things about coffee. First, that it's vibrant early European History is not so jubilant – it is a stark reminder of the paradox of the time. It is unethical to teach about the wonder of the Enlightenment without also teaching about the cancerous underbelly of violence, greed and racism that fuelled these European nations to apogee. Second, History is not dormant in the past, even for such a simple drink as seen by the unethical production practices of coffee even today.

Please drink and enjoy this wonderous beverage — but spend the extra five dollars to ensure your beans are coming from a supplier that does not employ slavery.

“Since 1945, in Asia, have alliances formed and functioned as expected by alliance theory?” Answer with reference to both historical and theoretical aspects. (Thomas Mitev)

Alliances in Asia have formed and functioned as expected by alliance theory as understood through a realist lens, however, it is not without its exceptions. What exactly is an alliance? There is no

While reaching consensus on a definition is difficult, for the purposes of this paper, the term alliances refers to an agreement - formal, unofficial, or tacit - for military cooperation under specified conditions. This essay will critically analyse alliance theory first to provide an understanding of the theoretical aspects that underpin Asia’s alliance structure post-World War Two. Moreover, the U.S. hub-and-spokes alliance mode focusing on the U.S.-Taiwan alliance, along with the formation and failure of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (‘SEATO’), provides a vehicle to illustrate Asia’s conformity with alliance theory. These case studies also provide a useful avenue to challenge some of the core realist assumptions of alliance theory, most notably the assumption that foreign aid plays a minor role in alliance formation and function. Finally, this paper briefly discusses the future challenges for the U.S. hub-and-spokes system by suggesting that the changing power dynamics in Asia are making it increasingly unfavourable to have strong security commitments with the U.S.

Balancing and bandwagoning

According to the realist school of thought, states have two options when forming an alliance: balancing or bandwagoning. Balancing is the act of allying against the prevailing threat while bandwagoning is an alignment with the source of danger (Walt, 1987, p. 17). Stephen Walt ultimately concludes that balancing is the “dominant tendency”, with bandwagoning occurring as an “opportunistic exception” (Ibid, p. 38). However, there is a notable limitation in Walt’s work as “alliances are responses not only to threats but also opportunities” (Scheller, 1987, p. 928). Walt’s theories imply that states form alliances purely to mitigate the risks posed by a threat, but overlooks the point that states may seek an alliance to advance their interests in the absence of a threat, in particular asymmetric bilateral alliances. Notwithstanding, let’s first understand the common assumptions regarding balancing and bandwagoning to see if the alliances formed and functioning in Asia correspond to them, and if not, why. In short, in a balancing world, aggressive behaviour is discouraged, the credibility of actors plays a minor role, and policies of restraint are best suited (Walt, 1987, p. 17). In a bandwagoning world, aggressive behaviour is rewarded by states that seek security, international competition and rivalry intensifies, and the inclination to use force is increased (Ibid, p. 32-33). These concepts will be important when analysing the architecture of Asian alliances later in the paper.




Figure 1:
Map of Asia

Multilateral alliances offer different costs and benefits and are identifiable through its membership of three or more states (Cox, 1992, p. 162). Multilateral alliances enable states to aggregate their capabilities to deter threats from their aggressive intentions (McInnis, 2019). The benefits of multilateral alliances include greater “transparency, reduced transaction costs, economies of scale, and credible commitments” (Cha, 2009, p. 163). These alliances ultimately empower smaller states to influence the behaviour of larger states as weaker powers can leverage their voting power within the institution in exchange for the protection of their interests (Ibid, p. 159). The larger state/s power is therefore diluted by the membership of multiple different actors within multilateral alliances. This made this an unattractive option for the U.S. when it crafted its alliance structure in Asia. This, coupled with the belief that many Asian countries are ‘inferior’ to the West and are incapable of creating and managing a multilateral alliance (Ibid, p. 161), is the reason the U.S. opted for deep bilateral alliances with key actors Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea. While a NATO-type multilateral alliance structure may appear the expected solution to protect U.S. interests in Asia (White, 2012, p. 83), it has limited applicability in a continent not predicated on Westphalian principles, coupled with vastly different power dynamics, geographic proximities, and conflicting ideologies. Another feature and limitation of multilateral alliances for great powers is the issue of ‘free-riding’ and ‘buck-passing’ (Chan, 2021, p. 1-7). Smaller states within these institutions often play a negligible role providing security, and have the tendency to rely on the larger powers within the alliance to bear the costs of collective security. These factors explain why multilateralism has failed in Asia and why bilateralism has prevailed as the dominant alliance structure, evidenced by the failure of SEATO.

Bilateralism has underpinned U.S. statecraft and foreign policy objectives in Asia and thus analysing the core theoretical concepts is imperative to understanding how alliances have formed and functioned in Asia. Most critical to this essay is the powerplay theory which identifies the important political and economic leverage great powers enjoy over smaller powers. Victor Cha’s powerplay theory is defined as the “construction of an asymmetric alliance designed to exert maximum control over the smaller ally’s actions” (Cha, 2009, p. 158). The dominant realist narrative suggests that alliances are created to aggregate capabilities to respond to common threats, but once that threat dissipates, the alliance is absolved (Snyder, 1997, pp. 1-4).

In this classic balance-of-power explanation to why alliances form, it fails to identify the unique power dynamics of Asia as this theory was formulated to apply to the European theatre. Europe in the 20th century had numerous great powers, including France, Germany, Britain, and Russia with many sharing land borders. Notable examples in Europe include the Munich Agreement 1938 and the Quadruple alliance of 1815 in which great powers identified the importance of maintaining the balance of power within Europe (Kronenbitter, 2019). However, in Asia, the U.S. enjoyed uncontested primacy post-Cold War with vastly different power dynamics enforcing the need for a different approach to alliance formation. In short, asymmetric bilateral alliances offer State A autonomy and control over the behaviour over State B in return for security assurance (Morrow, 1991, p. 907-912). This alliance structure is a feature of asymmetric alliances and is referred to as a ‘pact of restraint’ and is achieved through the “penetration of an ally’s security structure” (Walt, 1987, 49). This model suggests that states can achieve their interests even if they are divergent in nature because both states will benefit from this alliance structure, at least in the short-term. However, as power capabilities tend to balance out in the long run, and those former weaker states gain in relative power, there is a real chance of an ugly breakdown of asymmetric alliances as states can only achieve their interests by retrieving their autonomy. Just as power dynamics change in time, so do state’s interests. Thus, there must come a point in an asymmetric alliance where the subordinate state is no longer willing to sacrifice its autonomy for its security. This seemingly unchangeable fate of asymmetric alliances is now a reality for the U.S. in Asia. It has the capacity to not only destroy the U.S.’s hub-and-spokes alliance model but thwart any chance the U.S. has at maintaining primacy in Asia through asymmetry as U.S. exceptionalism makes it unlikely that the U.S. will relinquish control easily (Pease, 2009).




Figure 2: Hub & Spoke model: the US acts as the “Hub”, offering defence in exchange for influence over the foreign policy of the “nodes” (other countries)

Another important feature of asymmetric alliances that has a peculiar outcome is the effect of foreign aid. In principle, the idea of using foreign aid as a mechanism of control and leverage is self-defeating (op. cit, p. 45) . At first glance, it may seem that a donor can threaten the cessation of economic and military assistance to effectively control the behaviour of the recipient. However, a more sophisticated level of analysis reveals a number of factors that suggest foreign aid fulfills minimal avenues of control for larger powers, especially in bilateral asymmetric alliances. Firstly, foreign aid provides clear signals of non-aggression to the recipient (Ibid, p. 46). Secondly, if statesman believe bandwagoning is widespread, the defection of even the weakest ally makes a difference in the balance of power, and the fear of this dissuades states from using foreign aid as leverage (Ibid, p. 46-47). Lastly, the capabilities and relative power of the recipient will increase for as long as military and economic assistance continues, nullifying the need for further aid. These factors ultimately void the use of foreign aid as political leverage instruments as alliances form and function. This has important implications for the leverage and control the U.S. has within its bilateral alliances as security and power dynamics have drastically changed in the 70 years since the formation of the hub-and-spokes model.

The U.S. hub-and-spokes alliance model

The U.S. hub-and-spokes model of bilateral alliances in Asia offers a valuable case study to evaluate the application of alliance theory, highlighting the strengths and limitations of theoretical concepts through the successes and failures of these alliances. This model consists of a network of bilateral alliances where the U.S. serves as the 'hub' and each individual state acts as a 'spoke'. Official U.S. allies or 'spokes' are Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, and Thailand. U.S. alignments include India, Indonesia, Singapore, and Vietnam (White, 2012, p. 82). This alliance model has served the purpose of balancing against the threat of the Soviet Union, and post-Cold War China. The U.S. opted for this model to develop key pacts of restraints to control the behaviour of 'rogue allies', in particular Taiwan and South Korea, where aggressive authoritarian leaders raised concerns in the U.S. about being entrapped in a war with the Soviet Union or China.

President Eisenhower and Truman also shared grave concerns about the domino theory. It is the belief that if one state falls to communism, the risk that neighbouring countries will also fall to communism was significant. Thus, the U.S. established bilateral alliances to control the spoke's ability to use force through a dependency on U.S. military and economic aid, leveraging the asymmetrical power differences to garner "maximum and exclusive control" (Cha, 2009, p. 158) over her allies.

Taiwan

The theoretical concept of balancing underpins the U.S.-Taiwan Mutual Defence Treaty signed December 1954, while also functioning as a pact of restraint to prevent U.S. entrapment in a war between Taiwan and mainland China. The decision to form a bilateral alliance with Taiwan originated when the North invaded the South in Korea, reaffirming the threat Communism posed to U.S. interests in Asia (Ibid, p. 159-160). The U.S. passed the Formosa resolution to facilitate the use of force to protect Taiwan. The interests of the U.S. are clearcut: deter a communist incursion; however, Taiwan's interests were different. Taiwan, led by Chiang Kai-Shek, held aggressive intentions to retake mainland China. Various skirmishes occurred in the off-shore islands near Taiwan, and on mainland China, with tensions escalated by geographic proximity, ideological differences, and the outcome of the Chinese Civil War that ended in 1949 (United States Department of States, n.d.).

The U.S. was in a difficult position. On the one hand, abandoning its mutual defence commitment to Taiwan would severely damage its reputation and would undermine its other defence commitments in Asia, while also reducing U.S. credibility to deter and balance against the threat of communism. However, President Eisenhower firmly believed that the U.S. risked a costly war with China via entrapment by Taiwan, perceived as a rogue ally, as Eisenhower affirmed "the real trouble and danger [is not China, but] that Chiang Kaishek might go on the warpath" (Cha, 2009, 151). Fortunately, the U.S. enjoyed both primacy in Asia and power supremacy over Taiwan. Taiwan's main interests were not to deter communist pressure per se but to trigger an aggressive mainland invasion of China through Taiwan's nationalistic reunification goals.



However, Taiwan ultimately sacrificed its autonomy for security, and hence exclusive control over its behaviour. The U.S. was able to exert control over Taiwan by threatening to withhold key military technology and equipment vital to Chiang Kai-Shek's plans for reunification. A key divergence from traditional alliance theory which regards foreign aid as playing a minor role in alliance formation and operation (Walt, 1987, p. 46) is that Taiwan grew dependent on U.S. military technology, training, and equipment such that it was integral to its offensive commitments that the U.S. was able to exert such coercive pressure. This case study ultimately highlights weaknesses within Walt's theoretical concepts and challenges the notion that foreign aid is not a vehicle for coercion.

SEATO

The rise and fall of SEATO provides a powerful case study to examine the theoretical concepts that underpin multilateral alliance theory. The creation of SEATO in 1954 spurred from a successful independence movement in Vietnam, succeeding from French colonial rule and recognised at the 1954 Geneva Accords. The partition of Vietnam divided the state in two. The North was ruled by a communist government and the South governed by a non-communist body. SEATO operated as a vehicle for collective self-defence via the aggregation of capabilities from eight different countries in response to a growing threat perception about the spread of communism through Vietnam. However, notions of a 'neo-colonialist' narrative plagued the reputation of SEATO as lingering colonial ties from the U.S., United Kingdom, and France made it difficult for regional players to see the organization as one primarily concerned with deterring the threat of communism and to protect the interests of regional states (Gentilucci, 2015, p. 10).

Why did SEATO fail? Firstly, SEATO failed because of the uneven military capabilities across its membership (Fenton, 2012, p. 324). Disproportionate military capabilities give rise to the tendency for smaller powers to free ride and buck pass security arrangements, forcing the larger powers within the alliance to bear the costs of any military intervention. Moreover, various member states held reservations about militarizing SEATO due to the fragmented consensus as to the role and function of the alliance (United States Department of State (2), n.d.). Secondly, there was widespread hesitance among member states about the diminishment of national autonomy and sovereignty to powers outside the region (op. Cit, 2012, p. 325). Thirdly, SEATO struggled to ascertain consensus among member states as to the conditions that warrant military intervention (Ibid, p. 325).

A key takeaway from the failure of SEATO is that building shared consensus among different interests in Asia is difficult. Moreover, while it is possible for multilateral alliances to remain intact following the end of a perceived threat, like NATO post-Cold War, the dissolution of SEATO in 1977 following the end of the Vietnam War in 1975 is consistent with realist assumptions about why alliances form.

The future of alliances in Asia

While future alliance structures in Asia remain uncertain due to constantly evolving power dynamics, it is still critical to analyse the expected future of this system to determine if it will or will not adhere to alliance theory. In short, the future of America's alliance structure in Asia seems fragile. The traditional dichotomy of alliances being 'with us or against us' is going to change as power imbalances even out and we move to a multipolar regional and international system (White, 2012, p. 83-85). Asian allies will continue to support U.S. interests so long as it brings peace and stability to the region. However, any continuation from the U.S. to contain China will likely bring about a loosening of commitments by the spokes, in particular Japan, as China continues to grow an important economic trading partner for these countries.



Figure 3: SEATO Logo

The US-Japan alliance is arguably the most fragile of them all. Escalating rivalry between the U.S. and China would have negative consequences for Japan diplomatically and economically, but so too would cooperation. Escalating rivalry between the U.S. and China will drive a wedge between all her allies, and tensions would inevitably increase. If cooperation increases, the U.S. will no longer require such a robust alliance and security commitment, and will no longer be willing to bear most of the costs of ensuring Japanese security. Thus, Japan is likely to break-away from its robust alliance with the U.S. to focus on becoming an independent Great power as it does not ruin crucial economic ties with China to preserve U.S. primacy. This means that, even if tensions rise and China remains a threat to the region, it is in Japan's best interest to dissolve or reduce its commitments to the U.S. which is contrary to Walt's realist alliance theory.

Conclusion

It is clear that alliance formation and function is complex and multifaceted, and while alliances in Asia have predominantly conformed to alliance theory, these theoretical concepts based on Westphalian principles do not always have universal application. The case studies focusing on Taiwan and SEATO ultimately reaffirm core alliance theory principles that states form alliances to balance against and deter common threats. It is also true that asymmetric alliances facilitate "maximum and exclusive control" over the behaviour of states. However, it is clear from the Taiwan case study that foreign aid plays a much more influential role in alliance formation and function than what alliance theory suggests. Moreover, the likely escalation of U.S.-China tensions and subsequent future break-down of the U.S.-Japan alliance undermines the assumption that alliances only breakdown when a perceived common threat is removed, however, it is only likely to intensify.



Figure 4: US President Joe Biden meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio on the 27th of July, 2022



Figure 6: Tensions between China and the USA, particularly regarding trade

Seeking Peace in the Midst of War: My Introduction to International Affairs (Robert T. Harris)

December 1971. I was scheduled to fly from Singapore to Delhi to represent Australian teachers at an international seminar on education for peace. The airport departure board showed 'flight cancelled'. Delhi airport had been closed. India and Pakistan had declared war as India supported rebels in the East of that divided country – soon to be known to the world as Bangladesh.

I went from one airline desk to another. Alitalia said I could go to Bombay (now Mumbai). No problems accepting my ticket. My young wife, Merry, had plans to take the train up to Ipoh in Malaysia, where she had friends, so I quickly farewelled her: 'I'll call you when I get back from India', I said. I walked out onto the tarmac – no airport security checks in those days – up the steps and boarded the Alitalia DC8. Found my seat. Sat next to a girl about my age - mid-twenties - reading the Sydney Morning Herald. Saw the headline: 'War breaks out between India and Pakistan: all Australian citizens are advised to leave.' Too late. The 'plane taxied out and we were on our way. Smooth flight over the Bay of Bengal, then the lights of towns in India came into view below. Another hour or two and we began our descent. My seatmate and I noted there were no more lights – total darkness as we approached the airport of one of India's major cities. The DC8 landed, then taxied to a point just off the runway. Out came a refuelling tanker and a bus. About 20 of us disembarked and got onto the bus. By the time we reached the terminal, Alitalia had already refuelled, then took off again on its way to Rome. In the darkness of the terminal, a turbaned official checked our passports. 'We have a curfew' he said casually, then added: 'Those Pakistanis attacked us an hour ago'.

It was after midnight. I had only a carry-on bag, so no luggage to collect. I asked how to find a hotel. There is a bus taking people, I was told. I found the bus and hopped on. Sitting in front of me, a middle-aged couple straight out of the colonial era – the man with a neatly trimmed moustache, smoking a pipe, his wife, well-dressed with a large hat. We made our way through the darkened streets without headlights. 'I never thought to see Bombay as quiet as this, did you?', said the lady to her husband, with a clipped upper class British accent. The era of Empire was not long gone, I thought. The bus stopped at a hotel where I could catch a few hours of sleep. Next morning, the hotel reception advised I could take the train to Delhi or try the airport, as some domestic flights were getting in. I opted to try the flight and went back to the airport. Indian Airlines accepted my ticket to Delhi. I kept an eye out the lefthand window looking towards Pakistan. I read later that a Pakistan air force fighter had strafed a train on the same route. At Delhi airport, relief to see a big sign: 'United Schools International Welcomes Delegates' and helpful staff at a desk. I was taken to the conference centre where I would spend three incredible weeks. Other delegates - from Europe, the United States, Canada, and some Asian countries – had managed to get into Delhi before the war broke out. Many of the states of India were represented, mostly by school inspectors. Participants expected from Pakistan had cancelled!

Our host was the United Schools Organisation of India, which through the initiative of its General Secretary, Jiya Lal Jain, had developed internationally. The programme was well thought out, organized around the challenge of how teachers could contribute to peace through education. The central principle was the founding statement of UNESCO: 'Since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed.'



The school inspectors from Indian states tended to dominate the sessions, with wonderful oratory about building understanding and tolerance among nations. But when we met for chats at the bar – designated as a tourist site so that alcohol could be served – the conversation turned to the war. As a young and, let it be said, naïve idealist, I was struck by the contradiction between their glowing public speeches and their private vilification of their absent Pakistani counterparts. Since before partition at the time of independence, they told me, the Muslims of the Indian sub-continent had been brought up to hate non-Muslims, whether Hindu, Buddhist or Christian. India had been founded as a secular state, they said, and could relate to the West as well as the non-aligned countries. But Pakistanis had been schooled with hate in their hearts, and the government was right in its decision to combat those villains on the battlefield.

These private exchanges seemed to me to be incongruous in relation to the very purpose of the seminar. It was an early learning experience for me, and an introduction to certain realities of the world. I thought of exhortations from my own education to 'practice what you preach'. This experience underlined the difficulty of bridging the gap between aspirations for peace and justifications for conflict based on nationalism, religious beliefs, or combinations of them.

With these thoughts in mind, I participated in one of the highlights of the seminar: a visit to the burial place of Mahatma Gandhi. I approached the marble slab of the grave of India's founding father reverentially, pausing for some minutes with hands together in the Indian fashion of greeting and of respect. Gandhi was assassinated by a Hindu extremist who viewed him as being too accommodating to Muslims in his endeavour to maintain unity among the peoples of that vast sub-continent.

Gandhi had succeeded in winning independence from the British Raj, he had inspired the emergence from colonial rule of other third-world nations, but he had been unable to prevent the partition of India. Millions of people had migrated, often in appalling circumstances. Muslims went to the West or to the East, to the geographically separated parts of Pakistan, while Hindus moved from those parts to the various states of India. Now, twenty years later, rebels in East Pakistan had risen against the military rulers based in the Western capital. Their aim was to create a new nation – Bangladesh. And after earlier conflicts over the northern border in Kashmir, India had decided to support the rebels by declaring war on its neighbour.

Some of my younger Indian colleagues invited me to join them at a huge rally in the centre of Delhi – a million people addressed by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. From way back in the crowd, I could just see the podium where she was speaking, loudspeakers carrying her words exhorting support for the war.

Delhi was still under curfew, with cars making their way slowly at night without lights, to avoid oxcarts and pedestrians. Newspapers headlined a decision by the United States of Richard Nixon and his national security advisor, Henry Kissinger, to send the USS Enterprise carrier group into the Bay of Bengal, in a show of support for Pakistan. There were stories of Americans being beaten up in the streets. Back then, I was a suntanned Aussie with black hair and beard, and I did my best to meld with my Indian friends whenever I ventured out.

Finally, the seminar was over, and so was the war. Indira Gandhi achieved her goal of splitting Pakistan. Back at Delhi airport, now with the help of friends, I managed to get a flight to Colombo, and from there I was able to reach Bangkok. From a 'phone cabin I called Merry, who took the train up from Ipoh. I called my parents in Adelaide, who had no idea of what had become of me. Before the days of mobile 'phones and WhatsApp there had been no way to communicate. I later discovered they had listened every night to ABC news for the latest on the war in India.

We travelled back to Singapore. There I was invited to join the Singapore Teachers' Union for a dinner in honour of a guest, André Braconier of Belgium, who was General Secretary of the International Federation of Free Teachers' unions, (IFFTU). André spent much of the evening telling me that another body called the World Confederation of Organisations of the Teaching Profession (WCOTP) was a front for American and British interests, but with headquarters in neutral Switzerland. His verbal onslaught aroused my curiosity. When I returned to Adelaide I asked the President of the SA Institute of Teachers, Wilf White, the man who had the idea of nominating me to represent Australian teachers in Delhi, for more information about this WCOTP with which the Australian Teachers' Federation was affiliated.



Little was I to know that seventeen years later I would become Secretary General of WCOTP, then after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War, join forces with the successor to André at IFFTU, Fred van Leeuwen, to found Education International, today representing 32 million teachers around the globe.

Nor could I imagine that in between I would be invited to tea with Indira Gandhi at a UNESCO seminar in Delhi. Or that after her assassination, I would join her son and successor, Rajiv, at a rally of 20,000 primary teachers in Delhi, organized by an amazing man named Jagdish Mishra from Patna, in the state of Bihar, who had accompanied Gandhi on the famous Salt March of 1930, which sparked the movement for Indian independence.

During those years I studied the role of the United Nations in attempting to mediate between India and Pakistan. I worked in Papua New Guinea at the time of independence from Australia under a UN mandate, and in South-East Asia and the Pacific, and helped organize Asian regional conferences of teachers in Adelaide and in Baguio, Philippines. I went to Geneva to continue studies in international relations. Merry joined the Australian foreign service, but we separated in Geneva. She continued a distinguished career, rising to the rank of ambassador. When I completed a term serving as President of the Conference of NGOs at UNESCO in Paris, Jiya Lal Jain came, and I thanked him publicly for his inspiration. Mishraji was with us at the Founding Congress of Education International in Stockholm, January 26th, 1993, and was saluted by 1,000 delegates.

One of the supporters of the movement for international teacher unity was Motufumi Makieda of Japan, who became President of WCOTP. After Baguio, he asked me to organize an international seminar on Education for Peace in Hiroshima. Atomic bombs destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki just before I was born. In my final year of school, I had been deeply affected by the Cuban Missile Crisis, when the world faced the risk of nuclear catastrophe. In Hiroshima, I worked with Yuko Matsuoka – whom I first met in Baguio. We have been married now for 16 years. As I struggled to put together words for a draft of the Teachers' Call for Peace from Hiroshima, I thought back to that seminar on education for peace in a country at war.

The seminar in India had been the beginning of a journey of learning about the world, about the aspirations we all share for a peaceful life, and about the harsh realities that all too often block the way. If there is one key lesson to take away, it is the fundamental importance in education of critical thinking, questioning interests declared or hidden, never accepting rhetoric, and never giving up the age-old quest for peace with dignity and justice.



The Mediterranean: Birth of Civilisation? (Ethan Bailey)

Ancient Greece and Rome were more important to the state of the world than almost any other civilisation, including France and England. Developments in this relatively small area around the Mediterranean Sea have changed the course of history. From philosophers inspiring new ways of thinking and rapid technological development, to the conquest of large swathes of land by the Roman Empire, to the burning of the library of Alexandria the collapse of Greco-Roman society plunging Europe into the dark ages. there is very little that could have been considered as influential as these societies.

To start with literature, technology, and philosophy, it's hard to deny their significant origins in ancient Greece with the likes of Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and others. The Ancient Greeks could be seen to be responsible for the creation, development of, and expanding of literature and drama. As evidence one need only look as far as any modern literature to find the sheer volume of relevant ideas that originated over two thousand years ago, such as the idea of a 'novel', intricate stories told on stage in drama, even the practice of recording events for the purposes of future learning. Of course, the ancient Greeks were not the only, and perhaps not the first to engage significantly with the arts, but they were the first to do it with such scale to make their academic and literary pursuits so notable. Examples of notable literary exploits can be seen in the many ancient Greek myths often referenced not only in academics, but also in popular culture. (Pittsburgh-research)

Technological advancements are less notable with relation to modern day, this is a fact, but for the time they had created many technologies and military tactics that allowed them to dominate militarily, economically, and in terms of civil organisation. For example, their systems of governance functioned effectively and fairly, not something which would be replicated for thousands of years, and only led to the fall of the Roman empire when it was subverted by Julius Caesar. Mathematics core to our understanding of the subject were also established in Ancient Greece, particularly, Pythagoras is the most well-known for this example of technology (Britannica-Pythagoras).

Philosophy is one of the first things one may think of when they think of Ancient Greece, and with good reason. Discussing philosophy is still one of the best ways even today to think about the way we look at each other as humans, and the world as a whole. Much of our understanding of philosophy originates from the ancient Greek philosophers such as Socrates, Epicures, Heraclitus, Democritus, and, Diogenes. Schools of thought that sprung from Ancient Greece include cynicism, stoicism, epicurean, and scepticism.

The fall of the Roman empire resulted in the loss of much knowledge, literary value, and advanced societal growth which would not be replicated until the renaissance. The causes for this are considered by historians to be largely due to overreliance on the system they had which had worked for so long. For instance, they were over reliant on slave labour to support their economy, this resulted in complete collapse when slaves were no longer able to be controlled due to the chaos caused by the invading 'barbarian' tribes and the unwieldiness of the vast size of the empire. In conjunction with multiple other issues such as military overspending in an attempt to combat the Huns, this chaos led to economic devastation and made it very difficult to recover from any additional problems that led to collapse (thoughtco.com). The era that followed the fall of the roman empire came to be known as 'the dark ages' not because they were particularly worse than any other time in history, but simply because we lack the in-depth records that the Greeks and Romans used (study.com). This issue for modern day historians betrays a loss of culture and knowledge that shows how much of a setback it was to humanity as a whole when the knowledge from Ancient Greece and Rome was burned and lost.

In conclusion, ancient Greece and Rome were by far the most advanced civilisations at their time and had history played out differently, maybe we would be living in a more technologically and societally advanced world due to the loss of knowledge in Rome's collapse. However even with their destruction, the knowledge that was able to be recovered is still used today, and the culture is still relevant to our own. It is for these reasons that I believe ancient Greece and Rome were and still are more influential than any other ancient societies.



Newton or Leibniz: Both? Neither?

(Connor Stone)

Since its inception, calculus has forever shifted the mathematical paradigm and allowed for a plethora of discoveries in a nearly infinite areas of knowledge. Whilst calculus is primarily studied through the lens of mathematics and its possibility for use within the natural / human sciences, it also boasts a rich history filled with controversy which has divided many of the greatest minds for centuries. Newton is most credited with the gigantesque achievement, however there are levels of nuance which often are omitted.



Figure 1: Statues of Isaac Newton and Gottfried Leibniz at Oxford University

Widely recognized as one of the greatest scientific minds to ever exist, Isaac Newton claims to have begun his work on differential calculus in 1666 as a part of his work "The method of fluxions and fluents" (History and applications - the newton-leibniz controversy, no date) whereby his definitions of 'fluxions' form the modern definition of the derivative. Whilst some of his earlier work, such as his magnum opus 'Philosophiæ naturalis principia mathematica' contained small elements of his early work in what is recognized today as differential calculus, Newton had no formal publications concerned with calculus until 1693.

Contrastingly, Leibniz began working on his derivation of calculus in 1674, and later published his paper in 1684. Such, if the merit of 'winning' this race is awarded purely on publication, then Leibniz is clearly first. However, the nuance exists not in who publishes their work first, but rather in a set of accusations elicited towards Leibniz by Newton, accusing him of plagiarizing his mathematics and ideas whilst merely changing the notation.

Whilst on behalf of Newton, the initially allegations were primarily pursued by the English mathematician John Wallis, who many cite as being a rather "xenophobic and quarrelsome character" (History and applications - the newton-leibniz controversy no date). Wallis was fixated on the superiority of English scientists and claimed in 1695 that Leibniz's work was formulated due to copying Newton's findings. These allegations disrupted the relationship between Newton and Leibniz and were perpetuated by other allegations on behalf of the mathematician Fatio de Duiller in 1699 who had a distaste for Leibniz due to some comments he made involving his 'version' of calculus being the only way to solve some complex problems.

In response to these allegations, Leibniz formulated four core claims which outlined why his development of calculus was independent to the work of Newton: He published a vague outline of his work long before Newton had published anything about fluxions, in all of his work he always inferred that his discovery was his own invention, his work mirrored a development of calculus which was independent to the path Newton took, and finally that he always was a man of good faith.

The third of these claims is what substantiates belief today that Leibniz's work was his own, and not stolen from Newton. For example, Leibniz's work began with integration which he immediately recognized as being a summation of an infinite series, whilst Newton began with the principles of derivation (fluxions). In fact, leading up to the allegations of plagiarism, they had worked collaboratively on aspects of 'power series' and were both aware of the other working on calculus. Additionally, Newton used a geometric approach in his work and used instantaneous change as a means to define his 'fluxions' using this to connect to Wallis's work on infinite series. Contrastingly, Leibniz used a more analytical method of investigation which was detached from Newton's mathematical methodology.

In 1712 a report of extreme bias favouring Newton was published by the Royal Society in England which attempted to settle the disagreement. However, the whole report was directed by Newton himself, and purposefully omitted elements of Leibniz's story, particularly around how mathematical methodology was completely detached from Newton's work. Immediately in response, Leibniz accused Newton and his followers for stealing his working and using it incorrectly in their own application. Continually, allegations, threats and disagreements simmered between Newton, Leibniz, and their followers. Eventually, this culminated in 1715 when it was agreed that the first to construct a tangent to a family of curves would be credited with the discovery of calculus. Formally, Leibniz won this competition however, this is largely due to a technicality in competition which discredited Newton's entry. In many ways, Leibniz's death in 1716 marked the decline of the argument between the two, and according to Rupert Hall (1980 p. 241) Newton himself became disinterested with the drama by 1722.

In many respects, Newton and Leibniz are equally responsible for the development and modern application of calculus. Both applied their findings to the work of those before them, using it to propel their own findings. To claim that Newton was the 'inventor' of calculus, such as is generally accepted, in many ways completely omits the mathematical methodology, work and findings of Leibniz and his own predecessors. Instead, it is vital that all sides of the historical dispute are considered; particularly Leibniz who did not steal Newton's work, instead only supported it unknowingly (Ramos 2017). Interestingly, Leibniz's notation (detailed in figure 2) is the more commonly used and accepted notation used today, especially his integral notation. Equally, this alone does not support Leibniz's work over Newton, instead it reinforces the independence of each mathematician, and the vitality in acknowledging both as important in a discovery which shifted our understanding of the world forever.

	Newton	Leibniz
Differentiation	$\dot{y} = \frac{dy}{dt}$	$\frac{d(f(x))}{dx}$ or $\frac{dy}{dx}$
Integration	\bar{x} or \boxed{x}	$\int_a^b f(x) dx$

Figure 2: Differences in Newton/Leibniz notation

Why the A-10 Thunderbolt II is Overrated (William Benecke)

The A-10 Thunderbolt II is an aircraft renowned for its destructive capabilities and its iconic 30mm GAU-8 Avenger cannon. It was used extensively during the USA's two recent Middle Eastern military engagements, namely the Gulf War (August 2, 1990 – February 28th, 1991) and the Iraq War (20th March 2003 – 15th December 2011), yet its significant ineffectiveness warrants closer examination. This article will delve into these issues through its troubled development, effectiveness and dangers in close air support (CAS), and tank-busting capabilities.

Development:

The development of the A-10 posed several challenges that had to be overcome through constant testing and improvement. In the early development of the A-10 one major drawback was structural fatigue. It was reported that "The aircraft undergoing fatigue testing developed cracks" (Jacques and Strouble, 2010) observed before the desired 6,000-hour mark and the fuselage was later reinforced to solve the issue. This, however, was not enough, as "The Analytical Condition Inspections conducted in 1995-96 discovered cracks in several wing locations due to fatigue." (Jacques and Strouble, 2010) showing cracks were still a constant issue plaguing the A-10, causing the early retirement of many aircraft. Furthermore, the testing of the gun came with some issues of its own. During the firing tests, "unburned propellant from the cannon cartridges would accumulate in front of the muzzle". This would cause it to "explode in a distinctly unnerving and potentially dangerous fireball" (Greg Goebel), which was later fixed by "adding potassium nitrate to the propellant". This would allow for a "more complete combustion", effectively removing the problem.

On the 7th of November 1979, the A-10's GAU-8 Cannon was put to the test against ten immobile and outdated Russian T-62 MBTs[i]. The testing was done in ideal conditions, allowing the pilot to use as many rounds as he would like and multiple passes of the targets. In the passes, the pilot fired off 174 rounds. 90 of those rounds contacted the target, over half of the rounds fired missed, and out of these 90 rounds that hit, only 30 of them penetrated the tanks. Out of the 10 tanks only 3 were destroyed. These were considered 'lucky shots' as they had hit the tanks' ammunition or the fuel, causing internal explosions.

In a realistic setting, the planes could only perform one or two passes. In the firing test, the tanks that were used were considered outdated, and Russia had designed and created more modern tanks such as the T-72, which the A-10 could theoretically penetrate, but only under near-perfect conditions and with a remarkable amount of luck. In genuine combat situations, the enemy would fire back and utilise smoke dispensers to obscure the vision of the A-10, exposing its biggest flaw, the use of outdated technology. The A-10 was built without modern technology in mind, to ensure the 'ease' of maintenance and upkeep. This significantly hindered the potential of the A-10, especially during the Gulf War, which resulted in "Some pilots using binoculars to assist in target identification." The technology used was underwhelming, proving to be its biggest and most fatal flaw, ultimately resulting in many blue-on-blue[i] incidents. These deaths could have easily been avoided with the implementation of modern technology already being utilised by other aircraft of similar roles, such as the F-111. This lack of technology would result a lack of efficiency in close air support roles.

CAS Performance & Blue on Blue:

Close air support (CAS) is the primary role in which the A-10 was utilised, especially during the Gulf and Iraq Wars. The main CAS weapon for the A-10 is the GAU-8 Avenger, with reports stating that "The gun is accurate enough to place 80% of its shots within a 40-foot (12.4 m) diameter circle from 4,000 feet (1,220 m)" (Jenkins). This means that approximately 20% of the shots will land outside of the 'circle', possibly near friendly soldiers, which greatly impedes its performance as a CAS fighter. Due to the inaccuracy of the gun, when the aircraft was called in, Marines would take cover, and the Iraqi soldiers would learn to do the same, taking cover and hindering the effectiveness of the aircraft. As stated, the A-10 had a hard time identifying the difference between friendly and hostile soldiers resulting in Blue-on-blue incidents such as the one on March 23rd, 2003. Eighteen marines were killed during a firefight, but of those eighteen marines killed only eight of the deaths were confirmed to be killed by the hostile fire.



In an interview after the battle, 1st. Lt. Michael Seeley said, "That was my second time being strafed by an A-10," he later states "The First Gulf War I was strafed. If I can't work with Marine Air, I don't want to work with anything", showing his overall resentment towards the Thunderbolt. This incident happened as the Marines were attempting to secure a bridge. A Marine was caught out in the open with the A-10 strafing the area. Cpl. Edward Castleberry recounts the incident; "He [Lance Cpl. David Fribley] was trying to climb in, he's got one arm trying to get in, and he just takes a huge round directly through his chest, and it blew his whole back out," (Cpl. Edward Castleberry) it is then stated that "pilots should have recognized the tub-shaped armoured assault vehicles" due to the fact that the "biggest vehicle that the Iraqis even had was a pickup truck with a machine gun in the back" (Staff Sgt. Troy Schielein).

This identification between friendly and hostile vehicles was a problem that plagued A-10 Pilots. Since 2001, the A-10 has been involved in four friendly fire incidents that killed 10 U.S. soldiers and one UK soldier. These statistics were only recorded after the Gulf War, but the A-10 flew 8624 missions during the Gulf War. Due to the lack of data before 2001, the number of Blue-on-Blue incidents could potentially be much higher. This resulted in an incident in Iraq on March 28th, 2003, when two A-10 Thunderbolt II pilots fired upon a convoy and destroyed two British light armoured vehicles, killing one soldier and injuring 5 more. The British armoured vehicles had "orange panels that had been used by the soldiers to make their vehicles easier to identify". The pilot had trouble identifying these panels and "concluded that the orange panels were a peculiar type of Iraqi weapons system." (Mair et al., 2017) This could have easily been avoided if the pilot had access to appropriate equipment, such as the "AN/AVQ-26 Pave Tack infra-red targeting designator/reader" used in the F-111 Aardvark, which was able to "track and designate ground targets for laser, infra-red and electro-optical bombs" being developed in the 1970s and used as early as 1982. This proves that this technology was not inaccessible and could have easily been implemented on the A-10, resulting in fewer casualties.

Tank Busting Capabilities:

The A-10 is stated as being used to "support allied ground troops by striking armoured vehicles, tanks, and other hostile ground forces." Realistically, it was inefficient at striking tanks. The A-10 has roughly 900 kills, a fact that's disputed by many. The data is impossible to confirm as stated in 'Evaluation of the Air Campaign'. It's impossible to confirm this data "because data on a large number of A-10 strike events were unclear or contradictory [and] we found it impossible to reliably analyse and include A-10 strike data." The A-10's primary weapon, the 30mm GAU-8 Avenger was reported as "ineffective against tank targets" (David R. Jacques, Dennis D. Strouble). This later meant that the 'Tank buster' was required to use conventional weaponry such as "dumb" bombs and AGM-65s.[i] This meant that effectively any aircraft that carried such weaponry could fulfil the same role as the A-10, and often to a better degree.

The A-10 flew 8,100 sorties during the Gulf War, launching 90% of their AGM-65's with reported kills of around 900, whereas the F-111 Aardvark had 'nearly 5,000 sorties in the Gulf War' during which it destroyed 920 tanks and armoured personnel carriers. Based on this evidence, the F-111 Aardvark flew half the missions of the A-10 and achieved more air-to-ground kills. Furthermore, the A-10's statistics are inflated, as during the war pilots referred to ground kills as 'armoured kills.' Under that definition, lightly armoured trucks and vehicles are also included as armoured vehicles, further inflating the data, and making it impossible to verify, as the number of kills is "unclear or contradictory". This means that "questions on the effectiveness of aircraft and missile strikes could not be answered nor could some effectiveness claims." That is just for the missiles carried by the A-10 alone.



The GAU-8 cannon, the gun which the A-10 was designed around, was rarely ever used against tanks to an efficient level, this is because it was inefficient against relatively modern tanks such as the T-72. Furthermore, the T-72s were non-stationary, unlike the A-10's testing. When the A-10's depleted uranium rounds would hit a target, it would kick up dirt and ignite parts of the tank, but the tank would remain operational. The soldiers accompanying the tanks would scatter so as not to get hit and this would give the pilots the impression that the tanks were disabled when they had not been immobilised. Furthermore, in the live fire test report 'combat damage assessment team' simulating Soviet tanks, it's theorised that if it was tested on T-72, the GAU-8 Avenger would have been near useless against the armour in ideal conditions. Offering additional evidence in proving the ineffectiveness of the 'Tank Buster' on modern armies.

To conclude, The A-10's effectiveness was limited because it was a dangerous CAS weapon leading to friendly casualties, it had an inefficient cannon against tanks and its lack of technology proved to be its biggest flaw. All of these major inefficiencies could have been easily avoided through improvements and modernisation of the A-10 with the technology available at the time, showing the extent of inefficiency of the A-10 during the Gulf and Iraq conflicts.



Figure 1: The A-10 Thunderbolt II



Figure 2: Flying in formation




Figure 3: Inboard Profile

This period of instability lasted until 1492, when the government of Albert of Saxony finally managed to secure a peaceful dialogue between the Burgundian estates and (now) Prince Maximilian (Prince following the creation of the Monarchy of Burgundy in 1492). By the time Maximilian rose to the throne of Austria in 1493, Maximilian had control of the Low countries of Burgundy, but lost the Duchy of Burgundy which had been occupied by France at the beginning of the rebellions. With the rich Low Countries under Habsburg rule, the united empire of Spain and Austria following Maximilian's death saw a massive trade income from the territories. This income was later lost in the Dutch revolt (1566 to 1648), which saw 80 years of constant warfare between the Dutch and Spanish forces, resulting in the creation of the United Provinces as a Dutch Kingdom. As Spanish power declined into the 17th and 18th century, repeated invasions led the Spanish to grant the remaining territories to Austria, who lost the territory to the French in 1794 during the Revolutionary Wars. Whilst the territories had brought the Habsburgs prosperity, it became costly to maintain and saw conflict that brought damage to the region for centuries. Luckily, none of the countries in the lowlands have faced any long-lasting repercussions, but the damage wrought by Maximilian's desire to inherit his wife's territories have left their mark on the culture of the region.

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


Figure 3: The Jagiellonian Kingdoms of Bohemia and Hungary after the Battle of Mohács

The territories of Bohemia and Hungary both saw a similar method of incorporation into the Austrian empire. Both countries had been ruled by the Jagiellons of Poland since 1490 but had been contested by the Habsburgs in 1491. Jagiellon rule lasted until 1526, when King Louis II was killed by invading Ottoman forces. Not keen on Ottoman rule, the nobles of both realms voted for Ferdinand, the younger brother of Charles V, to rule the territories, and they were both brought under Habsburg rule, remaining until 1918 (both regions still saw border changes; All of Hungary was united under Austria in 1699, and Bohemia had the region of Silesia taken from it in 1742). Ferdinand also had a legitimate claim to the throne of the two countries, as Louis had married Mary of Austria, Ferdinand's sister.

Both territories proved detrimental to Habsburg rule and authority. Bohemia, as the centre of the Hussite movement after Jan Hus, saw intense conflict in the Age of Reformation, with the three defenestrations of Prague culminating in the Thirty Years' War, the largest conflict to occur in Europe at the time. For the Catholic Habsburgs, the subsequent Peace of Westphalia weakened the extent of their control over the Holy Roman Empire, and some of the confessions forced from the country were never regained. Hungary had a more tumultuous period under the Habsburgs. Following the Reformation, Hungary became a Protestant region under Catholic Habsburgs and saw constant repression, and into the 18th and early 19th centuries, Hungary saw recession and economic decline after repeated Austrian defeats at the hands of Western empires (notably Napoleon in the early 19th century).

Into the mid 19th century, the Revolutions of 1848 brought more recession (around 90% of Hungary's employed population was in agriculture) and even rebellion which led to the removal of the famous Austrian Foreign Minister Klemens Von Metternich (famous for his dealings with Napoleon). From the Austrian defeat in the Seven Weeks' War, the Hungarian diet demanded more representation in the Empire, and Austria became a dual monarchy, a further weakening of Habsburg authority. By the end of the First World War in 1918, the Bohemian and Hungarian territories finally received the independence they sought for centuries, and their efforts ultimately contributed heavily to the defeat of the empire in the First World War.

Maximilian's policies in marriage with the rulers of Castile led to the incorporation of 2 large territories that contributed to the ultimate dissolution of the Austrian Empire. This dissolution was the result of the weakening of the territories that had thrived as independent kingdoms, and the continual oppression through events such as the defenestrations of Prague or suppression of the Hungarian Revolution ultimately drove a rift between the Habsburgs and their territories, dividing the potentially powerful united Austrian lands into individual weakened regions.

Spain came under Habsburg rule through Charles V in 1519. A child of Maximilian's, he ruled Burgundy from the age of 6 before ascending to the throne of Spain in 1516 with the death of his Grandfather Ferdinand II. With the death of his father Philip I he inherited the Lowlands, and with the death of Maximilian, Spain became the most powerful country in Christendom. This personal union only lasted until 1556 with Charles' abdication, but the two countries remained closely related. The Spanish Habsburgs lasted until 1714 with the War of the Spanish Succession, when the Bourbon line of Spanish kings came to power, and rule to this day. Although this personal union made the Habsburgs the most powerful Catholics in the world, it ultimately failed to last more than 40 years, and neither country remained a Habsburg monarchy beyond the 20th century, with its monarchy ultimately outlasted by the English monarchy (present today).



Figure 4: Charles V, King of Spain 1516 - 1556

Without Maximilian, it's likely that the two empires, united in alliance, could've posed one of the biggest threats to Europe, larger than the threat it did pose, because the two separate empires, under separate administrations, would be able to control Europe whilst keeping the elites of the empires complacent in their own needs. Essentially, decentralisation could've kept Austria and Spain in dominant positions in Europe for much longer than their union lasted.

Maximilian I was the ultimate Habsburg emperor, but his efforts to expand the glory of his dynasty didn't last, with the various territorial possessions he gained either falling within a century or constantly resisting Habsburg rule. Historians claim that the glory he brought upon his dynasty and his efficient rule made him one of the best Habsburg emperors to rule Austria, but the efforts that historians praise ultimately failed to achieve Maximilian's goal to expand the glory of his dynasty, instead bringing humiliation on the states that succeeded the golden eras of Austria, Spain, and all their dependencies.

In a situation where Maximilian's ambitions failed, it's likely that Austria as a great power would've been weaker, but would've lasted for a longer time due to the potential for Austria to consolidate and centralise authority in a smaller region without having to separate the empire into decentralised, larger regions. It's for this reason that Maximilian's 'pyrrhic' expansive policies led to the downfall of the Austrian empire, bringing it glory but a short lifespan with the consequences of his reign.

Seit Meiner Thronbesteigung war Ich unablässig bemüht, Meine Völker aus den Schrecknissen des Krieges herauszuführen, an dessen Ausbruch Ich keinerlei Schuld frage.

Ich habe nicht gezögert, das verfallungsmäßige Leben wieder herzustellen und habe den Völkern den Weg zu ihrer selbständigen staatlichen Entwicklung eröffnet.

Nach wie vor von unwandelbarer Liebe für alle Meine Völker erfüllt, will Ich ihrer freien Entfaltung Meine Person nicht als Hindernis entgegenstellen.

Im voraus erkenne Ich die Entscheidung an, die Deutschösterreich über seine künftige Staatsform trifft.

Das Volk hat durch seine Vertreter die Regierung übernommen. Ich verzichte auf jeden Anteil an den Staatsgeschäften.

Gleichzeitig entsetze Ich Meine österreichische Regierung ihres Amtes.

Möge das Volk von Deutschösterreich in Eintracht und Veröhnlichkeit die Neuordnung schaffen und befestigen. Das Glück Meiner Völker war von Anbeginn das Ziel Meiner heißesten Wünsche.

Nur der innere Friede kann die Wunden dieses Krieges heilen.

Kammaracht m. p.

Karl m. p.

Figure 5: Emperor Karl I's Proclamation of Abdication 1918 (Abdication of the last Habsburg)



Winston Churchill - My Take

(Tom Turnbull)

Recently, I visited the United Kingdom, a country which has led the world as one of its largest presences, both economically and militarily. The visit was full of historical activities, sightseeing throughout historical cities such as London, Oxford and Cardiff. Perhaps most striking was the overall aura of London as one of the world's largest cities. In the heart of London, lies Parliament Square in which a statue of the British Prime Minister from 1940-1945, and 1951-1955, Winston Churchill was erected in 1973. The statue is a symbol of both victory and some of Britain's darkest moments, most notably the battle of Britain. Churchill has long been remembered as being Britain's heroic war-time prime minister which helped it defeat Nazi Germany in the Second World War. Churchill led his country through the brutal Battle of Britain in which the Nazi's bombed London for 56 of the following 57 days from the 7th of September 1940.

Throughout Churchill's professional life his leadership was well received by British citizens and soldiers alike, with Conservative MP Nicholas Soames, Winston's Grandson being quoted as stating his grandfather's deployment of "leadership and his leadership skills in such a brilliant way to lead Britain at a very bad time," were key in his path to becoming the greatest Briton as voted in a 2002 BBC poll. Churchill's leadership throughout the Battle of Britain is undoubtedly some of the finest seen in modern warfare, with his perseverance inspiring a nation. Churchill worked "18-hour days...regularly... and travelled abroad many times a year to conferences and battlefront," showing his people that he was willing to go to great lengths to overcome a severe German offensive.

Whilst Churchill is widely viewed as one of the greatest war-time leaders of all time, his failings and controversies often go unnoticed, and when touched upon can lead to fair debate as to whether he is deserving of the accolades which have been bestowed upon him. Firstly, Churchill had a history of racist comments throughout his career, including a comment made in a statement to the Palestinian Royal Commission in 1937, "that a stronger race, a higher-grade race, a more worldly-wise race... has come in and taken their place," when referring to the British settlement in Australia and the American colonisation.

Similarly, the public disdain which Churchill showed towards great Indian social activist Mahatma Gandhi further overshadows his career. Churchill referred to Gandhi as a "malignant subversive fanatic," a disdainful comment about a man who led his own country out of British colonial rule in 1947. Furthermore, at the conclusion of the second world war, Churchill was voted out of the position of British Prime Minister, whose conservative party received 39.6% of the vote share, compared to 48% which the labour party received. This outlined a weakness in the conservative campaign one that was built around the personality of Churchill. Finally, Churchill's role in the orchestration of the disastrous WW1 Dardanelles Campaign is often overlooked by Historians and those who actively glorify Churchill. The former PM's role in the designing of the campaign led to 205,000 British Empire deaths, a figure inclusive of the Gallipoli landings, similarly led by Churchill.

In conclusion, whilst Great British wartime Prime Minister Winston Churchill helped drag his country through some of its darkest hours, his career was also marred by controversy which places his name in the books as one of history's glorified figures.



Figure 1: Winston Churchill

The Proud British Empire

(Rijak Dhingra)

According to a survey from YouGov in 2019, 32% of Britons believe the empire is something to be proud of, and only 19% thought it was something to be ashamed of (YouGov, 2019). The British Empire was the largest empire in the history of humanity and at its peak controlled almost 25% of the world's land mass and 23% of the world's population (McCarthy, 2020). In this article, I will explore broadly the benefits and horrors of the British Empire to determine whether it was something to be proud of.

The British Empire is often credited with providing better sanitation, as well as technological advancements in transport and agriculture, to their colonies. Additionally, they enforced similar property and land ownership framework as the mainland, allowing for a more optimised use of space. This is often seen as a precondition for any economy to develop (Libecap, 2012). So even after the British left, many of these systems and laws remained in place helping the country grow economically. Further, the infrastructure and medicine introduced by the British improved the quality of life for many people. This can be seen in Africa as the "the growth of the African population was aided by Western medicine" (Lincoln County Schools, n.d.).

However, there are many consequences and negatives to the empire. One of its most infamous atrocities was its involvement in the transatlantic slave trade as Dr Scanlon said, "you can't understand the British Empire without understanding Britain's central role in slavery." (Cross, 2017) From 1640 – 1807 (when the empire engaged in slavery) it is estimated that Britain transported 3.1 million Africans, of whom 400,000 died en route to their destination. This allowed for a £12 million profit for the Empire (BBC Bitesize, n.d.).

Additionally, the contact with European colonisers led the African colonies to have outbreaks of smallpox, cholera, yellow fever and meningitis. Additionally, the conquest of some British colonies such as the South African Republic leads to 14, 000 deaths in action and 26, 000 deaths in concentration camps from the SAR (Marks, n.d.). All of this was for two goals, limit the expansion of rivaling powers, and local economic interest. (Africa at LSE, 2016).

'The Jewel in the Crown' that was India was integral to the British empire, but the scars left from this are still felt. Utsa Patnaik calculated that the monetary gain from India was \$45 trillion (Patnaik and Chakrabarti, 2019). India lost its independence to the East India Trading Company in 1757. During this time the company started growing opium in India and trading it with China. This led China to ban opium completely in 1797 due to staggering civilian population addicted to opium. However, the company started illegally smuggling opium to China leading to the First Opium war (Archives, n.d.). Within India, the company used the Indian taxes to pay for the infamous railroads, among other extortions.

The consequence of the Empire was great, according to Aziz (2018) "in the 18th century India accounted for 23 percent of the world's GDP, a percentage greater than all of Europe combined. By the time the British packed up their things and sailed home in 1947, that number had fallen to under three percent." Not only was India economically affected but there were severe scars from the partition, one million died during the partition and 15 million were displaced. (Brocklehurst, 2017).

To summarise, the British empire brought sanitation, medicine and infrastructure to their colonies, however the price on the colonies was slave trades, democides, civil turmoil and conquests. To conclude whether or not the British empire is something to be proud of, I think it is obvious that nothing could justify the horrors that occurred during and as a consequence of the British Empire.



Figure 1: The British Empire at its largest territorial extent (1921)

A reshaping of the World Order? A review of *The Russo-Ukrainian War: Return to History* by Serhii Plokhy (Ron Pippett)

Acclaimed Harvard History Professor, Serhii Plokhy must have been tempted to draw multiple parallels between Hitler's aggressive military operations in eastern Europe (1939 – 1945) and Putin's brutal invasion in 2022 in his speedily published, but masterly, *The Russo-Ukrainian War* (2023). In fact, a recent New York Times feature article, Past is present on the battlefields of Ukraine (Andrew E Kramer NYT 20/7/23) used photographs and research to assert the similar terrain, tactics and politics between the two eras. However, in many ways, Plokhy is more concerned with the present, as he had to be, in this timely account where there is some blurring of the unwritten rule concerning History being written no less than ten years after the event. Few historians would have any chance of pulling this off. Plokhy does it masterfully!

The book is not all recent history though, as in its early pages we have a comprehensive dive back into Ukrainian history in order to not only substantiate the existence of this nation and its people, but also to explain how it has existed far longer and with deeper cultural traditions than most European states. Plokhy outlines the Ukrainians' battles against Ivan the Great, Novgorod 1471, the rise of the Ukrainian Cossacks, the emergence of the Ukrainian national project in the 1840s and the short-lived Ukrainian People's Republic of 1917-18 before delineating how the Soviets definitely treated Ukraine as a separate and often problematic, entity. Stalin's Holodomor (Ukrainian famine of 1931-32) bears this out. Somehow Plokhy is able to share these insights in a coherent and remarkably readable manner.

One of the highlights is Plokhy's insightful rebuttal of Putin's infamous essay of 2021 'On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians'. Referring to the KGB Putin as a 'colourless apparatchik', Plokhy dismembers the Russian dictator's case with the skill one would expect of a Harvard professor up against a part-time History enthusiast.

Firstly, Plokhy attacks the inconsistencies and 'opportunism' in Putin's position which has changed significantly, depending on the political circumstances of the day. (Interesting to note that Orlando Figes stated the one and only secondary school subject Putin has interfered with is History, going to such lengths as banning the teaching of the Nazi-Soviet pact - for obvious reasons.) Secondly, Plokhy alludes to a chronic degree of paranoia in Putin's assessment – it appears almost every Russian neighbour in history was Russia's enemy - but particularly the Mongols, Poles, Swedes, Austro-Hungarians, the Germans and now more broadly the West! Difficult to fathom why Russia might encounter so many enemies?

However, it is Plokhy's discussion of this war that is most enthralling – a war which he emphasises has been mutating since 2014. His references to accounts by soldiers, residents, medics, journalists and ordinary people on the ground bring this book to life. Descriptions of courage are prominent such as Zelensky's 'I need ammunition, not a ride' statement and more importantly his reassurance to the Ukrainian people,

"I am here. We are not putting down arms. We will be defending our country, because our weapon is truth, and our truth is that this is our land, our country, our children, and we will defend all of this!" - Volodymyr Zelenskyy.



Figure 1: Volodymyr Zelensky - Person of the Year

And then there was the appalling Russian atrocity at Bucha, ‘producing outrage at the barbarity of Russian troops’ whereby Plokhy informs us that the key Russian commander involved was promoted to Colonel and the whole murderous Brigade received a ‘Guards Brigade award’ on Putin’s instructions.

Plokhy also details the mass exodus of innocents, the largest since WW2, that occurred as a result of the invasion, estimated at more than 8 million with almost 3.5 million finding their way to a big-hearted Poland. One refugee, Oleksandr, revealed “They destroyed everything...I was scared we would be killed trying to leave the city; we saw a car with two dead civilians.” Of course, Russia’s Wagner forces in Syria and Africa had already done some malicious work in expanding the world’s refugee count to over one billion by their signature strategy of levelling cities block by block and they were soon fast at work with the same brutal, mindless destruction in the Kherson region. Clearly Putin was intent on making civilians suffer immeasurably in this war of his.

It is quite resounding to see recent events move from BBC, Al Jazeera, NYT or even from social media reports to the pages of a published historical text (with impeccable sources and 362 pages of citation notes), especially some of the more sensationalised events such as the sinking of the Moskva (the largest warship sunk in combat since the ARA General Belgrano in 1982), the continual blasts that demolish sections of Putin’s favourite bridge, the Kerch and of course the Snake Island incident. This is where we saw a typically hardy Ukrainian response to the demands to surrender made by the Moskva, words that quickly went viral and led to a famous Ukrainian stamp, depicting the incident, becoming a hot item at the time. Plokhy also traces sombre battles like the apocalyptic siege of Mariupol but posits the Russian victory there as ‘pyrrhic at best, coming almost three months after the start of the offensive... (and) it was won only by turning a major urban centre into rubble.’ Plokhy concludes sensibly that it is difficult to predict the time and the way the war would end but its impact already is global and may determine our future in so many ways.

Profoundly, part of Plokhy’s title offers a nod to Francis Fukuyama’s brilliant, *The End of History and the Last Man* suggesting perhaps that this war has restarted the debate over whether liberal democracy is actually the final point in our political evolution. After all, if Russia is victorious (or if indeed China capitalises on the war somehow) then we may still see another disastrous chapter on Authoritarianism – a chapter many of us thought terminated in 1989. Both Fukuyama and Plokhy demonstrate, that single-party dictatorships have profound weaknesses. Firstly, dictators make bad decisions, often fuelled by the sycophants that surround them and secondly, with little public backing, power bases can disappear overnight (as we saw a glimpse of with Prigozhin’s attempted coup). Plokhy’s Afterword makes the crucial point that this “conflict has presaged a return to the bipolar world of the Cold War, now not centred on Washington and Moscow, but on Washington and Beijing.” At this point it appears Putin’s Russia has irretrievably removed itself as a leading player on the world stage, but the world may eventually be better for it.

Mr Ron Pippett



Figure 2: Serhii Plokhy

Mao Zedong was largely to blame for the failure of the Great Leap Forward (Marcus Nagel)

The Great Leap Forward, Mao's second five-year plan from 1958 until 1962 which was launched to transform China's economy in an attempt to catch up to the west. However, it would turn out to be one of Mao's greatest failures during his reign as chairman. Mao was the sole architect of the Great Leap forward and pushed for it against the advice of the party therefore he owns its failure. Secondly Mao created a culture of silence within the party that compelled Cadres to give false reports to Mao about the state of the Great Leap Forward. however, China was subject to "three years of natural calamities" from 1959-61 which also contributed to the failure of the Great Leap forward.

Mao was the sole architect of the Great Leap Forward and was the main party member who pushed for it. Following the relative success of the first five-year plan. Mao was eager to press further with the communist cause. Prominent party leaders such as Zhou Enlai urged caution however Mao dismissed them stating "the high tide of socialism, some of our comrades are totting along like women with bound feet, always complaining 'you going to fast'" (Fenby 2008). As a result of this China embarked on a 'headlong' drive to bring farmers together to collective state-run units. leading to the forced combination of more than 740,000 peasant collectives into 26,000 communes by the end of 1958 (Dikotter 2010). This led to a lack of individual responsibility and accountability in the collectives as they were not rewarded for extra work and stuck doing exactly what the cadres say, further contributing to the failure of the Great Leap Forward. Mao's insistence on using the people was evident in the anti-sparrow campaign. As he wanted "children as young as five should participate in the anti-sparrow offensives...to kill them in flight" (Fenby, the penguin history of modern China 2008) the failings of Mao's communist policies in which he was the only member to suggest meant that he was only to blame.

Secondly, the Great Leap Forward failed because Mao created a culture of silence which intimidated cadres and party members into publishing false information. Mao's unrealistic targets for production were out of reach, aiming to catch up with the Soviets and the West. Such as the goal of catching up to Britain in 15 years economically. Anyone who did not appear to meet these impossible targets became targets themselves "ministers and provincial bosses vied to outbid one another in their forecasts; those who were more realistic were purged" (Fenby 2008). This shows that the sycophantic culture when reporting to Mao was caused out of fear of being purged for being realistic or truthful.

This can be seen specifically in the purge of defence minister Peng Dehuai when touring his home province in Henan he visited his own and Mao's villages. Reporting to Mao that he saw 'crops rotting in fields, starvation, and falsified production figures' (China and the great leap forward, 1958 – 1962) When Peng reported this Mao in response, he brutally purged Peng. labelling as a 'traitor and a rightist' Peng was relieved of his position within the party, showing that being truthful made you a target of Mao thus added to the sycophantic culture. However, the cadres bear some responsibility for the failure of the Great Leap Forward because they understood the repercussions of speaking truth to power and such lied about the status of the communes secondly, they abused their power within the collectives, such as the stealing of rice to feed themselves and their families. Secondly, "Those who resisted or were too weak to work were beaten and tortured by Party cadres, often to death." (Columbia University). Thus, the false reports to Mao were made out of fear due the sycophantic culture and ultimately Mao's own fault.



Finally, poor weather conditions that were unavoidable played a contributing factor in the failing of the Great Leap Forward. the period of 1959 – 61 known as the “three years of natural calamities” natural disasters were a leading cause of crop failures, contributing to 12.9 percent of the collapse in production (Notre dame university). Most notably the flood of the Yellow River which directly affected the Henan and Shandong provinces the flood affected 741,000 people in 1708 villages and inundated over half a million acres of cultivated fields. (Dahe Daily). Because of this over 2 million farmers were forced to leave the fields and act as a rescue team in repairing the banks of the Yellow River, which resulted in “neglected crop and left to rot in the fields” (Bowman, John S 2000) According to economist Daniel Houser and others, 69% of the Famine was due to government policies while the rest (31%) was due to natural disasters. However, historian Frank Dikötter argues that the floods were not a result of natural disasters rather poor irrigation works.

On the 23rd of July 1959 Mao finally admitted his part in the failure of the Great Leap Forward. can be seen that the Great Leap Forward was destined to fail from the beginning as Mao was the only major party member to push for it and implemented poor policies to achieve success, secondly the sycophantic culture that Mao created made it impossible for cadres and party members to speak up about the issues with the Great Leap Forward. Mao also set impossible targets and finally the three years of natural calamities contributed to the failings of collectivised farming. Overall, it can be seen that Mao was largely to blame for the failure of the Great Leap Forward.



Figure 1: Mao Zedong

Mao's involvement in the failure of the Great Leap Forward

(Seb Atterton)

The Great Leap Forward was the second instalment of Mao's five-year plans, lasting from 1958-1962. The Great Leap Forward set ambitious targets to double steel and grain production and catch up to the West. Despite Mao's wishful thinking the Great Leap Forward was disastrous resulting in industrial declines and 10-30 million Chinese dead due to famine. (The Investopedia Team 2022) Mao is to blame for this failure as the Great Leap Forward was his idea and even after his plans failed continued to pursue communist policies. However, there is an element to which the cadres can be blamed as they used poor farming techniques and exaggerated crop outputs.

The Great Leap forward can be blamed on Chairman, Mao Zedong, as it was his brainchild and therefore his responsibility. After the great successes seen in the first 5-year plan Mao and China found themselves sitting slightly more comfortably in their aims for development. In the First Five Year Plan Mao and his surrounding party members took more of a capitalist approach to grow their industry and it was successful, however at the conclusion of the plan China faced a fork in the road. Their options were to either continue the same approach of a more soft communism or switch and follow a more 'idealistic' communist regime, Mao chose the latter. His colleagues strongly disagreed with this decision; this did not stop Mao, and he used close party delegates to side with him as leaders such as Ke Quingshi declared "we have to trust the Chairman to the degree of blind faith." (Fenby 2008.) Demonstrating the clear lack of support for Mao yet the willingness to coincide with him as it was his wishes.

This determination to enact communist policies continued as did the doubt from his peers. Mao's most significant step forward was to fully collectivise China, building their blueprint from the failed plans of their communist soviet counterpart. A feeling of unease amongst the party persisted, as Mao again used close member Ke Quingshi to speak out in support stating, "We should obey the Chairman to the extent of total abandon." (Fenby 2008.)

Along with Mao's insistence that expert advice was not needed, putting full faith in agriculturally inexperienced local cadres to run communes (The Great Leap Forward and the People's Communes—Socialist Ideals and Practice, Chinese Law & Government 2014) is yet another example of his idealistic communist thoughts which cost the nation immensely. This persistent wishful thinking and sheer ignorance on Mao's part is why the Great Leap Forward failed tremendously and demonstrates how Mao personally created "the worst man-made famine ever seen on earth." (Fenby 2008.) Overall, the Great Leap Forward was a colossal failure with the responsibility falling at the feet of Mao due to his fixation on trying to advance the nation in an extreme communist fashion whilst staying completely oblivious to alternative suggestions from his party members.

The policies put in place during the Great Leap Forward contributed significantly to the failure of the campaign. These policies were thought of and implemented by Mao, and they were flawed. They sought short term solutions with no consideration of the long-term effects. Some of these policies include the four pests' campaign, large scale irrigation systems, increased grain exportation and backyard furnaces. These were tremendous failures that lead to decrease in crop productions, locust swarms, famine and useless steel production which achieved the opposite of Mao's goals (The Investopedia Team 2022). As others began to recognise Mao's failures, he "was becoming increasingly upset as... some leaders started focusing not only on the failures but also on his personal role in them." (Dikötter 2010). This, however, did not stop Mao as he continued progressing his failing plans, trying to extract some sort of positive result from these ill-advised campaigns and maintain his pride.



The direct results of his attitude and policies were one of the world's worst widespread famines, as Mao continued to push grain exportation in 1960, increasing production to 2.2 million tonnes (Kasahara 2020). This once again demonstrates Mao's "blind fanatical devotion to his own naïve policies" (Brown 2012) and stubbornness towards accepting faults in his own leadership. Largely, Mao is solely responsible for the failed policies which were enacted during the Great Leap Forward, he continued to promote them despite being aware of the harm they were causing to the nation and came at the expense of his obsession of his communist ideals.

Despite this, Mao has in place a chain of command that started with himself and travelled all the way down to local police, therefore Mao cannot be completely to blame for the lack of success in the Great Leap Forward. Mao's biggest force of localised power was through the cadres or local police within the communes. Cadres were responsible for organising the farms and reporting on crop outputs however they often gave false reports, exaggerating figures. Historian Frank Dikötter agrees that "local cadres were cooking the account books... as a consequence information was distorted all the way up to the Chairman." (Dikötter 2010) This resulted in Mao gaining belief that his plans were working and gave him confidence to continue implementing his communist policies. Another flaw in this change of commence was that cadres had no formal training or necessary expertise in farming. This led to extremely poor agricultural strategies which hindered crop production. These ineffective strategies included "concentrated sowing of seeds, deep ploughing of the soil, close cropping" (Rebecca Cairns 2022) and were the main contributors to the lack of crop production. However, these factors certainly do not dismiss Mao's poor leadership. It can be argued that he created an environment whereby cadres felt they could not share the truth; he employed inexperienced workers who lacked the necessary professional expertise within positions of agricultural power. Dikötter agrees that "local cadres were under pressure to focus on figures rather than on people, making sure they fulfilled the targets they were handed." (Dikötter 2010) Furthermore, Cadres can also be blamed for falsifying reports and implementing poor farming strategies, however what cannot be ignored is that Mao created an environment of hostility and fear placing cadres who were inept at utilising effective, successful farming strategies into positions of power.

In conclusion Mao was largely to blame for the failures of the Great Leap Forward. This is due to the campaign being his idea to begin with and that he continued to promote his own failing policies forcing the nation deeper into communism. Cadres can also be blamed as they implemented ineffective farming strategies and over-exaggerated crop production. Yet, Mao created the environment to which cadres felt pressured to misrepresent results, subsequently bringing the causes of the extreme failures of the Great Leap Forward back to Mao.



Figure 1: Peasants working the land during the Great Leap Forward

To what extent can Khrushchev's fall from power be attributed to his handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis? (Sidhak Dhingra)

The Crisis

The resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis saw American president, John F Kennedy, prevail diplomatically over Khrushchev, further increasing internal opposition against Khrushchev's leadership. Leading up, Khrushchev had escalated geopolitical tensions to the brink of nuclear war by placing ballistic missiles in Cuba to threaten the USA. Although Khrushchev was the initial provocateur, he did allow considerable mediation and diplomacy to resolve the crisis. Nevertheless, the short-term impact was humiliating for Khrushchev as reflected by the emergence of the traditionalist school of thought which developed in the 1960's. Scherer summates the traditionalist view thus 'Soviet behaviour during the crisis [seems] to have been contradictory and puzzling'. Subsequently, Khrushchev's reputation was in question both internationally and domestically. Some 10 years after, a revisionist view emerged which aimed to 'condemn the blockade as irresponsible and explain the resolution of the crisis as the result of Soviet moderation and American good luck'.

However, this alleviation of liability is countered by Taubman who asserts that Khrushchev caused the crisis due to his 'determin[ation] to prove himself'. A view reinforced by the origins of the crisis, that is, Khrushchev's provocation of the United States can be interpreted as an act to exhibit his power on the global stage; to establish a parity of fear and intimidate the USA. However, by provoking the crisis and then proposing a compromise and further, by sending a second letter of negotiation before delivery of the first, Khrushchev surely reveals an underlying inferiority and insecurity. In fact, Harrison accredits 'a tremor in Khrushchev's political control' before the crisis, which was exacerbated afterwards. Scherer provides evidence for this claim citing that 'K. S. Moskalenko, chief of Strategic Rocket Forces, and F. I. Golikov, head of the Main Political Administration of the Armed Forces, were replaced in April 1962' due to their opposition to Khrushchev's policy. As such, there is pre-existing resistance mounting against Khrushchev, moreover, this initial resistance increases at the resolution of the crisis.

Taubman believes it had a snowball effect on the outcomes of Khrushchev's subsequent policies, as he was 'without the positive momentum that a Cuban triumph would have provided', therefore a connection between his actions downfall is formulated. Though this factor seems mildly overestimated as records from Khrushchev's deposition meeting in 1964 made limited reference to the Cuban Missile Crisis specifically. In Khrushchev's final meeting, Soviet politician Alexander Shelepin mentions his discontent on how Khrushchev was 'juggling the fate of the world' in 1962. While critical, it reveals no clear or decisive connection to his deposition. Thereby, while Khrushchev's actions invariably contributed to his downfall, due to the lack of conclusive evidence connecting the two events, it contributed to a limited extent.

Failure of Virgin Lands Campaign

The alteration of Soviet ideology and failed agricultural reforms both substantially contributed to Khrushchev's fall from political favour. Introduced in 1953, the Virgin Lands Campaign was a plan to drastically increase agricultural production within the Soviet Union. While the program was very successful initially, it stagnated from 1959 onwards. Statistical analysis of various economic indicators such as the gross output, market output and labour utilisation all signify little to no improvement. So, given the long-term repercussions of the economic and ecological investment (in cultivating the soil), Khrushchev's 'great gamble' had not paid off. More problematically, Karcz points out that 'Khrushchev gave few signs of recognising the dangers'. A view also partially explained by Taubman's assertion that 'Khrushchev's underlings were telling him what he wanted to hear'. Furthermore, Khrushchev neglected the agricultural expertise of Nikolay Voronov rather, took it upon himself to 'monopolise policy making' based on self-proclaimed expertise.



Consequently, this had a major impact on Khrushchev's political position as the fostered resentment within Voronov manifested itself as direct opposition to his leadership in 1964. In Khrushchev's final meeting with the Presidium Voronov exclaimed that 'it's become impossible to get anything done in the Presidium' due to Khrushchev's autocratic handling of the Soviet Union's affairs.

Khrushchev's Doctrine

Coinciding with Khrushchev's failing agricultural campaigns, his destalinisation and reformulation of Soviet ideology set up his downfall from power. Early into his power, Khrushchev instigated a series of social and political reforms after denouncing Stalin's leadership of the state. However, these reforms caused his own downfall in two regards; it allowed an environment in which Khrushchev could be deposed and secondly, exacerbated the disparity between Khrushchev and the members of the Politburo. By pursuing an international doctrine of peaceful co-existence, Khrushchev challenged Stalin's, and by extension Lenin's, perceptions of international order. In particular, the inevitability of war with the capitalist west. This put him at odds with Soviet hardliners such as minister of defence, Rodion Malinovsky. In regard to the Berlin crisis, Malinovsky set forth the message that the USSR would 'destroy any aggressor'. Juxtaposing, Khrushchev indicated a policy of reciprocity if the West exhibited a 'readiness to settle the German problem'. There is an evident tension between the contrasting sentiment of traditional Soviet views and the policy Khrushchev pursues. Even so, Harrison argues that it is 'almost impossible for those who have held power in a fixed communist structured system to adapt to the concept of freedom of speech'; a perspective supported by the open criticism and subsequent deposition which occurred in Khrushchev's final meeting (1964). Voronov directly corroborates this stating that 'the cult of Stalin had been replaced by the cult of Khrushchev'. As such, Khrushchev's domestic reforms and doctrine of peaceful coexistence proved a crucial factor in his downfall.

Khrushchev's Underlying Personality

Lastly, underpinning all other factors, Khrushchev's unpredictable personality and treatment of Soviet officials was the decisive factor in his downfall. Foreshadowed in the first paragraph, Khrushchev's contradictions were problematic for leadership. He contradicted his own policy of peaceful coexistence to induce the crisis, only to internationally humiliate the USSR in its resolution.

However, this impulsiveness was a trend in his leadership, as his soon to be successor Brezhnev, accused him of 'sow[ing] disorganisation in both industry and agriculture'. Taubman further accredits his downfall due to his 'pledge to overtake America in agricultural output...without consulting his Presidium', which turned from an 'embarrassment' to an international 'disaster' for the USSR. As such, there is an inherent pattern to Khrushchev's shortcomings as first secretary, that is, his impulsive, unpredictable behaviour resulting in large scale failure and humiliation of the Soviet Union. In Khrushchev's final meeting, Brezhnev summates this to 'incomprehensible' behaviour. Without discernible structure or predictability to his actions, the Politburo grew increasingly frustrated with Khrushchev's leadership. Moreover, these sentiments were amplified by Khrushchev's treatment of individual members of the Politburo. In addition to overpowering Voronov's agricultural authority, Brezhnev, Shelepin and Schelest all pointed at Khrushchev's demeaning manner. This alludes to an intrinsic resentment of Khrushchev which was at the forefront of their mind when forcing his resignation. Brezhnev accused him of 'rudely' treating his colleagues, and Schelest highlighted that 'no one can speak frankly'. Ultimately, even the government-controlled Pravda scrutinised Khrushchev's personality, denoting his dismissal with 'harebrained scheming, hasty conclusions, rash decision and actions based on wishful thinking'. Therefore, it was Khrushchev's personality towards both his policies and the Politburo which to a large extent caused his downfall.

In conclusion, Khrushchev's deposition can only partially be attributed to the outcomes of the Cuban Missile Crisis as direct correlation between the two events is limited. The crisis played an important role in revealing Khrushchev's leadership, depicting both his hypocritical foreign policy and underlying lack of control within the Soviet Union. Additionally, failures of both his political reforms and agricultural policies amplified resistance towards his leadership. Nevertheless, as shown through the crisis and his other policies, it was his personality and treatment of the Politburo which proved decisive in his downfall.

To what extent did the development of the Nazi war economy influence Hitler's decision to go to war in 1939? (Sidhak Dhingra)

The German invasion of Poland in September of 1939 ignited the catastrophic Second World War. As an extreme right-wing authoritarian state, Hitler's Nazi ideology was centered around Lebensraum (living space) for the German people. In the pursuit of Lebensraum, Hitler orientated economy policy towards the expansion of Nazi territory into neighbouring European countries. Two separate Four Year plans were introduced; the first by economist, Hjalmer Schacht, to gear the economy for rearmament. However, Schacht's plan was neglected as military spending began to 'increasingly dominate' (Tooze, 2006, p.198) economic behavior. This exacerbated the economic burden intrinsic to military spending, resulting in a long-term structural weakness in the economy. Moreover, Schacht's opposition to Hitler's autarkic (self-sufficient economy) pursuit saw him replaced by Nazi official, Hermann Goering. A second Four Year Plan instituted, which aimed at preparation for war through increased military spending and autarky. This not only increased economic repercussions from rearmament, but further depleted already scarce raw materials within Germany. Amidst economic rearmament, Hitler successfully defied the Treaty of Versailles to re-militarise the Rhineland and expand into Austria and eventually, Czechoslovakia. For Hitler, the notion of going to war stemmed from the ideological objectives of Lebensraum; expansion into Poland satisfied this ideological appetite. However, expanding also derived economic benefit, namely, it alleviated economic consequences of rearmament and enabled the German economy to become autarkic. Therefore, a tension exists between the ideological and economic factors behind war, consequentially, the question for this study is: 'To what extent did the development of the Nazi war economy influence Hitler's decision to go to war?'

Nazi economy experts, Adam Tooze and Richard Overy, both note the long term economic weakness caused by rearmament and resultingly, argue a predominantly intentionalist (orthodox) thesis. That is, Hitler had a long-term intention to go to war for his ideological goal of Lebensraum, therefore, the economic repercussions were intentional and made 'war a logical continuation of preparations made' (Tooze, 2006, p.204). Nevertheless, rearmament, and the consequences thereof, placed long-term pressure on Hitler's decision to go to war. These pressures were compounded with Hitler's short-term autarkic goals for the economy which further influenced him to go to war. Marxist historian, Timothy Mason, provides an alternative explanation regarding the influence of the economy on Hitler, he argues that 'domestic pressures and constraints [arising from economic consequences]... expressed themselves in acute social and political tension' (Mason, 1995, p. 39) which pushed Hitler to expand into Poland. Lastly, traditional functionalist historians such as AJP Taylor argue that 'blunders, opportunism [and the] traditional balance of power' (Clare, 2010) were the dominant influence in Hitler's pursuit of Lebensraum. Via, the exploitation of both the non-confrontational policy of appeasement, and, the relative advantage of the mobilised Wehrmacht (military) over it's counterparts in other nations. Overall, in the pursuit of Lebensraum, it seems the decision to go to war in 1939 was influenced in part by two economic motivations; the alleviation of the economic consequences caused by rearmament and, more importantly, the move towards Hitler's goal of autarky. Crucially, orientating the economy towards war contributed to Hitler's strategic opportunism which then played a major role in emboldening him to invade Poland in 1939.



Rearmament

The Nazis began remilitarisation early into their economic recovery, this proved to be a long term influence on Hitler's decision to go to war. Economic revival was pertinent for Lebensraum as investment into military forces requires economic resources. Moreover, in Hitler's view, the instrumental purpose of the economy was to support his Wehrmacht (Weingroff, 2017). Accordingly, Hitler told his cabinet in February 1933 that 'every publicly supported job-creation scheme must be judged by the criterion of whether it is necessary from the point of view of the rearmament' (Evans, 2016), showing implicitly the ideological importance of reconstructing the military and Hitler's strategy to begin rearming. This induced the First 4 Year Plan and the creation of a 'defensive force' (Tooze, 2006, p.199), effectively opting to revitalise the economy through investment. Out of the first installment worth 1.5 billion Reichsmarks allocated towards rearmament, or as the Nazi's framed it, 'work creation schemes', in 1932-1934, only 18 percent went directly to 'military installations' such as airfields and landing bases (Overy, 1994, p.5). Despite this, the investment into military foreshadowed the later development of the Wehrmacht; demonstrating how the economy was to be utilised to serve an ideological agenda of war.

However, the First 4 Year Plan was inherently unsustainable, beginning the accumulation of long-term economic repercussions which placed pressure on Hitler to pursue war. While the work creation schemes saw success in reducing the unemployment rate from 34% in 1933 to 20.7% in 1934 and simultaneously sparking an increase in gross national product (Tooze, 2006, p.214), the projects themselves had significant shortcomings (Overy, 1994, p.6). Firstly, they were short-term solutions to unemployment; and secondly, they were funded by a budget deficit. The Reich's total deficit grew from a 51 million Reichsmark surplus in 1932/33 to a 4.17 billion Reichsmark deficit in 1935/36 (Ritschl, 2000, Table 4). The staggering increase in deficit spending was worsened as repaying the debt was neglected for increased deficit spending. Furthermore, projects such as the Autobahns and military installations utilised 'unskilled labour' (Ritschl, 2000), tying employment of these labourers to be dependent on government spending (Overy, 1994, p. 5).

This limited free market forces (increasing economic inefficiency) and established economic weakness through the employment sector's dependence on the government deficit. The unsustainability of this occurs in the long term as the accumulating debt needed to be repaid, but doing so would deprive the state from the ability to continually employ the German populace. In the Hossbach Memorandum, a secret document summing a meeting from 1937 outlining Hitler's expansionism, Hitler subtly acknowledges this unsustainability, stating that 'effects of rearmament could never form the basis of a sound economy over a long period' (Hossbach, 1949). Due to the secrecy of the meeting, this is a particularly valuable source, authentically revealing Hitler's expansionist intentions, although, there is some limitation regarding the precision of Friedrich Hossbach's recollections. Nevertheless, Hitler's acknowledgement of the consequences stemming from rearmament highlight the intentional creation of structural weaknesses which in turn, establish pressure for expansion.

Furthermore, fiscal excesses fed into the economic motives on Hitler's decision to expand. As explored, the rearmament program relied on a budget deficit with the state continually increasing their debt to accommodate the plan (Ritschl, 2000). Hjalmer Schacht crafted an eight year plan allocating 35 billion Reichsmarks (around 4.3 billion per year) (Tooze, 2006, p.207) towards remilitarisation. However, this was perceived inadequate by Hitler. In reality, military spending is estimated to be 5-6 billion Reichsmarks in 1935 (Tooze, 2006, p.208). Schacht's opposition to this fiscal indiscipline, and resulting resignation as Minister of Economics, illustrate the negative economic implications of the accelerated spending. Schacht's expertise had been essential to Germany's economic policy, however, his resignation indicated both his powerlessness against Hitler's expansionist ideology and his understanding that the economic trajectory of these policies would be highly problematic. Herman Goering replaced Schacht as Minister of Economics and introduced a shift in policy further aligning to Hitler's goal of a powerful Wehrmacht. Indeed, The Second 4 Year Plan transformed the German economy into what Abelshauser insightfully posits as 'military Keynesianism on a large scale' (Abelshauser, 1998).



That is, economic growth was to come from investment in, and, growth of, the military. Thus, the total deficit breached 5 billion Reichsmarks in 1936/37 and then more than doubled to 10.8 billion Reichsmarks in 1938/39 (Ritschl, 2000, Table 4). The magnitude of the spending funded by an increasing deficit meant fundamentally this policy was unsustainable in the long-term. Spending of this sort was bound to result substantial inflationary pressure, and arguably did so early in 1939 (Moorhouse, 2021). Given that these consequences developed from his remilitarisation, it seems highly likely that financial justification became an ongoing influence his subsequent foreign policy.

The economic investment into the formation and maintenance of the Wehrmacht was a significant influence on Hitler's decision to expand. Between 1935 and 1938, 'military keynesianism' (Abelshauser, 1998) was realised as 67% of economic growth stemmed from government spending on the military. Invariably, employment within the military also grew to accommodate its expansion, orientating the economy towards war. Moreover, defying the 100,000 men cap imposed by the Treaty of Versailles, Hitler enacted conscription in 1935 to build the Wehrmacht. A total of 360,000 young men were recruited (Muller, 2016) in 1935, a figure that would accumulate to 1.3 million by the declaration of war in 1939. With the commencement of the second Four Year Plan in 1936, Hitler implemented a timeline of four years for the Wehrmacht to be ready for war (Tooze, 2006, p.203-244) effectively defining the time period he would bare the economic burden before receiving ideological and economic compensation through expansion. Not only did the military not quantifiably contribute to the economy when idle, it presented a burden. In the Hossbach memorandum, Hitler speaks to this burden through inactive 'equipment' and 'armament', fearing 'in further delay there lay the danger of their obsolescence.' Therefore, he notes the 'necessity of maintaining [the Wehrmacht] at its present level' (Hossbach, 1949) as his ideological objective of Lebensraum hinged on its strength. Hitler suspected his modern weapons would lose their relative advantage if not utilised in the near future. As such, with Hitler showing an acute awareness of the 'danger[ous]' (Hossbach, 1949) consequences of maintaining the Wehrmacht without its utilisation, there is a stated connection between its existence and the decision to go to war. In particular, when the Nazis would go to war, as obsolete weapons hinder the Nazi's military advantage.

Overall, given the long-term unsustainability of spending on the military, it appears that there were fiscal influences on Hitler's expansions in the late 1930's. Furthermore, as the Nazi military advantage diminished with time, it seems that rearmament played an important role in the timing of Hitler's expansion.

Autarky

Coinciding with increasingly unsustainable rearmament, Hitler amplified economic incentives to go to war by striving for autarky. It seems that Hitler did this to 'free Germany from the threat of a blockade' (Overy, 1998) during war. In the Hossbach memorandum, Hitler reinforces this view asserting a 'pronounced military weakness in those states which depended for their existence on foreign trade' (Hossbach, 1949). However, Hitler could not have domestically enacted autarky in 1936 due to the dependence on trade for both foodstuffs and raw materials. This reveals a tension between the ideological antipathy towards international trade and the economic necessity of imports in the 1930's. During the financial year of 1936/37, Germany imported 1.092 billion dollars worth of 'livestock, foodstuffs and beverages' (Reich Economic Ministry, 1939), exemplifying the extent of Germany's dependence on trade. According to a memo written in the same year the plan for autarky was sought (1936), Hitler believed that 'we [Germany] are overpopulated and cannot feed ourselves from our own resources' (Doone et al., 2012), a statement signalling his ideological justification for his intentions to expand. Supporting Hitler's claim, an archived trade statistics document from 1939 states that 'approximately one-fifth of the foodstuffs consumed has to be imported' (Doone et al., 2012). As such, complete autarky was not practically possible due to the insufficient means to supply food domestically. Given Hitler's awareness of this implication, in the Hossbach memorandum, he resolved that he must expand to 'gain space for agricultural use' (Hossbach, 1949). Thus, achieving autarky would co-incide with the increase in supply of foodstuffs. This established motives for war as Hitler could acquire the resources required to feed his nation through expansion and therefore become autarkic; fulfilling ideological aspirations.



Moreover, Hitler believed that expansion would further secure crucial raw material used in his rearmament program. At the time, materials such as steel, coal and rubber were imported to be used in the rearmament effort and autarky through expansion would ensure domestic access to these resources. Evidencing this, a Nazi-produced archived trade statistics document denotes the problematic 'dependen[cy] on foreign sources of supply for the raw materials required by her extensive manufacturing establishment' (Reich Economic Ministry, 1939). Nonetheless, autarky was critical to Hitler's ideology as Germany was inherently vulnerable to a blockade during their war for Lebensraum; lacking the ability to sustain armaments and to feed their population. Resultingly, Hitler believed that 'the question for German ran: where could she achieve the greatest gain at the lowest cost' (Hossbach, 1949). Furthermore, Hitler communicates that the expansion into Poland as 'not a matter of acquiring population'(Hossbach, 1949), rather, the expansion seems to blend the ideological goal of Lebensraum and the economic goal of autarky. Reinforcing this view, Hitler, in August of 1937, stated that 'dominion over Poland is necessary, in order to guarantee the supply of agricultural products and coal for Germany' (Eichholtz and Schumann, 1969, pp.204 (Document 88)). Therefore, by expanding into Poland, Hitler was increasing the German economy's autarkic capabilities; which, in the long-term, was preparation for an ideological war for Lebensraum.

In addition, military spending increased to unprecedented levels in the financial year of 1938/39; this increased incentive for Hitler to go to war. In the financial year of 1938/39 the Reich deficit increased to 31.8 billion Reichsmarks (Gaettens, 1982, pp.279–298), with some 18.4 billion accounted for as 'military expenses' (Gaettens, 1982, pp.279–298) (comparatively, 8.1 billion Reichsmarks were spent in 1933/34). Tooze's investigation into this spending is particularly extensive - and thereby valuable - as it reveals 'the Luftwaffe's fivefold expansion of 1938' and a 'naval expansion plan', which totalled to a request for 24-25 billion Reichsmarks in 1939 (Tooze, 2006, p.285). As evidenced earlier this request was not entirely fulfilled, Tooze suggests that an accumulated foreign trade deficit stagnated the spending. In 1938, Germany's balance of payments indicate an import surplus of 192 million marks for Germany (Reich Economic Ministry, 1939), and almost 400 million when combined with the recently acquired Austria and the Sudetenland (Tooze, 2006, p.285).

The Nazi-kept trade statistics document sources this due to an 'increase in domestic production [which] has not been able to keep pace with the acceleration of industrial consumption [rearmament]' (Tooze, 2006, p.285). Nevertheless, in 1938/39 the spending caused a balance of payments crisis within Germany, the situation was bluntly summarised by Hitler to 'export, or die' (Picker and Schramm, 2003, p.208). Consequently, Hitler introduced export subsidies to continue facilitating rearmament, although, this was temporary as Hitler's following quote from a monologue made before war in 1939 reveals: 'Since we brought back compulsory military service our armaments have swallowed huge deficit expenditures. Now there are just two ways: either this debt will be passed on in the course of time to the German people in the Reich, or it will be paid out of the potential profits from the conquered eastern regions. The last solution is obviously the right one' (Picker and Schramm, 2003, p.196). While this may not be a definitive primary motive, it shows the influence of the economy on Hitler's decision-making regarding war.

The short-term acute consequences of the surge in spending further increase economic influences to go to war. Marxist historian, Timothy Mason, argues that war was caused 'because of domestic pressures and constraints which were economic in origin and also expressed themselves in acute social and political tension' (Mason, 1995). This view encapsulates undeniable economic consequences of the spending, for example, the establishment of the Price Commissioner to 'put a freeze on prices wherever possible' which would 'cope with the financial implications of war preparation' (Overy, 1998). However, to say this influenced Hitler's actions is an overstatement. Given the sociological nature of his thesis, it is difficult to source quantifiable evidence to support this claim. Mason himself labels his evidence 'circumstantial' (Mason, 1995). A more plausible mechanism seems to be the notion that Hitler willingly induced economic weaknesses and aimed to recompense through war. Accordingly, as summarised by Tooze, this makes 'war a logical consequence of the preparations being made' (Tooze, 2006, p.213). This is evidenced in Hitler's initial Four Year Plan and his significant spending in 1938/39. Furthermore, Hitler's previously demonstrated awareness of the repercussions would seem to indicate that the surge from spending was also intentional. Hence, it appears that the economic and military implications of Hitler's spending were an influence on his decision to go to war in 1939.

Thereby, Hitler's goal of autarky created a general pressure to go to war and expand. This pressure was further heightened by his militarisation in 1938/39, ultimately serving as an influence to declare war in 1939.

Opportunism

Due to his rearmament efforts through the First and Second Four Year Plans, the Germany economy underwent an undeniable preparation for war. However, historians dispute over the extent of preparation and military planning. While Hitler had ideological aspirations to expand, he preyed on opportunity to realise autarky and Lebensraum. Although, on one hand, much of his plan seems predetermined, his political manifesto, Mein Kampf, declares his intent for Lebensraum in the east some 14 years before World War 2 (Hitler, 1925). However, it also reveals an ideological hatred of the Slavs; yet, in 1939, Hitler negotiated the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. The pact split up Poland with his alleged enemy, the Soviet Union. Thereby, Hitler shows a degree of flexibility in his plans; he makes ideological concessions in order to exploit the opportunity to acquire Poland. Moreover, Hitler also opportunistically exploited the British and French policy of appeasement in the Rhineland, Sudetenland and Czechoslovakia. As such, there is a balance between his intentionalism and opportunism in regards to expansion. Judging from economic policy, the Nazi's had a trajectory towards war, although, Hitler's opportunism proved another major influence.

Hitler's timing of expansion into eastern Europe was influenced by his relative advantage of the Wehrmacht over other militaries. Prior to his expansions, Hitler re-established the military by outright defying the 100,000 soldier limit imposed by the Treaty Versailles and by negotiating the Anglo-German Naval Agreement. Furthermore, he outlined the re-assertion of the German military on the international scene by remilitarising the Rhineland in 1936. Hitler continued increasing his military strength which created the opportunity to expand without a military force to oppose him. After removing the threat of the Soviet Union, there was a narrow window for opportunistic expansion as the British revamped rearmament and were investing an estimated 30% of their GNP into the military (Dunbabin, 1975). Britain's effort was expedited by the Anglo-American Trade Agreement (November, 1938) and therefore, the extent of Hitler's advantage was diminishing. In 1938, whilst rearming, Britain was the single largest importer, indicating a distinct ability to quickly militarise (K., 1938).

Given rearmament was in process, Hitler was incentivised to extend into Poland before Britain built up increased resistance, which would increase deterrence from Poland. In terms of relative size in 1939 (estimates vary) the British military consisted of 1.1 million men (web.archive.org, 2009) - with mobilisation beginning on the day of Hitler's invasion, the 1st of September (British Military History, 2009). In comparison, the German armed forces were 2.7 million men strong (Shoah Resource Centre, 2021) and, evidently, prepared to invade. However, the scope for growth was much larger for Britain as Germany had been rearming on a significant scale from 1936. Ultimately, the military preparation of Hitler likely influenced him to quickly capitalise on the opportunity to expand before the British amassed too much military strength.

Hitler's opportunism can be seen by territorial gains made by exploiting the British policy of appeasement. Between 1938 and early 1939, there were three major instances of appeasement which emboldened Hitler to declare war on Poland. Firstly, the Anschluss of Austria in 1938 allowed Hitler to gain territory by exploiting the weakness of international politics, shifting the power dynamic within Europe. Notably, Lebensraum was not the motive behind the Anschluss, rather, it was a broader ideological goal to unite all German speaking people. Further, this acquisition contradicted economic motives. Due to Austria's dependence on imports for foodstuffs, it was labelled an 'economic burden' within German documentation (Reich Economic Ministry, 1939). Nonetheless, Hitler capitalised on two opportunities in his Anschluss; firstly, by 1938, Italy shifted focus onto the Mediterranean (Röhr and Berlekamp, 2001) and strengthened relations with Germany through the Rome-Berlin Axis of 1936, therefore, they did not provide the resistance which had initially prevented the Nazi coupe of Austria in 1934. Additionally, Britain was not only unlikely to, but effectively unable to retaliate given the pace at which Hitler conducted his expansion. The annexation lasted one day, beginning on the 12th of March and culminating on the 13th. Due to these factors, Tooze characterises Hitler's moves as 'a clear-headed reading of a wider diplomatic scene' (Tooze, 2006, p.245). Moreover, it was the lack of international punishment imposed that was critical in enabling Hitler to continue his conquest into the Sudetenland and, in early 1939, the rest of Czechoslovakia. Critically, the economy and military were still preparing for war, as such, Hitler would not expand if he thought a major war was to follow.



In Hossbach's memorandum, Hitler acknowledges that Germany's war preparations both economically and militarily will conclude between 1943-45, thus, rendering it the most opportune time to engage in his greater ideological conquest for Lebensraum (Hossbach, 1949). As such, Hitler's expansion during 1938 and 1939 was done so under the understanding that he would be appeased and thereby unopposed; leaving Poland a miscalculation.

Hitler's expansion into Czechoslovakia (in March, 1939) set a critical precedent which emboldened him to continue into Poland. The invasion of Czechoslovakia was the first occasion in which Hitler expanded without a strong motive to recover ethnic Germans. The annexation of Austria and the Sudetenland were both motivated, in part, by Hitler's desire to reunite ethnic Germans- his expansion into the Sudetenland recovered an estimated 3 million German speaking people. However, without a major ethnic German base in Czechoslovakia, it seems Hitler was motivated by his desire to 'unhinge the balance of power in Central Europe' (Tooze, 2006, p.245). A factor which reoccurs in the invasion of Poland and which would gain him the resources necessary to expand into a Greater Germany. More crucially, Hitler defied the Munich Pact of 1938, where he had agreed to halt his expansion at the Sudetenland (Hitler et al., 2008). In a speech to the Wehrmacht commanders before the invasion of Czechoslovakia he revealed his belief that Neville Chamberlain would not go 'beyond a blockade' (Llewellyn, Esterel and Butler, 1954) in response. A risk Hitler was likely prepared to take given his movement towards an autarkic economy. Upon the acquisition of Czechoslovakia, Schausberger notes that 'the coal and machinery industry of Czechoslovakia and Silesia were slotted immediately into the German economic structure' (Schausberger, 1981). This further increased Germany's power on the global stage and assisted the Second Four Year Plan's rearmament. As Hitler faced no significant consequence, yet again, he had exploited the international sentiment against war to realise his ideological goals.

Poland was Hitler's next target for expansion as it fed into his ideological aims and was perceived to be undefended by a major power. Essentially, the ultimate example of Hitler's opportunism, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact signed on the 24th of October 1939 with the Soviet Union was crucial in Hitler's decision to invade Poland. Not only did it nullify a Soviet army of over 1.8 million men, but further, prevented the threat of a war on two fronts for Germany.

Notably, the economic incentives to invade Poland explored earlier are inherently interconnected with Hitler's desire to increase the power of Germany as a powerful economy and military necessitates international power. Furthermore, Hitler attempted to exploit Britain's foreign policy of appeasement in Poland. In his diary, on the 3rd of September, State Secretary Ernst Von Weizsacker wrote 'when the British and French declared war, Hitler was surprised, after all, and was to begin with, at a loss' (Weizsacker, 1974, pp.149-164). Weizsacker's valuable entry reveals that Hitler had not expected to engage the major powers of Britain and France in the midst of establishing his international power. Therefore, although miscalculated, Hitler's opportunism was a critical factor when expanding into Poland.

Conclusion

Nazi economic motives were influential on Hitler's decision to go to war in 1939. The 1930s rearmament played a significant role in the long-term as it invoked fiscal and structural weaknesses which were to be recovered through war. Moreover, the immense investment into the Wehrmacht served as an incentive to utilise it in conquest to recompense. These economic motives were further amplified by Hitler's ideological pursuit of an autarkic economic. Aiming for Lebensraum through war, an autarkic economy was an important strategic factor to negate the threat of a blockade. However, lacking sufficient resources to achieve this domestically, Hitler made military preparations for an expansion which secured economic resources. However, economic factors only served as motives, as such, Hitler's opportunism appears integral in his decision to expand. Given that he likely did not want a major war till 1943-45, it appears that Hitler believed he could utilise his mobilised Wehrmacht to further exploit the British policy of appeasement and invade Poland unopposed. While there is evidence to suggest that domestic spending in the Nazi economy had an influence on Hitler's decision to go to war. Within this study, the social ramifications of this were not fully explored and present as an opportunity for research, particularly, if these ramifications had any connection to the declaration of war (Tim Mason's thesis). More generally, the state of the economy tends to have an impact on a leader's decision-making, this relationship can be investigated with other prominent leaders in history.



To what extent can Irish Independence in 1922 be attributed to the leadership of Eamon de Valera in contrast to that of Michael Collins? (Regan Nelson)

Introduction

The importance of Eamon de Valera and Michael Collins in the rapid ascent of Sinn Fein after 1917 is a subject of much debate in modern Irish history. Historians debate the roles of de Valera and Collins in Sinn Fein's rise to power after 1917 and the War of Irish Independence. While some contend that de Valera's leadership was central to this success, others place Collins' actions within the IRA as the critical factor. As such, "To what extent can Irish Independence in 1922 be attributed to the leadership of Eamon de Valera in contrast to that of Michael Collins?" Within this essay, the various elements leading to the victory of the Irish War of Independence in 1922 will be investigated. It will be argued that the republic's achievements relied on the involvement of both de Valera and Collins equally.

During the turn of the 20th century, Irish nationalists sought independence from Britain. De Valera's leadership of Sinn Fein led to a successful campaign against British rule, resulting in Irish independence in 1922 by signing the Anglo-Irish Treaty. Simultaneously, Collins was a key figure in Ireland's fight for freedom. He directed the IRA's intelligence efforts and used guerrilla tactics against the British. Collins was famous for his strategic prowess and proficiency in mobilising and coordinating the IRA.

De Valera operated as a Commandant for the Irish Volunteers during the Easter Rising in 1916. In the book "De Valera: Long Fellow, Long Shadow" (1993) by Tim Pat Coogan, he describes that de Valera had been sentenced to death for his role in the Easter Rising, but his sentence was changed to life imprisonment due to his American citizenship. Coogan further states that the British government released de Valera to reduce tensions in Ireland and satisfy Irish nationalists in 1917. With de Valera's release, he once again became involved in Irish nationalism.

Due to the mass executions of other nationalist leaders, de Valera remained the only viable option for a leadership position and was elected the president of Sinn Fein. Until this point, Sinn Fein remained primarily a fringe group with unclear goals; however, in the aftermath of the Easter Rising, Sinn Fein emerged as a political party committed to Irish independence. Under de Valera, Sinn Fein proliferated, presenting a united front for Irish nationalists and republicans to rally behind. In 1918 during the British general election, Sinn Fein secured 73 seats in the Westminster parliament, forming the third-largest party. With this electoral success, de Valera and the rest of Sinn Fein boycotted the British parliament, with de Valera being arrested and sent to Lincoln Prison. They formed the Dail Eireann (Assembly of Ireland) in January 1919, declaring an independent Irish republic with de Valera as its president.

Similarly, Collins had served as the aide-de-camp for Joseph Plunkett during the Easter Rising. An extract from the Michael Collins House Museum named Michael Collins and the Easter Rising states, "Around this time Collins became Aide de Camp to Joseph Mary Plunkett, a role that brought him into the immediate orbit of some of the most prominent republicans in Dublin." Like de Valera, Collins was also arrested and sentenced to death. However, Collins got on a different prison train heading to Wales, an experience that historian Coogan deemed "the luckiest escape of his career." He was released from the Frongoch internment camp in Wales as part of an Anglo-Irish amnesty program in December 1916 due to growing public outrage in Ireland. After Collins's release from prison, he renewed his involvement in nationalism, becoming finance minister for Sinn Fein in 1917. In 1918 he was one of the founding members of the Dail Eireann and was instrumental in breaking de Valera out of prison.



Political and Economic conditions in Ireland pre-1910

Under British rule, "Ireland was viewed by England as a colony, to be exploited and governed for the benefit of the colonising power", resulting in economic disparity between the two. The majority of the Irish population did not own land, paying rent to absentee English landlords, which fuelled the resentment. The average wage of an Irish labourer was only 17 shillings per week, compared to 27 shillings in England. This economic inequality created further resentment because Irish workers were treated less than their English counterparts. Beyond this, Irish people held little political influence within the Westminster system.

Before Sinn Fein, the Irish Parliamentary Party (IPP) promoted universal Irish suffrage, but this was not achieved until the creation of the Irish Free State in 1922. Voting rights were restricted to a select few due to the need for land ownership. At the time, around 70% of the Irish population were tenants, the majority having no say in domestic affairs. According to historian F.S.L. Lyons, "The property qualification made the electorate in Ireland one of the most restricted in Europe, excluding many farmers and all agricultural labourers, as well as the urban working classes".

Another major issue in Irish politics under Britain was the House of Lords. The House of Lords in Ireland was an unelected body with significant power in the Irish administration. Members were primarily Protestant aristocrats and wealthy landowners who did little to represent most of the Irish population. According to historian Alvin Jackson, "The Irish peers, mostly Protestant and Unionist, were the most consistently reactionary section of the House of Lords, staunchly opposing any form of Irish Home Rule".

The political situation in Ireland in the early 20th century directly contributed to the desire for an independent state and created the environment that enabled de Valera to consolidate support for the War of Independence. This, coupled with severe economic disparity, intensified resentment among the population.

Irish Nationalism and the Home Rule Act

Irish nationalism by 1920 was a prevalent part of Irish society. In 1914, the long-fought Home Rule Act was postponed by Westminster due to the outbreak of the First World War. The Home Rule Act promised Ireland a position like Australia or Canada within the British Empire, recognised as an independent dominion instead of a colony. Therefore, previously moderate and placated groups became outraged again with British rule. In her book "A New History of Ireland", Christine Kinealy describes how "For the British Government, therefore, the start of the first World War in August 1914 offered a drastic solution". She concludes that suspending the Home Rule Act helped drive nationalist sentiment in a more radical direction. Regarding radicalisation, de Valera and Collins came away from the failures of the Home Rule Act with different mindsets. In his book "The Irish Civil War 1922-23" (2008), according to Cottrell, the enactment of Home Rule would have eventually led to Irish independence. However, radical figures like de Valera and extremist factions within Irish nationalism made the process more tumultuous and divisive. For a more thorough examination of de Valera's changing political views, "Eamon De Valera, the man who was Ireland" by Coogan is a valuable resource. Coogan posits that de Valera's initial political trajectory was moderately aligned with Irish nationalism, as evidenced by his endorsement of the Home Rule Act. Nevertheless, when the first World War broke out, and the implementation of the Home Rule Act was delayed, de Valera became more involved with revolutionary groups. According to Coogan, de Valera began to adopt more radical views towards Irish independence, rejecting the idea of autonomy within the British Empire and instead advocating for total independence.

In Coogan's biography, "Michael Collins: The man who made Ireland", Coogan demonstrates how Collins's role as a skilled negotiator secured a level of self-governance for Ireland during the Anglo-Irish Treaty discussions. Coogan depicts Collins as able to recognise the limitations of the Home Rule Act and exhibits his importance in achieving more substantial independence for Ireland. According to Coogan, Collins was willing to compromise, even though the final agreement failed to live up to the dreams of total independence. This sentiment is reinforced by Collins statement in reference to the signing of the Anglo-Irish treaty that "Let us not waste our energies brooding over the more we might have got. Let us look upon what it is we have got."



The interpretations of numerous historians determine that while de Valera was highly consequential in the radical direction that Irish nationalism turned to in the aftermath of Home Rule's failure, Collins remained more moderate and practical in understanding its importance. Cottrell's interpretation of events concludes that de Valera's provocative stance towards British governance inflamed tensions unnecessarily, preventing the still probable Home Rule Act from returning to open discussion. According to Cottrell, de Valera's actions made Irish independence unnecessarily bloody. Cottrell's book "The Irish Civil War 1922-23" (2008) suggests that the Home Rule Act could lead to Irish independence. However, the extreme views of de Valera and other radicals resulted in a violent and divisive process. In contrast, Coogan argues that de Valera's early political career showed a considerable willingness to cooperate with Britain. Coogan highlights how de Valera was an open advocate of the Home Rule Act until its postponement at the outbreak of World War One, which drove him towards more radical circles. Coogan also highlights how Collins learned from the failures of the Home Rule Act in his approach to the Anglo-Irish treaty with a willingness for cooperation and compromise, unlike de Valera. This is demonstrated when Coogan states, "Neither Collins nor Griffith liked the proposed treaty, but Collins was mindful of how Home Rule had been lost through sudden changes in circumstance." This reveals Collins's ability to exercise restraint compared to de Valera's radicalism.

The prior political and economic tensions culminated in the Easter Rising of 1916, which was the catalyst for de Valera's rapid rise to prominence, Collins' entry into nationalism, and renewed calls for Irish independence. Despite widespread resentment towards British rule, the Easter Rising only attracted roughly 2,500 Irish rebels, most electing to stay silent due to the ongoing First World War. Rebel leader James Connolly fought over Dublin for six days until he was forced to surrender to superior British forces. In the aftermath of the failed rebellion, Connolly was arrested and executed without a trial. This execution happened alongside fifteen other nationalist leaders who participated in the rebellion, such as Patrick Pearse, Thomas Clarke, Thomas MacDonagh, and Joseph Mary Plunkett. Both Eamon de Valera and Michael Collins had participated in the Easter Rising, with de Valera serving as a commandant and Collins as the aide-de-camp of Joseph Plunkett. While both men were given the death sentence due to their participation, de Valera was instead imprisoned due to his American citizenship.

At the same time, Collins snuck on a train to a Welsh prison instead of Kilmainham Gaol, where other Irish Nationalists were being executed. Due to severe public outrage at the mass executions, many Irish citizens turned in favour of the rebels. One of the primary sources of evidence for this shift in public opinion is the increase of support for Irish nationalist political parties, particularly Sinn Féin, who won 73 of 105 Irish seats in the British Parliament in the 1918 general election, with both de Valera and Collins joining as party members. This success can be seen as a clear indication of a shift in public opinion against British rule, as well as the beginnings of both men's significant roles within the independence movement.

From the Easter Rising to the War of Irish Independence

Both de Valera and Collins are key figures that link the Easter rising and the Irish war of independence, participating in both events in an attempt to win Ireland its freedom. Their broad participation in Irish nationalist movements across the course of their lives demonstrates the commitment of both de Valera and Collins to the cause of Irish independence. Despite this, both men held differing views on what a sovereign Irish nation should look like, and more specifically Ireland's relationship with Britain after the war. One of the prime examples of this is the Commonwealth debate that arose towards the end of the conflict. This debate was about Ireland's status within the Commonwealth and if Ireland should split from the British Empire completely or remain a sovereign member. As a radical, de Valera held a firmly separatist stance on the Commonwealth, calling for the permanent severing of ties with Great Britain. In contrast to this, Collins held a more moderate view on the topic, believing that while independence from Britain was necessary, cooperation between the two was still possible. This dispute between de Valera and Collins concluded at the Anglo-Irish treaty discussions, where Collins took a more moderate approach, stating that "In my opinion it gives us freedom, not the ultimate freedom that all nations desire ... but the freedom to achieve it." This contrasted heavily with the view of de Valera, who commented that "I am against this Treaty not because I am a man of war but because I am a man of peace. I am against this Treaty because it will not end the centuries of conflict between the two nations of Great Britain and Ireland."



Furthermore, Collins and de Valera had conflicting objectives during the Irish War of Independence, with Collins using guerilla tactics while de Valera pushed for a more traditional approach. This caused controversy and hindered international support for the Irish cause. For example, de Valera's "Document No. 2" was a proposal in 1920 for a formal, conventional declaration of war against Britain. De Valera wanted a formal declaration of war, but Collins argued that guerrilla tactics were more effective due to the military imbalance between Ireland and Britain. Although unconventional and arguably frowned upon, these tactics ultimately saved Ireland from immediate defeat. Despite the conflicts between de Valera and Collins, their continued cooperation throughout the War of Independence highlights the importance of their collaboration. Although they had differing views on Irish politics and military strategy, de Valera and Collins remained instrumental figures in the war effort. As the political leader, de Valera represented the Irish Republic abroad, particularly in the United States, to gain international recognition and support. Meanwhile, Collins, as Director of Intelligence for the IRA, played a crucial role in leading the guerrilla warfare campaign against British forces. While de Valera and Collins conflicted with each other frequently over political and military matters, both were willing to cooperate in the pursuit of a common goal.

Impact of World War One on Britain - shift in global opinion

The aftermath of World War One significantly weakened Britain's hegemony over Ireland, increasing the likelihood of a successful Irish secession. This meant that the number of British troops in Ireland was significantly reduced, making it easier for Irish nationalist groups to operate without as much opposition from the British military. As historian Eunan O'Halpin notes in his book *Defending Ireland: The Irish State and its Enemies since 1922*, "The withdrawal of so many troops had the effect of reducing the security presence in Ireland and allowing the IRA to expand its campaign". The transition in global public opinion towards self-determination following World War One also served to further undermined the influence of Britain in world affairs and particularly Ireland. Irish representatives at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 sought international recognition for their independence and used Woodrow Wilson's 14 points to gain support. Their efforts granted legitimacy to the cause of Irish freedom on a global scale, however, no official international recognition.

This is demonstrated through a propaganda poster produced by Sinn Fein in the lead-up to the 1918 Irish parliamentary elections. The poster compares the Irish cause to the ideals of 'Self Determination' in the Austro-Hungarian Empire present during the Paris Peace Conference. Despite this, the delegation failed to secure an open recognition of Irish independence. Following this setback, de Valera led a delegation to the USA, effectively garnering recognition as a legitimate cause by the US population.

Role of Michael Collins vs De Valera in securing independence

The Irish independence movement was defended by both de Valera and Collins, whom each played a crucial role in achieving independence. While de Valera led Sinn Fein to political victory, Collins was instrumental in achieving military success on the home front. The Easter Rising's Irish Volunteers underwent significant reform under Sinn Fein in 1917. The Dáil Éireann declared the Irish Republic the following year and established the Irish Volunteers as the official army of Ireland. Newly christened the Irish Republican Army (IRA), this initiated a difficult and prolonged struggle for independence from Britain. Collins was selected as Minister of Finance and played vital roles in the developing war of independence, serving as Adjutant General and Director of Intelligence for the IRA. From 1919 to 1921, he led a Guerrilla war against British forces and is attributed as the primary reason for Ireland's military success during the war, responsible for the assassination of 14 British officers in November 1920. The IRA played a central role in the War of Independence through attacks on British forces and infrastructure disruption. Their use of guerrilla tactics and asymmetric warfare caused significant pressure on the British military, disrupting their operations, and making it difficult to maintain control. As such, Collins' role in the war of independence as Adjutant General of the IRA was much more central than the political manoeuvring of de Valera. However, de Valera's contributions to internal and international politics indirectly influenced the success of the Irish War of Independence, exemplifying his determination to secure international recognition for Ireland. De Valera did not hesitate to send a delegation to Paris during the Paris peace conference at the end of World War 1. Although the venture was unsuccessful, he persisted and journeyed to the United States in 1919 with the goal of official recognition for the Irish Republic.



His primary mission was to gain the support of the American people and guarantee financial assistance from the Wilson administration. Despite the government refusing to help, de Valera's expedition was highly fruitful. He gathered immense public support, and his fundraising efforts raised a staggering \$5,500,000 in donations. While Collins contributed significantly to the cause of Irish independence militarily, de Valera's leadership and political coordination proved equally crucial in securing American funds.

While de Valera's trip to the USA secured over \$5 million by selling bonds to Irish Americans, Collins focused on domestic fundraising and direct financial strategies. The National Loan was a campaign to fundraise within the new Irish Free State and keep the Irish people's momentum to strive for Independence from the rule of the British Empire. The objective was to be able to help fund its various arms like the Irish Volunteers, the Dail Courts and the administrative restructuring of the government. The Campaign on home soil was launched in 1920 and was called The National Loan. This comprised of selling bonds and certificates to the people of Ireland on the promise that they would be paid back with interest once Ireland was a free state. When the British caught wind of the campaign, fundraising was quickly made illegal. Collins, who was critical in the movement as the Director of Finance for Sinn Fein, was forced underground alongside the rest of his party. Many who contributed were harassed, and some were arrested by the black and tans if found to be helping the Campaign. Collins originally aimed to raise 1 million pounds between de Valera's trip to the USA and the National Loan. Whilst Collins continued overseeing all military decisions and keeping the party running while de Valera was away, he raised £371,849, equivalent to €22 million today. In the video production of "The Democratic Revolution," Michael Doran speaks about Collins's ability to draw thousands of people into the Irish political struggle, stating that "Most of them never took up arms or saw violence," but through Collins visions, the Irish became greater sympathisers to the cause. The Irish people's donations made a valuable and essential contribution to the new democracy, with roughly 50% of the Irish population giving to the cause. In 1924 the First Dáil of Ireland approved and paid back the loans in full, including an additional 40% in interest. As such, without the determination of both de Valera and Collins, the war would have most likely been lost within its early stages, with the political and economic actions of both leaders contributing greatly to the success of the Irish War of Independence.

Conclusion

The period spanning from 1920 to 1922 during the Irish War of Independence holds immense significance in the history of Ireland. The attainment of Irish independence can be credited to the pivotal roles played by de Valera and Collins. Historians have debated the contributions of de Valera and Collins to this victory to varying extents. While the actions of both de Valera and Collins were indispensable to the cause of Irish independence, neither was without flaws or faults. De Valera has often been described as the father of the Irish nation. While his role in gathering international support was paramount to the Irish cause, he was also incredibly arrogant and self-righteous, alienating potential allies during his tour of the United States in 1920 and in his leadership of the Irish War of Independence. On the other hand, while Collins was instrumental in the military success of the republic, historians often deemed him as vacillating and overly compromising at the signing of the final negotiations, which he later deemed as "signing his own death warrant." Furthermore, as relationships between the former allies deteriorated, the historical discussion around either man's importance became polarised along ideological lines. Despite their fierce rivalry, de Valera and Collins shared an unwavering commitment to the cause of Irish independence and a mutual respect for one another during the war. This idea is most evident in a quote from de Valera stating that "It is my considered opinion that in the fullness of time history will record the greatness of Michael Collins and it will be recorded at my expense." Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that both men played equally crucial roles in securing victory for the Irish Republic in 1922. This is due to Collins' role as a strategic coordinator and in his more moderate approach to independence. Despite the controversy that surrounds it, due to Collins willingness to compromise at the treaty discussions, he was able to achieve a free Irish republic, even if it failed to live up to the expectations of de Valera. Simultaneously, de Valera's position as president of Ireland and his charismatic idealism were equally vital to the independence movement. His role in raising international support and funding was instrumental in maintaining the Irish war effort. While de Valera and Collins clashed in their vision, it is clear that Irish independence was only achievable with their combined individual contributions.



Mao Zedong was largely to blame for the failure of the Great Leap Forward. (Max Thomas)

The Great Leap Forward (1958-1962) ranks among the most disastrous campaigns in the history of modern statecraft. Unattainable industrial goals and agricultural collectivisation which can be traced back to Mao resulted in the deaths of up to thirty-million people, attributing him with significant blame. However, the tendency for historians to confine blame to individuals is oblivious to the political, economic, and social structures which enabled reckless rulers like Mao. Therefore, those in Mao's immediate leadership circle also bear responsibility, as does Mao for weaponising a homogeneity of views which prevented accurate reporting and stalled the potential reversal of failing policies.

Most importantly, Mao's ideological ambition caused impossible targets to be set, resulting in the failure of the plan. Inspired by Stalin's 'Great Turn of the late 1920s', Maoism took a distinct turn from the previous pragmatism of the First Five Year Plan (1953-1957). In a bid to 'desperately surpass the Soviet Union and the West within fifteen years', the Chairman set absurd and overly ambitious agricultural and industrial targets, such as to 'double steel production' by 1962. It was clear from the outset that these goals were doomed to fail, particularly given the rife internal backlash from central planners over the goals. Indeed, his 'close-to-utopian vision' received pushback internally within the party, but dissidents opposed to 'rash advance' were said by Mao to be a mere 'fifty metres away from the rightists.' Historian Andrew Walder argues that 'the economic reasoning behind the Great Leap Forward was flawed and would not have achieved its lofty goals under any circumstances'. Empowered by a new, obstinate brand of communism, Mao was willingly ignorant to these concerns, accusing any dissidents of 'pouring cold water on the enthusiasm of the people'. His ideological recklessness in constructing the Great Leap Forward also represented a divergence from previous CCP pragmatism. Chinese communism was previously a 'poly-centric phenomenon [...] adapted to suit each region', yet now became 'dangerously dogmatic' with a 'one size fits all' approach. Hence, Mao's insistence on unattainable goals from the outset doomed the Leap to fail.

Mao's blame is exacerbated by his personal involvement with egregious agricultural and industrial policy. Mao's 'Four Pests' campaign "was a sort of Maoist DIY subsisted for a health service", negatively affecting agricultural yields due to insect proliferation. Mao's other direct command was that China had to increase steel production through backyard furnaces, which rid households of "productive, essential objects". These two policies were largely contradictory insofar as 'the melting down of pots and pans for iron meant they were not available to bang to frighten off the sparrows'. This new brand of Maoism was enforced through an intricate system of propaganda, with slogans such as "to hide one nail [from the backyard furnace campaign] is to hide one counter-revolutionary". Mao's insistence on the continuation of the policy despite reports of failure also contribute to his liability. By 1959, it became apparent that 'real national income and wages declined, as did living standards.' Mao's unqualified scientific theories of agriculture, such as 'deep plowing, close planting, reforestation, and the economies of scale made possible by enthusiastic massed labor power' began to fail. In the face of these tragic reports, 'the Chairman was unabashed', and a dangerous brand of Chinese communism had firmly taken root. Crucially, Mao was also conscious of these failures, reportedly exclaiming to local cadres 'What is the use of exaggerating?!' when presented with conflated statistics, however he 'seemed to care less and less for the consequences that might spring from his own erratic utterances'. Thus, Mao's personal involvement in policy development, and forceful continuation of these policies once it was evident they began to fail contribute to his blame.



Some historians object to Mao bearing responsibility because local cadres misrepresented statistics such that Mao was unaware of the true tragedies that occurred. Indeed, reports 'had [falsely] declared that China's wheat output exceeded that of the United States', and "euphoric production claims" were widespread in reporting. However Mao was complicit 'deliberately falsifying records [...] to have an excuse for further exploiting people'. Hence, this falsification of information prevented the reversal of stalled policies, proving that 'the messianic, political nature of the Leap meant that it had a big built-in exaggeration factor'. That said, there is an argument that this misinformation came from a political structure which he actively fostered. That is, when provincial bosses "stayed silent when asked to cough up more food, Mao needed his standby; terror, to steel his machine." Mao's weaponisation of dissent within the party during the Great Leap was also notable, such as how officials were "condemned and published as 'Rightist anti-party cliques' ". Historian Michael Wood argues that Mao's "supreme ideological authority", a continuation of "political ideas at the centre of the Chinese tradition" allowed the continuation of policies which were disastrous in practice. Additionally, "there was plenty of ambiguity in Mao's stance" when it came to cadres reporting statistics, which meant that they were often fearful to report the truth. Historian Jonathan Fenby is particularly scathing, arguing the failure of the Leap stemmed "directly from one's man to admit reality or criticism and from the reluctance of those around him to risk sharing the fate of Peng Dehuai". Thus, the political structure leading officials created allowed him to remain uncaring to failures of the Great Leap Forward are largely responsible.

Ultimately, historiography which pegs responsibility on sole individuals is broadly oblivious to the social, political, and economic systems which facilitated policy disasters. Although Mao yielded immense power and therefore blame, allowing sole individuals to be blamed is unnuanced analysis and allows responsibility for these events to be avoided. Therefore, Mao was largely responsible for the failures of the Leap, but only to the degree to which the political system in which he ruled enabled him to enact these tragedies.




Figure 1: Flag of China

America's success as a nation is due almost entirely to lucky timing around WW1 (Nic Warne)


We exist in a period of incredible growth and relative stability, where after the most destructive war in human history, the US rose to power as the global leader. A leader that has implemented democratic beliefs around the world, and with the largest economy on the planet with an astounding \$23 trillion in 2021 according to worlddata.info, the real question is, how did the USA achieve such power?

America's territorial expansion; American perspective

There is no doubt that the USA had achieved such economic success in the years before the Great War. But in order to understand how the United States gained such influence in the modern world, we must first look back to the birth of America. America's great expansionism begins with the appointment of an antislavery activist and Republican politician, William H. Seward as Secretary of State from 1861 to 1869. His 'American Empire' and economic independence ideologies were adopted quickly in the Western world. On March 29, 1867, the purchase of Alaska from Russia for \$ 7.2 million (Roughly \$148 Billion in today's money), known as "Seward's Folly" or "Walrussia" would be one of Russia's biggest mistakes and was very beneficial for America's economy in the coming years, followed by Seward stating after his successful purchase, "all prosperous nations must expand".

Shortly after the success of purchasing Alaska, Seward made several proposals to purchase Greenland and Iceland from Denmark in the years of 1867-1902 that were prevented due to the Legislative Branch/Congress preventing America from buying them. This led to anti-imperialist ideologies beginning to form, with people fearing America was getting too power-hungry and getting too involved with world conflicts. The opposition to American Imperialism, known as the American Anti-Imperialist League, was not yet proposed until June 1898, following the American annexation of the Philippines.

The aftermath of the Spanish-American War in 1898 saw a new wave of politicians who successfully advocated the virtues of American territorial expansion that quickly defeated the Anti-Imperialist League in all public debates. A Treaty was signed which led to the cease-fire agreement in its brief conflict over Cuba and the Philippines known as the Treaty of Paris (1898). The treaty included the Spanish handing over the acquisition of many territories in the Western Pacific including, Puerto Rico, the Philippines and Guam. Over the following years, America would successfully overthrow the Hawaiian government (1898) and effectively annex Wake Island (1899) and American Samoa (1900). A few years later, the US took control of the Panama Canal Zone (1903) which gave them full naval control of North America and sent troops to occupy the Dominican Republic (1916). And with this, the American Empire was born.



"We cannot always do what is best, but we can do what is practical at the time."

— William McKinley

American influence in the 20th century

The USA's vast expansion of its industrial plant and output began decades prior to WW1 in 1914, but it can be argued that their boundless resources and an ocean's separation from a war that crippled the great powers at the time, but the USA sold supplies to the non-partisan sides and joined when it felt best, becoming a key intervention that was a decisive factor in WW1's end. However, the United States was a neutral party during the first two and a half years of the war. An economic boom came essentially from supplies and exports to allies in Europe. The total number of U.S. exports grew from \$2.4 billion in 1913 to \$6.2 billion in 1917. America's neutrality with powers such as Britain and France led to economic expansion. Trade with the 2 countries almost tripled between 1914 and 1916, whilst trade with Germany was cut by over 90 per cent. This caused an economic boom for the U.S., but great European powers were slowly being affected by enemy blockades.

America's influence as a nation however was the international organisation dedicated to resolving international disputes and providing security for its members, the League of Nations was created in 1920 by Woodrow Wilson following the conflict of WW1. The league included Italy, France, Switzerland, the U.K. and many more, however, the United States was never a member. With the introduction of the Bretton Woods system in July 1944, the international currency exchange and trade was pegged to the U.S. dollar system of currency and was in turn pegged to the price of gold. The Bretton Woods System's main principal goal was to create an efficient foreign exchange system, preventing competitive decentralization towards one form of currency and promoting international economic growth. This in turn showed the true scale in which the U.S. had influenced the modern world of trade, human rights, defence and international order, democracy and setting an example for other countries to follow.

Interpretation: how war changed the economy for the better.

Although it has been mentioned America's economy was on a steady incline prior to WW1, the economy appeared to be stuck in a recession, World War 1 swiftly put an end to the recession and according to the National Bureau of Economic Research, the total cost of World War 1 to the United States was approximately \$32 Billion, or 52% of gross national product at the time between 1914 to 1918. This economic boom was a significant breakthrough in the United States and solidified its position as a world power, as European powers had been purchasing U.S. goods that had been manufactured even before America decided to join the war. This 44-month economic conversion gave the United States an upper hand, and it wasn't until 1917 when they had reached their peak, did they join to fight against an already economically struggling nation.

It was clear that WW1 was good for the American economy and people back in 1918, however in today's world, with American military presence growing in the Asia-Pacific region, as of the past few years, it seems we could be in a new century of a leading superpower, China. It has been said that The Chinese Century is well underway, and Global order has again been threatened by another major superpower with communist ideologies, with reference to the Cold War. We are entering a new era where a new global leader may very well be calling the shots with very high ambitions not far from now and many argue that China will surpass the United States not only economically but militarily by 2050, according to LSE Blogs.

Conclusion

Over the 20th century of significant growth, America has had many successes, largely due to their geographical location and common world-power allies. However, America's modernisation and success have likely been a result of their role during WW1. Firstly, America had already gained a useful amount of territory prior to WW1 and their decision to export stock with Britain and France would ultimately "sell the war". The Central Powers stood no chance against an economically booming superpower whilst struggling to uphold their own economy which ultimately led to the conclusion of America was a 'foreign Western power'. Nowadays, the United States is renowned for implementing democratic beliefs and acting as the world's police, however, America has also had a major impact on the media and global trade system. But as of recently, the global order has been threatened once again by an uprising superpower that is very capable of surpassing America. But what will this mean for our future?



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